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ABSTRACT 
 
People rely on polls and other representations of public opinion in the media to update 
their political cognitions and behaviors. However, individuals’ preexisting beliefs can color how 
they perceive opinion reports and lead them to cherry-pick evidence that is congenial when 
presented with multiple options. Such biases result in distorted perceptions of public opinion, 
declining trust in journalism, and political polarization. Moreover, in today’s unprecedentedly 
polarized and contentious information environment, individuals often encounter contradictory 
messages from digital data-journalism and numerical evidence is regularly critiqued, fact-
checked, or debunked on reasonable or unreasonable grounds. In such a cacophonous context, 
individuals’ biases in information processing might amplify. Through three large national survey 
experiments and one smaller study, this dissertation examines how news consumers’ attributes, 
the content of opinion reports, and patterns of media coverage can trigger or mitigate biases in 
public perceptions. In the first part, I document that individuals process reports of public opinion 
in biased ways when they evaluate issue polls, election polls in competitive contexts, and diverse 
metrics of public opinion. I also show that their levels of knowledge and education moderate the 
extent of these biases. In the second part, I find that the corrective potential of three journalistic 
remedies to reduce these biases are minimal and contingent upon individuals’ education levels. I 
discuss implications for political polarization, trust in the press and representatives, and 
democratic politics at large.
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Public opinion reports, broadly construed, constitute one of the most fundamental 
information flows in American political communication. Citizens and political elites rely on 
quantitative reports of public opinion to update their beliefs about what people want (McLeod, 
Kosicki, and McLeod, 1994). Traditional public opinion polls have long dominated news 
coverage (Patterson, 2005). However, more recently, digital media and data journalism have 
evolved and alternative quantifications such as polling averages, forecasting models, analyses of 
social media “buzz,” and prediction markets started to occupy increasingly more space in 
mainstream news outlets. Hence, there are a great number and variety of metrics purporting to 
provide systematic representations of public opinion. Of course, not every public opinion report 
is truly systematic; not all of them have robust methodological quality (cf. Baker et al., 2013). 
Moreover, there is an extensive amount of punditry, blogging, and both expert and partisan 
commentary over public opinion evidence whereby different media sources and actors attempt to 
frame the results by attacking their credibility with or without objective reasons. In such an 
information ecosystem, how people process evidence about public opinion and its coverage 
becomes crucial. As people rely on polls and other representations of public opinion in the media 
to update their political cognitions and behaviors, what they make of public opinion reports 
constitutes a critical question.  
In this dissertation, I theorize public opinion reports as a social scientific and systematic 
evidence about public opinion and examine how ordinary individuals process these messages in
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communicative environments. Through a series of survey experiments collected from late 2014 
to late 2016, I measure individuals’ reactions to hypothetical news reports about public opinion. I 
show that individuals’ preexisting beliefs, such as their party identification, candidate preference, 
or issue positions, can color how they make sense of these messages. I show that their 
perceptions of the credibility of the evidence are mostly driven by the favorability of the results 
that public opinion reports communicate. I further show that this biased processing can lead them 
to cherry-pick evidence that is congenial when presented with multiple messages in competitive 
information environments. In particular, I suggest that the cacophony and polarization of 
contemporary news coverage might amplify these biases.  
Specifically, according to the expectations from motivated reasoning theory, this biased 
processing could be stronger for individuals with greater sophistication – individual 
characteristics such as education level, political knowledge, methodological knowledge, and 
numeracy. Contrary to the knowledge-deficit models which purport to claim that biases are due 
lack of adequate knowledge, I expect that people with greater cognitive capacity and 
sophistication will engage in more biased processing. This is because people with greater 
sophistication are more equipped to counter-argue against new information that is unfavorable to 
them (Taber and Lodge, 2013; Kahan et al., 2013). I discuss how motivated processing may 
prove to be democratically deleterious because it can result in distorted perceptions of public 
opinion, declining trust in journalism, and political polarization. However, there are potential 
journalistic strategies in news reports that can mitigate these biases by making the objective 
methodological quality of the evidence a more salient criterion in people’s evaluations of public 
opinion reports. These range from adequate presentation of methodological details, providing 
more data with better explanation and disclosure of logic, or providing expert commentaries on 
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methodological aspects of the public opinion reports. 
In the Contextual Background subsection below, I first provide a description of public 
opinion reports in American political communication and discuss their importance. Then I 
introduce the basic communication model (the interpretative framework) that I will employ in 
studying public perceptions of public opinion reports and review prior literature. Following this I 
go into details about the three parts of the communication model, which are (1) aspects of public 
opinion reports, (2) their media coverage, and (3) individuals’ psychological characteristics. In 
aspects of public opinion reports, I focus on the diversity of metrics, their results, methodological 
quality, and their potential influence on what people make of public opinion reports. In media 
coverage of public opinion reports, I focus on how source cues, reporting of methodological 
details, contextualized-explanatory reporting, and expert and partisan punditry in the news media 
could further influence news consumers’ evaluations. Finally, in the audience characteristics 
section, I focus on individuals’ motivations, cognitive heuristics in information processing, and 
their differences in political sophistication that might be consequential for their perceptions of 
public opinion reports. I discuss how these different sets of factors mentioned above could 
influence the evaluative mechanisms undergirding individuals processing of public opinion 
reports.  
In the Theoretical Background subsection that follows the Contextual Background, I 
discuss the theory of motivated reasoning, the logic of corrective attempts, and related literature 
to explicate the theoretical approach I will take in formulating expectations about individuals’ 
evaluations of public opinion reports that they encounter. This section shows why motivated 
reasoning is important for understanding how people process public opinion reports and reviews 
possible journalistic strategies that could reduce biases. 
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Finally, in the Overview of Empirical Studies section, I introduce the outline of specific 
studies and how they complement each other in examining the nature of motivated reasoning in 
perceptions of public opinion reports as well as the corrective potential of journalistic strategies 
to overcome these biases. 
Contextual Background  
Why Public Opinion Reports are Important 
The relationship between public opinion and public opinion reports is mutually 
constitutive, and this underscores the prominence of public opinion reports. What does a 
mutually constitutive relationship look like in this context? We should first situate and define 
public opinion reports before conceptualizing their role and importance in democratic politics. 
Public opinion could simply be defined as what the public as a collective entity tends to prefer or 
believe in (Herbst, 1993; Patterson, 2005). Yet, this notion is not necessarily the only way we 
can define public opinion. Understandably, public opinion is a very fuzzy concept, and its very 
definition is a political phenomenon and deliberation as well. Although there could be many 
approaches to defining public opinion and its dimensions, one practical approach is looking at 
what reifies public opinion as an informational entity in our daily political talk and political 
news. From this measurement and pragmatic perspective, public opinion is simply what public 
opinion reports show, or claim to show, as the quantitative, systematic, and summative evidence 
about society’s preferences and beliefs (e.g. Herbst 1993; Bishop 2004). They could range from 
traditional polls (issue polls, election polls, and presidential approval ratings) to more recent 
quantifications such as polling averages, forecasting models, analyses of social media buzz and 
political prediction markets. These different types of reports will be further discussed in detail in 
the following section. 
 5 
Aside from this straightforward definition, understanding the complex web of processes 
and actors involved in the production of public opinion reports is also necessary for our 
understanding of the importance of public opinion reports. While for news consumers public 
opinion reports are finished and well-packaged end-products ready to consume, the reports have 
actually very complex processes and multiple actors involved in their production. Academics, 
polling industry, and the media (journalists and media sponsored polling) interact iteratively to 
produce and disseminate public opinion reports (cf. McLeod, Kosicki, and McLeod, 1994). In 
this dynamic system, public opinion is constantly and iteratively conceptualized, measured, 
analyzed, and packaged as ready-to-consume summative reports which are disseminated, 
critiqued, aggregated, and even re-analyzed by a variety of actors. This complex web of actors 
and processes reifies public opinion in the form of public opinion reports. 
As public opinion reports solidify the abstract notion of public opinion (Gallup and Rae, 
1968), they emerge as one of the social sciences’ most notable contributions to public debate, 
deliberation, and its political psyche. The concept of public opinion lies at the heart of 
representative democracy because this system consolidates its legitimacy by deliberating on and 
executing the preferences of the society at large (cf. Gallup and Rae, 1968). “The general will” 
of the people is a central concept in classical normative politics (Rousseau, 1762), which the 
public opinion reports purport to measure. To what extent this function is achieved is the subject 
of considerable philosophical debate, but the main point here is that this is one of the major 
principles of representative democracies. The quantitative evidence that public opinion reports 
generate are presented in news reports (for ordinary citizens’ and political elites’ consumption) 
as well as in technical-academic papers (mostly for political elites’ and academics’ consumption) 
as the most systematic evidence of public opinion (McLeod, Kosicki, and McLeod, 1994). As 
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opposed to individual stories, anecdotes, specific events, protests and the like, polls and other 
quantifications of public opinion arguably provide the most systematic, aggregated, quantified, 
and reliable evidence.1 
Public opinion reports are crucial for all actors in representative politics – ordinary 
citizens, the political elite, the news media, and the democratic system’s legitimacy at large. 
People rely on these reports to update their political beliefs and preferences (Moy and Rinke, 
2012). People also have attitudes about polls and incorporate them to their decision making 
processes although they might be critical about their value (e.g. Kim et al., 2011). Similarly, 
citizens and NGOs pressure political elites in policymaking decisions with the poll results 
(Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). On another front, journalists find polls instrumentally useful about 
providing information in covering public opinion in their news stories (e.g. Weaver, 2009; 
Weiss, Singer, and Endreny 1988; Wichmann and Brettschneider, 2009). Finally, at the macro 
level, each public opinion report, both methodologically and symbolically, constitutes an 
approximation of the electoral system in which people’s preferences in elections are counted in a 
systematic way to select representatives or make policy decisions in the case of referenda (cf. 
Herbst, 1991). That is, each public opinion report is actually a symbolic nano-scale manifestation 
of official elections and referenda and the associated feelings of having been participated in 
democratic decision-making. 
Aside from recognizing both the normative and pragmatic importance of public opinion 
reports, there are also some legitimate reasons to doubt the role that public opinion reports 
occupy within the broader universe of democratic politics. There is another vast and closely 
related literature interrogating the meaning and importance of public opinion reports with critical 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, there are also other types of polls such as push polls or strategic polls by special interest groups, 
which are not designed to truly represent public opinion for the maximum public interest. 
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eyes. Scholars as early as Herbert Blumler (1948) worried that relying on polls alone fails to 
capture the dynamic nature of public opinion. Similarly, Bourdieu (1979) asserted that 
aggregation of every individual’s answer to survey questions make public opinion an artefact of 
measurement. More recently, some scholars such as Bishop went as far as stating that collective 
preferences of the public cannot be captured at all by public opinion polls (2005). In his book 
titled The Illusion of Public Opinion, Bishop raised issue with how respondents to public opinion 
surveys provided different answers that seemed to be sensitive to the methodological differences 
in survey design and administration (also see research on non-attitudes; e.g. Zaller, 1992). Yet, 
other scholars did not agree with the evidence presented in this view as an indication that public 
opinion is just a complete social-methodological construct and hence an illusion, because such 
evidence still provides useful and predictive information about public preferences (e.g. Page, 
2007). Overall, these scholars posed critical questions and issues about the validity of polls and 
their capacity of reifying or representing public opinion.  
On another front of criticism, scholars focused on the practical problems that quantitative 
reports could have on democratic politics. Herbst (1991; 1993) pointed out how public opinion is 
constructed as “numbered voices,” as they constitute a rationalization process via quantification 
of citizens’ preferences. Herbst argued the processes of producing and disseminating quantitative 
public opinion reports could hinder other meaningful ways of political participation and 
deliberation, because they would create a false sense of deliberation and meaningful 
representation (1993).2 Similarly, Cappella and Jamieson (1997) asserted that polls fuel a 
substantial portion of strategic news framing. Strategic framing in news coverage focuses on 
tangential issues about the horse race and candidates while taking away appropriate levels of 
                                                 
2 Rousseau had also pointed out that the general will is not the mere cancelled out aggregation of the preferences of 
all citizens (1762). 
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attention of the press and the public on the discussion of substantive political issues. Finally, 
there is also the question of whether political elites should always respond what current public 
preferences demand, which emerges within the longstanding debate regarding the balance 
between populism and elitism in political decision-making processes (e.g. Hayward, 1996). 
These are indeed legitimate criticisms, although we cannot have conclusive judgments 
about them because of the larger philosophical and political debates about the workings of the 
society that cannot be exhaustively studied in single studies or left confined to the 
epistemological biases of only one discipline. Hence, recognizing and “acknowledging” these 
criticisms should not be read as a condescending dismissing of the broader ideas they assume 
and perpetuate about the overarching role and significance of public opinion in democratic 
politics. 
Henceforth, while these philosophical, sociological, and political criticisms are 
legitimate, they do not make public opinion reports and their reception by the public a trivial 
phenomenon. Instead, these criticisms contribute to the central importance of public opinion 
reports by nurturing a healthy communicative discourse about their role in our society. In this 
dissertation, I assert quantitative public opinion reports as scientific and systematic reports about 
public opinion. This is a principled, theoretical, and normative assumption that I uphold and 
build upon. Based on this premise, I employ a science communication perspective which 
necessitates an understanding of public opinion reports as the best available systematic and 
scientific evidence at a given time while not necessarily ignoring their limitations in 
methodological, epistemological, sociological significance. A basic tenet of science is that it is 
tentative, it always has some methodological issues, and its conclusions are based on 
assumptions. Another basic tenet of science is that it is always open to theoretical and 
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philosophical questioning of its epistemology. Hence, the methodological and critical debates 
about public opinion reports, therefore, add to the importance of public opinion reports in the 
broad public discourse that reify democratic deliberation (cf. Jamieson, 2018). 
Public Perceptions and Communication of Public Opinion Reports 
How ordinary individuals makes sense of public opinion reports matters, because their 
perceptions might be different from what the report presents to them. Unlike the old and overly 
simplistic “hypodermic needle” models of communication, today we have a more sophisticated 
understanding of media effects in which the complexity of communication is recognized: 
Individuals’ agency during their consumption of media messages is acknowledged, such that 
individuals are conceptualized as active agents who negotiate and create meaning in their unique 
readings of public opinion evidence (cf. Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This is true for the 
communication of public opinion reports as well. In this section, I will (1) examine the prior 
work on this domain; (2) outline my approach, which lays out the major theoretical components 
in communication of public opinion; and (3) discuss why I focus on individuals’ perceived 
credibility of public opinion reports as the focus of analysis. 
What do we know about public reactions to public opinion reports?  Since the 1930s, 
scholars have examined the cognitive and behavioral consequences of being exposed to poll 
results. The vast literature could be theoretically grouped into four categories along two 
dimensions of temporal order (predictive vs outcome variable) and type of construct (cognitive 
vs behavioral): In some studies, poll reports were used to predict other constructs and in others, 
where polls were the outcome variable of interest (e.g. Lavrakas, Holley, and Miller 1991; 
Traugott and Kang 2000). On the other hand, whereas some studied constructs are about political 
cognition (mental constructs such as attitudes and beliefs), others are behavioral (turnout, 
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voting).3 This cognitive vs behavioral distinction may not be as helpful as the first distinction 
(i.e. predictive variable vs outcome variable) because most of the studies conceptualize voting 
preference as a political behavior and study both cognitive and behavioral components together. 
However, studies usually find differing results (significant vs null effects) for cognitive vs 
behavioral consequences of polling exposure (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995). Hence, this 
four-way categorization helps us recognize the diversity of political constructs that public 
opinion reports relate to and the varying ways that they might interact with each other.  
The first set of studies, mostly examining polls as predictive variable for political 
cognition and behavior, built on social psychological theories such as social conformity (Asch 
1951) and spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) which assert that people are highly sensitive 
to what other people in their social surroundings or in their society at large think. It is more 
comfortable to be consistent with what the majority of other people prefer, because, 
evolutionarily, this is an adaptive social strategy to survive in group dynamics. A similar 
mechanism is observed in citizens’ preference expression, according to the spiral of silence 
theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), in which people choose to remain quiet in anticipation of their 
perceptions that they hold unpopular views. 
Polling information provides a direct account of what others prefer; as Mutz (1998) 
argues, people increasingly rely on media in their perceptions of mass collectivities. Hence, in 
this category of scholarly work, researchers worked to tease out the individual level 
consequences of poll exposure, such as the bandwagon effect, according to which people vote for 
the winning candidate or issue position for conformity and strategic behavior ("strategic voting” 
                                                 
3 Aside from these individual level phenomena, studies also examined institutional level constructs in relation to 
polls, such as elite responsivity and policy change (De Vreese and Semetko 2002). There is a large literature on elite 
responsivity (Achen 1977; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Gilens 2012) but this topic is beyond the scope of the 
dissertation which focuses on public perceptions – hence the individual level phenomena. 
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in the sense of reassigning their vote to keep it from being wasted by casting it for the candidate 
who is expected to lose anyway) reasons of being on the winning side (e.g. Nadeau, Cloutier, and 
Guay 1993; Sonck and Loosveldt 2010).4  For example, Nadeau, Cloutier, and Guay (2013) 
found around a 6% change in support for popular issue position. In a similar non-election 
context, Sonck and Loosveldt (2010) have shown polling exposure effects persisting as far as 
three months. As a notable finding in the field, McAlister and Studlar (1991) found evidence of 
bandwagon effects in British election across the years, and no evidence of the underdog effect. 
Similarly, Blais, Gidengil & Nevitte (2006) found in Canadian elections that polls influenced 
expectations about the election as well as people’s voting preferences. Other research showed 
that polling questions and the dissemination of their results could even have agenda-setting 
effects by changing candidates’ evaluation criteria (e.g. Hardy and Jamieson, 2005). More recent 
studies continue to examine these relationships and find that polls influence turnout (Vannette 
and Westwood, 2016) and different levels of support in poll findings can change the effect size 
of bandwagon voting (Rothschild and Malhotra, 2014). 
While scholars find notable effects of polling exposure on people’s voting decisions or 
other preferences in issues, we should be cautious about making overarching claims about the 
significance of these effects. Meta-analytical and review studies have noted that most of these 
effects, especially bandwagon and underdog effects, are inconsistent – with sometimes 
significant or insignificant effects or effects in reverse directions (Moy and Rinke 2012). It is not 
clear whether lab experiments or field experiments which have differing methodologies factor 
into the inconsistent body of literature. Additionally, there is extensive prior research for 
                                                 
4 A counterfactual to this is the underdog effects, according to which people might also vote for the losing candidate 
or issue position as a reaction to the fact that the candidate or position is not favorable. 
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decades, and publication bias – reporting studies that find effects (Franco, Malhotra, and 
Simonovits, 2014) – likely plagues this field as well. 
On the other hand, there is relatively little research on polls – and public opinion reports 
at large – as outcome variables of interest at the individual level. Most of the research on this 
domain is descriptive, looking at interest in polls, knowledge about polls, and trust in polls for 
population level statistics (such as Pew reports) and trends over time. For example, Traugott and 
Kang (2000) found that while most ordinary citizens think that polls are important, they are not 
adequately knowledgeable about the methodology of polls, such as sampling, margin of error, 
and question wording. Kim et al. (2011) found that trust in polls in general decreased over the 
years. Journalists’ attitudes toward polls reflected anxiety about numbers, according to a study 
by Curtin and Maier (2001). Exceptions exist, such as Tsfati (2001), in which the author 
examined the influence of people’s immediate social surroundings on their perceptions of polls. 
 Where do we go from here given the literature on how polls relate to political cognitions 
and behaviors? With the lens of my contextual and theoretical approach, I identify three main 
limitations in this literature that should be addressed. First, whereas scholars have focused on 
outcome variables such as attitude change or turnout and voting behavior, they have not yet 
addressed systematically the psychological mechanisms underpinning public perceptions. In-
depth psychological investigations are not non-existent (e.g. Tsfati, 2001); but they mostly focus 
on other theoretical phenomena such as hostile media perceptions and third-person effects – 
which are not the evaluations people have of polls. Investigations of how people perceive 
opinion reports, in and of themselves, with a focus on constructs such as credibility assessments, 
are needed, especially in an environment of methodological issues, the polarized media 
environment, and election prediction failures that create a “polling-in-crisis” consciousness in the 
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public discourse. The current dissertation zeroes in on the intermediary process of perceived 
credibility of public opinion reports to advance our understanding of how people process the 
reports themselves at the immediate moment they encounter them.  
Second, previous literature mostly ignored the cacophonous and competitive information 
environment in which people encounter public opinion reports, which is unrealistic given that 
people get exposed to conflicting messages (cf. Chong and Druckman, 2007). Most research is 
experimental with a highly simplistic set up in which people are given vignettes or hypothetical 
news reports about a single public opinion poll result. Unlike the distilled experimental designs, 
individuals typically encounter public opinion reports in a highly competitive information 
ecosystem. Most experimental studies focused on singular media messages and failed to capture 
the dynamic aspects of journalistic reality where multiple polls offer conflicting results, have 
differing levels of objective quality, and are presented with expert and partisan comments. 
Considering these factors in a realistic manner is crucial for more external and ecological validity 
in our investigations. Hence all aspects of public opinion reports and aspects of the media 
coverage of public opinion reports should be considered in a holistic approach when we attempt 
to study the communication of public opinion reports in more sophisticated ways, by taking into 
account the abundance of messages in the media and how media covers them. 
 A third limitation in the previous literature is that it focused exclusively on the study of 
traditional polls (either election or issue polls) and has not explored the variety of public opinion 
reports that have proliferated over the last decade: polling averages, forecasting models, election 
prediction markets, big data analysis reports of social media and search-engine contents (cf. 
Traugott, 2009; Hillygus, 2011; Pasek, 2015). Expanding our understanding of public 
perceptions of traditional polls to the informational diversity of digital data is of paramount 
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significance, both theoretically and in terms of capturing the ecological validity of current digital 
news media. It is important to be mindful of the diverse forms of public opinion reports and their 
increasing prevalence in order to investigate how ordinary individuals make sense of them in 
competitive settings. 
The Communication Model of Public Opinion Reports  
 
Public opinion reports are fundamentally about communicating public opinion to an 
audience, hence, we need to consider the three sets of factors in a basic communication model: 
the message, the way message is delivered, and audience characteristics (what, how, who). Each 
of these aspects should influence the communicative process and how public opinion reports are 
understood. These are (1) the factors about the message itself, which are about the aspects of 
public opinion reports and (2) the factors about media coverage (the ways public opinion reports 
are delivered to the ordinary news readers), and (3) the psychological factors involved in 
information processing (the ways people react to the first two components). This tripartite model 
on understanding public perceptions of public opinion reports is illustrated in Figure 1. I position 
the three sets of factors in terms of temporal logic of communication, not in terms of importance. 
In the innermost layer, there are reports’ characteristics. Then, in the second layer, the media 
covers these original public opinion results. Finally the third layer represents how ordinary 
citizens rely on what media offers to them and includes audience characteristics 
Aspects of the Message – Public Opinion Reports 
In general, public opinion reports communicate metrics designed to represent public 
opinion in various ways. The two sets of characteristics of public opinion reports that are most 
crucial for public perceptions are the diverse types and results of quantitative evidence and the 
methodological quality differences between them. 
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Figure 1. Communication of Public Opinion Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diverse Types and Results of Public Opinion Reports. The meaning, representation, and 
presentation of public opinion is undergoing an important structural transformation due to the 
substantive technological innovation that has been going on over the last three decades since the 
onset of the Internet. Polling in the digital age brings new features (Goidel, 2011). For one, there 
are new types of data. What counts as “voice” and “opinion” now includes new data types that 
are not confined to the traditional polls asking a person to choose one of the response options of 
a survey question, but also includes things like a shared comment in a Facebook account and the 
aggregated quantitative analyses of such social media behaviors (Ellison & Boyd, 2013; Schober, 
Pasek, Guggenheim, Lampe, & Conrad, 2016) which are then analyzed and presented as a form 
of public opinion evidence. Alternatively, today’s public opinion could include more “enhanced” 
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and “sophisticated” data that integrates many of the same things - such as polling averages (cf. 
Jackman, 2005; Traugott 2009) -  or many of the different types of things – such as election 
forecasting models that integrate historical patterns, economic data, and the like into the 
estimate. (cf. Pasek, 2015).  
  Moreover, this structural change of public opinion has not only been confined to the data 
(a survey response vs. a Facebook post vs. an election prediction market score), but also involves 
the way data are collected, analyzed, and presented in today’s digital and data journalism. A new 
technological infrastructure has emerged that is characterized by smartphones and other mobile 
Internet-enabled mobile technologies which have advanced the new data collection efforts to be 
more computerized, digital, and multi-mode (Couper 2000); and this, in turn, was followed by 
diverse analytical tools and journalistic coverage in sites like FiveThirtyEight, Pollster, 
RealClearPolitics, and the New York Times Upshot (Butterworth 2014). Moreover, these new 
metrics are not only confined to data journalism blogs; they are increasingly integrated in 
mainstream news reporting. For example CNN embeds polling averages and prediction market 
odds when they release new poll results,5 while the NYT Upshot forecasts included real-time 
updates to their estimates. CNN had even a smartphone application with pushed notifications and 
alerts about “important” changes in the results during the 2016 election campaign (Personally, I 
experienced one case during 2016 election period in which I got up to the noise of a push alert 
from this application, after which I muted it for good).6 These examples show that mainstream 
news coverage has adopted these new quantifications of public opinion and especially thanks to 
the novel technological aspects of the media. In-depth interviews with journalists conducted by 
                                                 
5 <http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/11/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-presidential-poll/> 
6 <http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2016/09/12/presidential-forecast-
updates/newsletter.html?emc=edit_up_20160912&nl=upshot&nlid=75723958&te=1>  
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Toff (2017) also provided supportive evidence for this conjecture when he found that journalists 
are increasingly relying on polling aggregators instead of getting their hands directly on singular 
traditional poll reports. 
Table 1. A Typology of Public Opinion Reports 
Self-report data  Behavioral data  Hybrid data 
     
Polls 
Traditional survey 
 Search-term analytics 
Reports about the trends on 
Google searches regarding the 
candidates or issues 
 Forecasting models 
Integrates polls, economic 
indicators, and other metrics to 
form predictions 
 
e.g. ABC-Washington Post 
poll, CNN/ORC poll 
  
e.g. Associated Press Google 
search trend analytics 
  
e.g. FiveThirtyEight PollsPlus, 
PrimaryModel.com 
NYT Upshot 
     
Polling Averages  Analyses of social media buzz  Election prediction markets 
Aggregates and weights results 
of many surveys 
 
 
e.g. RealClearPolitics, CNN 
poll of polls, HuffingtonPost 
Pollster, NYT Upshot 
 Reports about the trends in what 
people post and talk in social 
media about the candidates and 
issues 
 
e.g. Twitter and Facebook 
trends, hashtags, USA Today 
Facebook Barometer, AP Twitter 
trend, Twitterwonk Model 
 Models that analyze the 
political betting market trends 
for the candidates 
 
e.g.Iowa Prediction Markets, 
Predictit, Intrade, CNN 
political prediction market, 
Predictwise  
     
Notes. Three types of quantifying and representing mass opinion data are presented with their different 
forms and important examples for each. Methodological distinctions (self-report vs behavioral) made in 
Schober et al. (2016) and Pasek (2015) have contributed to the idea of this categorization by the author(s). 
 
Categorizing these new metrics is helpful in terms of thinking about the nature of data 
generation, making sense of the diversity and distinctions as well as how they relate to each 
other. An examination of the media environment resulted in the following major quantification 
types that in some way represent the 2016 horse race: polls, polling averages, search-term and 
social media analytics, forecasting models, and prediction markets (See Table 1). They could be 
categorized into three major types of public opinion metrics based on the nature of data they rely 
on: self-report data (polls and polling averages that aggregate and weight them), behavioral data 
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(social media, search-term, or other media content analyses that process user generated content), 
and finally hybrid data that combines self-report and behavioral indicators (forecasting models 
and election prediction markets which involve more complex data generated from diverse 
parameters).  
These different metrics have both common and distinguishing features. Compared to 
traditional polls, the new forms of quantification of public opinion are almost always presented 
on the online digital (the Internet) platforms instead of paper, TV, or radio. The Internet 
environment provides a range of affordances that differ from those on other platforms. The 
Internet-based reports have much more interactive visuals, allowing news readers to engage with 
graphics and data (c.f. Wang et al., 2018; Cairo, 2013). The public opinion reports on online 
platforms are also more dynamic and integrative, such that they can provide real-time updates 
with new incoming information (e.g. the NYT Upshot, FiveThirtyEight). Also, Internet-based 
public opinion reports are more immersive, because they reach out to more people during their 
daily lives (e.g. incidental exposure) through social media and mobile communication devices 
such as smartphones (e.g. phone apps and push notifications, see Kuru et al., 2017; Dunaway, 
Paul, and Searles, 2016). We know this because according to Pew statistics, as of 2016, only two 
out of ten Americans get their news from print newspapers (Mitchell et al., 2016). See Figure 2 
for examples of these reports. 
At the same time, each of these reports provides substantially different information and 
varies in terms of its representativeness of the population, accuracy in capturing opinion, and 
relevance to the specific political event – the presidential election. For example, “polls show 
what people are thinking now, whereas the prediction markets are what people think will happen 
in the future” (Jackson, 2016). Whereas probability-based polls are representative of the U.S 
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population, analyses of social media are confined to people who have social media accounts 
(Schober et al. 2016). Such distinctions between these new tools matter, and they complicate the 
quantification of public opinion due to their diverse nature. They have fundamentally different 
methodological underpinnings and the meaning of what they present as evidence of public 
opinion varies widely. 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of diverse metrics. Top-left. Polling average from HuffPost. Top-right. 
Predictwise market scores. Middle. Associated Press-Google search term political index for 
candidates. Bottom-left. FiveThirtyEight’s forecasting model with electoral system road to 
victory. Bottom-right. USA Today-Facebook election barometer for the social media buzz. 
 
These fundamental methodological and epistemological differences between different 
types of reports can complicate our understanding of the nature of public perceptions, especially 
about the perceived uncertainty associated with numerical results and their underlying 
methodological differences. The clearest example comes from the latest presidential election in 
2016 in which a Clinton victory was expected by a large portion of the public and experts. A 
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forecasting model report stating that there is an 85 % chance that a candidate is winning the race 
inflates the sense of certainty about that result as compared to a poll report showing 52% of 
likely voters were supporting that same candidate (e.g. Messing, Westwood, and Lelkes, 2018), 
even though these nominal values are not directly comparable to each other. Similarly, what 
people think of a poll result about public beliefs in climate change with respect to a trend 
analysis of social media buzz about the issue becomes an intriguing question – especially given 
issues such as the strategic disinformation campaigns via social media bots to manipulate public 
discussion (cf. Bolsover and Howard, 2017; McKew, 2018). In sum, how people respond to 
these characteristics of quantitative public opinion evidence provides significant insights into 
individuals’ judgment processes in a context where the substantive results of reports, their 
methodological qualities, and the type of quantitative evidence they present compete. 
Methodological Quality of Public Opinion Reports. Methodological quality is an 
important aspect of public opinion reports that is crucial for the accuracy of representation and 
communication of uncertainty (cf. Dunwoody, 1999), and hence for public perceptions. 
Methodological quality matters and is an important issue, because there are notable 
methodological differences between public opinion reports (Jackman, 2005; Hillygus, 2011). As 
there are many actors involved in traditional polling, there are so many polls being reported 
every day. Especially during election times, there could be multiple polls released even in the 
same day. Subsequently, there might be many differences in the methodology employed in 
sampling (telephone, mail, Internet etc.), questionnaire design (the ways questions are asked and 
response options provided), scope (state vs national polls), mode (self, computerized etc.), and in 
analysis (decisions on weights etc.). Hence, even when polls are conducted on or around the 
same dates – which rules out a shift in public opinion -  and on the same issues or contexts, polls’ 
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results often differ (Baker et al., 2010; 2013). Researchers have demonstrated that small 
decisions in weighting could result in different substantive results even when the same dataset is 
being used (e.g. Cohn 2016a; 2016b). These methodological differences also lead, although not 
always, to methodological quality differences as well (Baker et al., 2010; 2013; Hillygus, 2011; 
Pasek, 2015). Aside from these, as explained in the previous section, today there are new 
quantifications of public opinion and these have very different methodological differences. 
Methodological quality dominates the public debate about public opinion reports, which 
might make quality a salient issue in people’s perceptions. There is a great amount of focus on 
methodological quality in the news media, because there are problems with polling due to 
overarching issues in the industry and skepticism about polls in general (cf. Kim et al., 2011). 
Methodological challenges such as how to integrate different modes of data collection, locate 
hard to cover populations, and declining response rates might bias the results. Especially in the 
election context, public opinion reports are compared to the official results of elections, a 
situation that creates a de facto truth benchmark for the accuracy of pre-election polls. Large 
literature documents “bias” in election poll results relative to the actual election (Traugott 2005; 
Hillygus 2011). Although pre-election polls are not only meant to be a tool of predicting 
elections, that is how the media and public discourse view them. While these studies have 
contributed to methodological improvements in the field, in the court of public opinion, such 
comparisons create a false expectation about public opinion reports as if they should exactly 
mirror the election result. This fallacious view of public opinion reports in the electoral context, 
along with other methodological problems, and media coverage of these issues – which will be 
discussed in further detail in the next section – all contribute to the polling-in-crisis narrative in 
the public discourse (cf. Traugott et al., 2008). While this credibility issue is a population-level 
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phenomenon, such that it concerns all public opinion reports and trust in reports in general, the 
point here is that this increased public consciousness due to the polling-in-crisis narrative would 
make methodological quality a more salient feature in ordinary individuals’ evaluations of public 
opinion reports, and potentially in ways that are rather susceptible to cynic evaluations. 
Aspects of Media Coverage of Public Opinion Reports 
 
Media coverage of public opinion reports matters, because individuals rely on media 
representations in their engagement with public opinion reports. People mostly encounter public 
opinion evidence as packaged products within news stories that are prepared for public 
consumption, often in simplified forms. Four major aspects of media coverage are crucial for 
public perceptions. These are (1) the source cues, (2) reporting of methodological details, (3) 
contextualized-explanatory reporting, and finally (4) expert and partisan punditry used to help 
readers interpret the results. 
Source cues. A large body of literature suggests that sources in the media could shape 
people’s perceptions of the message (Howland and Weiss, 1951). Prior research suggests that the 
source transmitting information can alter the perceptions of a message.  For example, individuals 
tend to inflate the credibility of sources associated with their political affiliations relative to those 
associated with out-parties (Stroud and Lee 2013). Because public opinion reports are typically 
presented within the context of media stories, there is good reason to expect that this process 
might alter individuals’ processing of public opinion reports.  
Hence, we have to test how people process public opinion reports with a consideration of 
source effects. This is important because people consume public opinion reports through media 
representations, hence, they heavily rely on media reports. Yet, people have opinions about 
media sources as well. They are knowledgeable about the ideological stances of outlets, and a 
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large body of research documents that many people believe that media are biased against the 
views they hold (e.g. hostile media effects; Chia and Chang, 2017). Therefore, we need to assess 
how people process public opinion reports by considering the influence of media sources. 
In the polling context, closely related to the media sources, there is also the issue of poll 
sponsor. However, there are reasons that media sources should matter more and trump the 
sponsor effects. First, people are not very knowledgeable about polling sponsors, second, the 
sponsors of polls and other public opinion metrics are increasingly complicated with 
collaborations between media and polling firms (e.g. CNN-ORC Poll) or academic centers (USC 
Dornsife-Los Angles Times Poll). Especially in the case of push polls and those conducted by 
campaigns themselves the sponsorship might matter, however this dissertation’s scope does not 
include push polls. Hence, it also does not consider the potential influence of sponsors.7 For 
research related to sponsors, see Panagopoulos (2016) and Chia and Chang (2017).  
Methodological Disclosure. Efforts to increase the methodological disclosures in releases 
of poll results by pollsters, such as the Transparency Initiative of the American Association for 
Public Opinion Research8, are recent movements in the discipline for the credibility of public 
opinion reports. However, there are many problems with how the press covers public opinion 
reports as well (Traugott, 2012). And these problems should be concerning, because the media 
coverage constitutes the point of contact with the larger public. Numerous content analyses have 
been conducted to document these issues.  Studies examined the trends in the proportion of poll 
reports in news reports (Brettschneider 1997), whether methodological details were included 
(e.g. Sonck and Loosveldt 2008), the effect of surprising results in media coverage (Matthews, 
Pickup, and Cutler 2012; Searles, Ginn, and Nickens 2016), misunderstanding of margin of error 
                                                 
7 http://www.aapor.org/Education-Resources/Resources/AAPOR-Statements-on-Push-Polls.aspx  
8 https://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/Transparency-Initiative.aspx  
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in press coverage (Larson 2003), and communication of statistical uncertainty in poll reports 
(Bhatti and Pedersen 2015). Overall these studies documented the problems (methodological 
details, communication of uncertainty) and theoretical patterns (reporting of surprising results, 
lack of issue coverage) in the media over the years. 
Contextualized and Explanatory Reporting. A third issue in the media coverage of 
public opinion reports is contextualized reporting of evidence. As there are many polls with 
different results and methodological qualities, and as there are newer metrics such as polling  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Aggregated reporting examples. Top panel. A screenshot of RealClearPolitics’ polling 
average table from the 2016 presidential election. Bottom Panel. A screenshot of CNN 
presenting its polling average along with the release of a new singular poll result.  
 
averages, mainstream news reporting on public opinion increasingly involves integrated 
reporting. Usually, each new poll result is presented in relation to the latest contemporaneous 
polls. Especially the format followed by the Pollster of Huffington Post and the RealClearPolitics 
websites involves the detailed presentation of the latest few, usually five, polls in a list. They 
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also include the polling average metric, however the presentation of multiple results in this way 
provides a unique form of contextualization (See Figure 3). Moreover, usually the logic behind 
methodological decisions, such as the justification for polling averages, are explained in simple 
terms for lay readers (e.g. Silver, 2012; 2016; Jackson, 2016; Cohn, 2016). This kind of reporting 
could influence in important ways how ordinary people process news reports. 
Interpretative Discourse: Expert and Partisan Punditry. While polls dominate news 
coverage at large, what dominates polling coverage itself is the interpretative discourse 
surrounding polls. As facts “only exist in the context of a larger interpretative scheme (Graves, 
2017), polls garner a lot of commentary as the most systematic and quantitative evidence about 
public opinion. In today’s polarized digital media environment, many commentators opine on 
poll results, for better or worse. Journalists, experts, and political elites continuously and 
competitively interpret available polling evidence by evaluating methodological validity, 
limitations, and framing of results as well as their practical implications. 
  There are several reasons for increasing public discussion and rhetoric on polls. For one, 
traditional journalists are not well equipped to report and interpret the polls accurately (e.g. 
Nguyen and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Bhatti and Pedersen, 2016; Tryggvason and Strömbäck, 2017). 
Journalists have anxiety towards numbers (Curtin & Maier, 2001; Wihbey and Coddington, 
2017). Methodological details are not always adequately disclosed (Sonck and Loosveldt, 2008) 
and half of the interpretations of margin of error were inaccurate (Larson, 2003). Hence, 
journalists rely on academic and polling experts to make sense of results and comment on 
methodological aspects of polling in their news reports (cf. Matthews, Pickup, Cutler, 2012). 
Second, to produce more engaging stories journalists use reactions of political representatives to 
poll results, who usually provide subjective and partisan comments (cf. Feldman, 2011a). Third, 
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popularity of data journalism sites dealing with polling fuels incessant punditry on the quality of 
polling evidence (cf. Butterworth, 2014; Turcotte et al., 2017). Finally, the social nature of news 
reporting, as it appears in online comment sections of traditional news stories and social media 
outlets where polls are shared, provides both experts and ordinary citizens with a platform where 
they can opine on evidence (McClain, Kuru, Pasek, 2017).  
The interpretative discourse around polling can influence people’s evaluations more than 
the actual poll results. Surprisingly, this is an overlooked aspect in decades of studies on polling 
exposure effects. As people do not have much interest and knowledge about polls (Traugott and 
Kang, 2000), they might instead rely more on what pundits tell them. Yet, whether and how polling 
critiques could help individuals in making sense of the results remains to be investigated, and it 
likely depends on the nature of the punditry. While some commentaries by experts are objective 
and focus on evidence and methodology, other comments by partisans are more likely to be 
subjective and biased.  
Expert commentaries constitute most polling punditry, because journalists rely on expert 
views in interpreting results (cf. Matthews, Pickup, Cutler, 2012).9 Most expert commentaries 
could be considered objective in the sense that they focus on methodological quality and serve to  
contextualize poll results. For example, such comments might single out the margin of error and 
timing of the poll or point out that the sample is not representative and compare result to a prior or 
concurrent poll (See examples in Figure 4). Hence, expert commentary may be an effective way 
to highlight to news consumers the validity and quality of numerical evidence, such as when they 
discuss the limitations of poor quality polls.10  
                                                 
9 For example, see the online training “Understanding and Interpreting Polls” at the Poynter News University, a free 
course funded by the partnership of AAPOR and Knight Foundation. 
<http://www.newsu.org/courses/understanding-and-interpreting-polls-2016> 
10 For example, see <http://www.businessinsider.com/poll-ted-cruz-donald-trump-iowa-2015-12>  
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Figure 4. Examples of expert and partisan comments. Top: Expert comment, Bottom: Partisan comment 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/poll-ted-cruz-donald-trump-iowa-2015-12>, 
<https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/poll-taken-day-after-fbi-wiretap-release-finds-pritzker-biss-in-dead-
heat/> 
 
On the other hand, due to the dominance of polls in election coverage and the recent 
“polling failures” associated with unexpected election outcomes across the world (e.g. 2015 Greek 
election, the Brexit vote in 2016, the 2016 U.S. presidential election), there is widespread public 
skepticism of polls (Jackson and Sparks, 2017). Appearing as opinion pieces, op-eds, parts of 
specialized blogs, or data journalism outlets, critical commentaries may target polls’ methodology 
or epistemological underpinnings, as well as the consequences of being exposed to polls for 
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democratic politics. Similarly, the diversification of public opinion metrics with the onset of data 
journalism may raise question about the limitations of traditional polling that suffers from lower 
funding, declining response rates, complications of sampling in its online modes. At a time when 
the entire polling industry has increasingly come under fire (Kennedy et al., 2017), such expert 
critiques on polls could shape public evaluations in prominent ways.  
Not all punditry is objective. As opposed to objective expert opinions, partisan 
interpretation on poll findings might be a facilitator of motivational biases. With the elimination 
of the Fairness Act by the Federal Communications Commission (1987), aside from objective and 
balanced reporting of news, explicit partisan commentary started to accompany news reporting 
over the last few decades. To drive audience interest and engagement, news stories frequently 
include partisan commentaries that can be provocative (Feldman, 2011a). These commentaries are 
subjective as they do not focus on the methodological aspects of polls – or when they do, it is often 
superficial and pseudo-methodological. Instead, partisan comments usually come from campaign 
representatives who strategically highlight a favorable poll result and dismiss polls that show their 
candidate unfavorably as “biased.” As illustrated in debates about unskewing the polls, 
oversampling of Democrats, weighting, and rigged / fake polls during the 2012 and 2016 elections, 
there is an enormous amount of pseudo-methodological attacks on specific polls.11  
Aspects of the Audience of Public Opinion Reports 
In studying perceptions of public opinion reports, the third analytical and perhaps the 
most influential component is individuals’ psychological differences.  
                                                 
11For example, see <https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/poll-taken-day-after-fbi-wiretap-release-finds-
pritzker-biss-in-dead-heat/> , < http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/adventures-fox-news-polling-part-vi>  
 <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-11-09/about-those-polls-rigged-or-just-clueless> and 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/24/very-bad-analysis-of-a-2008-email-is-donald-
trumps-new-excuse-for-why-hes-losing/?utm_term=.b8a1c8a8dd88>  
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A key feature makes public opinion reports susceptible to the influence of people’s own 
political preferences. Public opinion reports serve as a mirror with which a society looks at itself; 
such that, it is the picture in our heads (Lippmann 1925). Each reader, for example, of a poll 
report showing the state of the election, belongs to that society which that poll claims to 
represent. This interesting and mutually-constitutive epistemological relationship between the 
public and its own aggregate opinion might lead people to engage in comparing the results of 
public opinion reports to their own preferences, because they are part of the society that the 
report claims to represent. On this front, people’s motivations might matter in how they process 
reports. Kunda (1990) laid out that people have two types of goals - accuracy goals and 
directional goals – when they engage with new information. If they are motivated to get an 
accurate picture of public opinion they might try to be objective when assessing evidence while 
they might be biased if they fall prey to their directional motivations that push them to reach 
comfortable mental states. The current dissertation focuses on this second type of motivation and 
it will be explicated in detail in the Theoretical Background section.  
A second feature is that the public’s perceptions and engagement with political issues and 
facts are rather ephemeral, and a vast body of research documents that people are not 
knowledgeable about politics (see Carpini and Keeter 1997; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia 
2015) as well as polling specifically (Lavrakas, Holley, Miller, 1991; Traugott and Kang, 2000). 
People might not effectively process public opinion reports. The dual process models such as the 
elaboration likelihood and heuristics-systematics models provide us insight about how people 
may differ in their depth of processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984). 
This could mean that they typically rely on peripheral processing instead of effortful thinking, 
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which makes it more likely they will focus only on the substantive results without questioning 
the methodological quality of the systematic evidence. 
Relatedly, individuals will likely differ in the extent they will want to engage with public 
opinion reports, particularly in terms of their ability to process public opinion reports. People 
differ in their levels of political interest, interest in public opinion reports, education, political 
knowledge, numeracy, and methodological knowledge about public opinion reports. These 
relevant individual differences should be taken into account in our models of communicating 
public opinion through public opinion reports. As reported in the previous paragraph, a key 
finding is that people are not very knowledgeable (Traugott and Kang, 2000). Yet, we have to be 
careful about making sense of how knowledge or lack of it relates to the interpretation of public 
opinion reports. According to the traditional knowledge-deficiency models in science 
communication, the reason people do not hold accurate information is that they lack the adequate 
knowledge and skills (e.g. Batt, Waldron, Broadwater, 2008). This knowledge-deficit approach 
was later criticized as providing only a one-way conceptualization of communication 
(information flow from experts to the public), which ignored the interactions between report 
characteristics, media coverage, the characteristics of ordinary citizens (Akin, 2017; Scheufele, 
2014).  
Individuals’ Assessments of Credibility  
I focus on how people evaluate public opinion reports by examining the credibility that 
they confer on the information in these reports. Prior research in psychology, political science, 
communication, and journalism have validated “perceived credibility” as a measure of people’s 
momentary reactions to information that they encounter (e.g. Sundar, 1999; Metzger, Flanagin 
and Medders, 2010). These studies presented individuals with items asking them to rate aspects 
 31 
of the information that they encounter, such as its accuracy, reliability, trustworthiness, and 
sometimes its informativeness (e.g. Moiser and Ahlgren, 1981; Meyer, 2002). While exact 
conceptualizations of these evaluations may vary in different contexts, especially in relatively 
more abstract ones (cf. Bauer, 2017), these perceived credibility dimensions tap individuals’ 
evaluative judgments, especially during and in the immediate aftermath of encountering the 
messages. These items have also been widely used in prior literature. Capturing this immediate 
evaluation is crucial, as it will determine whether people would interpret the newly-encountered 
information into their beliefs and long-term memory. Especially within a news environment 
where individuals encounter many public opinion reports with differing results, varying 
methodological qualities, and competing interpretations, these momentary evaluations should 
matter in how people react to particular public opinion reports. 
Theoretical Background 
 Public interpretation of public opinion reports has a major problem. Scholars in public 
opinion historically acknowledged individuals’ limitations in making sense of an objective 
concept of public opinion. For example, according to Lippman (1925), people have prejudices in 
their conceptions of what others think and prefer. This basic idea of bias in people’s views about 
public opinion should similarly influence their processing of public opinion reports: Individuals 
tend to process public opinion reports in biased and detrimental ways, in line with their own 
political preferences. These biases could lead to deleterious problems for democratic politics. To 
document the extent of people’s biases, the mechanisms undergirding this bias, and to investigate 
the ways to reduce these biases, I rely on the motivated reasoning theory. In this section, building 
on the components of the tripartite communication model – which is composed of aspects of 
public opinion reports, aspects of media coverage, and individuals’ characteristics - I introduce 
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the expectations and moderators of motivated reasoning theory to document the extent of 
individuals’ biases and investigate the effectiveness of journalistic remedies. 
Individuals’ Bias against Unfavorable Evidence  
Motivational biases constitute one of the most fundamental aspects of human cognition 
when it comes to the processing of information. As individuals encounter new information, they 
process what they read or hear in relation to their pre-existing beliefs (Kunda 1990; Taber and 
Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2013). Individuals also develop negative affect and render snap 
judgments when information contradicts preexisting attitudes; this defensive-processing 
motivates individuals to argue against the information presented (Kim, Taber, and Lodge 2010; 
Redlawsk 2002; Lodge and Taber 2013). Similarly, studies showing higher arousal to negative 
political information (i.e. unfavorable information, Soroka and McAdams, 2015) support the 
view that unfavorable public opinion reports will lead individuals to be more recalcitrant and 
defensive against it. One result of this counterargument is that individuals can be expected to 
disregard the credibility of the counter-attitudinal information at the immediate moment the 
information is encountered.  
 In the context of public opinion reports at large, results shown in polls will mostly be 
either favorable or unfavorable to the news consumer. Specifically, if poll results conform to an 
audience member’s preexisting views, the results should be perceived as more credible than if 
they differ from these views.  So, for example, if an individual who is pro-life encounters 
information that most Americans support legalized abortion, that individual might find the 
results less credible.  Or similarly, an election poll showing a Republican candidate leading 
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would be discounted disproportionately by a Democrat news consumer.12 At large, this tendency 
constitutes a conflation and clash of societal perceptions and one’s own views. 
 Whether and how these biases operate in a highly competitive and polarized news 
environment should be investigated (cf. Chong and Druckman, 2007). Differing results, varying 
types of metrics, differing methodological qualities, and competing interpretations by experts or 
partisans could change people’s tendency to engage in motivated reasoning when they encounter 
public opinion reports in the news stories. 
Aside from competitive news coverage, political polarization is also a long-term issue that 
distorts public discussion in American politics and contributes to the motivated assessments of 
public opinion evidence (cf. Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). For example, the 2016 election period 
was an unprecedented race between the presidential candidates, full of controversies, lies, and 
accusations. Partisan framing also spilled over to the beliefs on basic facts and statistics, including 
the factual evidence on the performance of the candidates. Particularly, claims of a “rigged 
election” (Weigel, 2016), the misinterpretation of scientific methodological decisions such as 
“oversampling” (Bump, 2016), hidden (“shy” respondents) Trump vote in “the rigged polls” 
(Munro, 2016), and discussions on the low quality online polls (Fox News, 2016) on debates about 
who won the presidential debates were good examples of partisan dispute over factual evidence 
(Lepore, 2016) and more broadly, epistemological discussions about a “post-truth” (Davies, 2016) 
or “post-fact” era (Manjoo, 2016). In such a context, motivated assessments of public opinion 
evidence could prevail and plague public discourse. 
                                                 
12 Cases where people might not have opinions and hence do not have any favorable or unfavorable connection with 
a public opinion report’s result could also exist and are further discussed in the limitations section of the Conclusion 
chapter. 
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Potential Effects of Source. While investigating individuals’ motivational biases in 
assessing public opinion reports, we must consider the possibility of source effects to make sure 
that bias against sources are not conflated with bias against public opinion reports. The source 
transmitting opinion reports may also alter the influence of motivational processes on poll 
credibility.  A growing body of evidence suggests that individuals both seek and accept 
information from media sources they are prone to agree with (Tsfati and Cappella 2003; Stroud 
2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009). Further, individuals tend to inflate the credibility of sources 
associated with their political inclinations relative to those running counter to it (Stroud and Lee 
2013; Gunther and Liebhart 2006). Indeed, recent research shows that media tend to report polls 
in biased ways, along with their ideological slants (Searles, Ginn, and Nickens, 2016). Similarly, 
hostile media perception theory expects and finds that people believe that the media is biased 
against their positions (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985). In the polling context, similar 
mechanisms may explain why hostile media effects appear stronger when individuals dislike a 
message presented by an ideologically opposing source (Chia and Chang 2015).  
Knowledge-deficit Models vs the Sophistication Paradox  
When people are biased in their perceptions of evidence or hold inaccurate beliefs, the 
traditional approach by practitioners and scholars to tackle this problem has relied on the 
assumption that biased people lack knowledge and necessary information (Akin, 2017; 
Scheufele, 2014). However, research shows that people with more sophistication tend to engage 
in motivated reasoning more. Motivated reasoning theory posits that biased processing should be 
especially strong for individuals who are politically sophisticated (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 
2009) and thus are likely to have entrenched beliefs that enable them to counter-argue (Lodge 
and Taber, 2013; Zaller 1992). Indeed, the most knowledgeable individuals disproportionately 
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appear to discredit information from messages that contradict their preferences (cf. Redlawsk 
2002; Lodge and Taber 2013). Individuals use their cognitive arsenal – be it information or 
educational skills – to develop arguments against evidence that they do not like. Both more 
general theories of attitude formation (e.g. Zaller, 1992) and more specific theories such as 
motivated numeracy and cultural cognition (e.g. Kahan et al. 2013) found consistent support for 
this moderation observed in studies of motivated reasoning (e.g. Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 
2015). Similarly, research in selective exposure found that those people who thought they had 
sufficient scientific knowledgeable showed a tendency to prefer and select to read attitude-
congruent information more than attitude-incongruent information (Jang, 2013). Based on prior 
and related works, we can consider individuals’ education level, their numeracy, methodological 
knowledge about public opinion reports, election related political knowledge, issue related 
political knowledge and general political knowledge about government workings as relevant 
factors. For a recent comparison of these constructs and how they relate to motivated reasoning, 
see Pasek and Weeks (2017). 
Consequences of Biased Perceptions on Democratic Politics 
 If people process public opinion reports in biased ways, this will have a variety of 
adverse consequences in a variety of ways. First, dismissing unfavorable evidence about the state 
of public opinion should lead individuals to form and nurture biased perceptions of public 
opinion. In particular, they might be more likely believe that the majority supports their own 
views. This skewed perception of public opinion could happen in issue position perceptions (e.g. 
Nir, 2011). Similarly, people form predictions about an election outcome based in part on what 
they desire the outcome to be (Delavande and Manski, 2012) and differential evaluations of polls 
might exacerbate these skewed perceptions. Specifically, when Republicans expect a Republican 
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victory and Democrats expect a Democratic victory, the losing side is predisposed to view the 
victor as illegitimate. This process might serve to fuel perceptions of rigged elections (e.g. 
Collison, 2016), and skewed polls (e.g. Casca, 2016). A recent work shows that partisans indeed 
differ in their perceptions of rigged elections (Kernell and Mullinix, 2018). 
 Similarly, trust in media, pollsters, and public officials could suffer. Biased assessments 
of public opinion reports could also induce skepticism of polls and pollsters (cf. de Vreese and 
Semetko, 2002), increase partisan acrimony (cf. Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012), and further 
erode trust in government (cf. Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Trust in the press is a huge 
problem especially following the 2016 U.S. presidential election which involved attacks against 
the media and the problem of fake news – misinformation and deliberate fabricated content in 
digital platforms (Pennycook and Rand, 2017). Even computational propaganda by government 
produced bots to fuel fake news into social media settings became an issue in the latest election 
that lead to a governmental investigation of foreign interference in the U.S. (e.g. Dilanian and 
Memoli, 2018). 
Finally, if people do not trust the most systematic evidence about public opinion and 
develop cynical attitudes about them, these attitudes could spill over to the perceptions of more 
official statistics such as the Census results (cf. Wines, 2017) and perceived legitimacy of 
elections themselves (cf. Norris, 2014).  
Overall, these problems fuel affective political polarization (cf. Iyengar and Westwood, 
2015). At large, this is what is at stake in the biased interpretation and use of public opinion 
reports by stake-holders, political elite, and ordinary citizens who embolden their political 
preferences. The deeper problem is that people find some solid systematic evidence to latch onto 
and entrench their positions. 
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2.4. Mitigating the Motivated Reception of Public Opinion Reports  
Because of such serious problems for democratic politics, we should investigate ways to 
mitigate biased processing of public opinion reports. A potential remedy against motivational 
biases could be “corrective attempts” designed to eliminate biases or other information that has 
corrective potential. The prevalence and strength of motivational biases in most political 
phenomena and their further repercussions in the form of misinformation, conspiracy theories, 
and inaccurate statistics and beliefs – referred to as “post-fact” and “post-truth” politics recently 
(Davies 2016; Manjoo 2016) – means that fact-checking (by news organizations such as 
Factcheck.org and Politifact) increasingly become crucial as a corrective attempt against 
biases.13  
In the context of public opinion reports, shifting the focus to reports’ methodological 
quality could yield corrective potential. Whether methodological details are reported in news 
coverage, and if so, whether the methodological quality is robust or poor could act against 
motivational biases. On the other hand, other information from polling averages or alternative 
public opinion indicators, as well as direct attempts by experts highlighting the methodological 
characteristics or praising/debunking the methodological aspects of opinion reports, are more 
direct informational correctives in the context of public opinion reports’ reception. 
Yet the findings from the corrective attempts literature are unclear about whether these 
solutions might or might not work. Increasing amounts of studies produce inconsistent findings. 
Research showed that corrections have a positive influence in reducing biases and 
misperceptions in many circumstances (Bode and Vraga 2015; Cobb, Nyhan, and Reifler 2013; 
Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck 2015). Similar effects were observed in contexts of social 
                                                 
13 For a comprehensive list, see American Press Institute’s tracker: 
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/topics/fact-checking/ 
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media settings in later research. Bode and Vraga found that when other Facebook users comment 
in a post to fact-check a claim, people’s misperceptions can reduce in response to these 
comments (2017a). If the person who fact-checks is a real friend of the person in Twitter 
interactions, it is more effective (Margolin, Hannak, and Weber, 2017). Another study found that 
misperceptions could especially be reduced if corrections in social media include referenced 
sources (Vraga and Bode, 2017). However, in social media, fact-checking has a side effect as 
well; that is, some people take the absence of any fact-checking on news as an indication that it 
has been corrected and verified, while in fact that might not be true because the story was not 
checked for veracity to begin with (Pennycook and Rand, 2017). 
On the other hand, earlier studies also documented an adverse effect of fact-checking and 
corrections against misinformation. Research has shown the persistence of motivational biases in 
political judgments showing that correction attempts may backfire (i.e. the backfire effect, 
Nyhan & Reifler, 2010), but others found that there is also limit to this motivational resistance 
(Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Studies nearly a decade later, on the other hand, 
refuted the existence of the backfire effect. Wood and Porter (2017) found in their large set of 
studies across a variety of topics that the backfire effect is non-existent. In follow up work, 
Nyhan et al. (2017) also found supportive evidence that there is no backfiring effect, and 
corrections have small positive effect in reducing biases in the context of the 2016 election. A 
recent meta-analysis on the effectiveness of fact-checking studies found that especially fact-
checks with greater detail and explanation are effective countering misinformation (Chan et al., 
2017). Whether the backfire effect was a methodological artefact or people have gained more 
news literacy and knowledgeable about fact-checking remains to be investigated. 
3. Overview of the Empirical Studies 
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In the empirical studies, I weave together the three components of my communication 
model (reports, media coverage, and audience characteristics) as elaborated in the contextual 
background section with the three components of the motivated reasoning theory (bias, 
sophistication moderation, and informational correctives against the bias) as elaborated in the 
theoretical background section. This leads me to a number of important research questions. How 
do people process public opinion reports? Specifically, I ask how do their preexisting affiliations 
and political preferences factor into their evaluations of information provided in public opinion 
reports? I complicate this question by taking into account the potential influences of the 
characteristics of reports, their media coverage, and individual differences in sophistication. 
After this, my second set of questions pertains to finding a solution to individuals’ biases: What 
do people make of the additional methodological information and interpretation bundled along 
with public opinion reports?  
To answer these questions, in a series of large national survey experiments, I examine 
how news consumers’ attributes, the content of opinion reports and patterns of media coverage 
can trigger or mitigate biases in public perceptions. The studies aim to document both the extent 
of motivated reasoning as well as journalistic ways to mitigate them by measuring individuals’ 
evaluations (i.e. perceived credibility, perceived accuracy of the reports) of hypothetical public 
opinion reports in a variety of contexts. 
In Chapter 2, I present empirical evidence from diverse contexts and document 
individuals’ biased processing of public opinion reports by primarily considering psychological 
factors and characteristics of public opinion reports. 
The first empirical study examines how individuals confer credibility to public opinion 
polls that show majority support levels for the gun control and abortion issues. The study 
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examines whether people confer less credibility to polls that show them information suggesting 
their own views to be opposed (in the minority) by the greater portion of the public. The study 
examines how this bias is moderated by individuals’ issue-related political knowledge and media 
source cues. 
The second empirical study examines how people pick and choose in which polls to 
believe when they are confronted with multiple poll results that have varying results and 
methodological quality. Conducted in the context of the 2016 U. S. presidential election, this 
study shows how people compare the perceived credibility of election polls in line with their 
partisan affiliations. I also examine the role of individuals’ education level in these assessments.  
The third empirical study, conducted also within the context of the 2016 U. S. 
presidential election, examines how people evaluate and compare entirely different metrics of 
public opinion. It shows how the favorability of the results for individuals can trump the 
distinctions in the type and quality of evidence. I also examine the role of election-related 
political knowledge and numeracy in these assessments. 
Collectively, these three studies document the prevalence of motivated reasoning in 
individuals’ perceptions of public opinion reports in a variety of contexts, differing 
methodologies, and testing of theoretically relevant moderators. 
In Chapter 3, I test the corrective potential of a variety of journalistic remedies to reduce 
these biases. Here, I consider especially the moderating role of the media coverage on 
psychological and public opinion reports’ characteristics. The broader strategy behind these 
remedies is to make methodological quality of the public opinion reports a more salient factor in 
people’s evaluations instead to prevent their tendency of dismissing evidence based on the 
favorability of the results. 
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The first empirical study builds on Study 1 in Chapter 2 to test whether the inclusion of 
methodological details could mitigate motivated reception of public opinion issue polls. The 
roles of respondents’ political and methodological knowledge are also tested. 
The second study, compares whether contextualized and aggregated news reports, and 
especially theoretical explanation boxes on methodological quality without direct debunking 
could offset partisan motivated reasoning within the context of election reports in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. 
The third empirical study, building on Study 2 in Chapter 3, examines the corrective 
potential of expert commentaries that debunk polls with poor methodological quality and 
highlight ones with robust methodological quality. As a counterfactual test, it also examines 
whether partisan commentaries could amplify motivational biases. Additionally, I analyze 
whether respondents’ education level would influence motivated processing is investigated.
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Chapter 2 
The Problem: Motivated Reception of Public Opinion Reports 
In this chapter, I document biased processing of public opinion reports and how this bias 
is moderated by individuals’ sophistication (knowledge and education) in three different 
contexts. First, focusing on issue polls, I test how people process issue polls which suggest that 
their views either resonate or conflict with the majority position on longstanding issues such as 
gun control and abortion. Second, I examine how people pick and choose which election polls to 
believe in a highly competitive horserace news coverage environment. Third, I examine how 
people compare distinct types of public opinion reports in an election context that is 
characterized by data journalism quantifications such as polling averages, forecasting models, 
analyses of social media buzz, and election prediction markets. Collectively these three empirical 
studies document the extent of motivated reasoning in public perceptions of public opinion 
metrics in a variety of contexts and show how this biased information processing is moderated 
by source-related cues, political knowledge, methodological knowledge, education, and 
numeracy. 
Empirical Study 1: Biased Processing of Singular Issue Polls  
 
Introduction 
  
This study leverages a survey experiment to assess how source and message 
characteristics associated with reports of polling information influence the perceived credibility 
of poll results. In a broad national survey experiment, a sample of 1,211 Americans encountered 
poll reports on gun control and abortion that were randomly assigned to suggest that a majority 
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of Americans either agreed or disagreed with their own positions. In addition, the news stories 
that respondents saw were reported as originating either from a conservative or liberal source.  
Respondents were expected to interpret poll credibility in line with their preexisting 
attitudes. Specifically, motivated reasoning theory suggests that individuals should discount the 
credibility of polls that report attitude-dissonant results compared to those who interpreted 
attitude-consonant ones (Tsfati 2001; Lodge and Taber 2013; also see Lavrakas et al., 1998). 
Further, motivational processes should be the strongest for those who have the greatest political 
awareness and sophistication (Lodge and Taber, 2013; Zaller 1992; Redlawsk 2002; Lodge and 
Taber 2013; Miller Saunders Farhart, 2015).   
H1: Individuals should confer less credibility to public opinion polls that show their own 
views in the minority compared to polls that show favorable results in which their 
preferred views are shared by a majority of the public. 
H2: Individuals who have (a) greater political knowledge and (b) methodological 
knowledge will disproportionately discredit unfavorable poll results more strongly than 
those who score low on these knowledge measures. 
However, when we consider the context of media reports on poll findings, the source 
presenting the polls could influence how people view the poll results as well. There are two 
source-related factors in the context of public opinion reports. First, individuals confer more 
credibility to a source that they perceive to be ideologically similar to their own positions (Stroud 
and Lee 2013). Hence it follows that, when individuals receive a counter-attitudinal message 
from a trusted source, they may be more likely to accept it (cf. Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). Or 
individuals might evaluate the media source of the poll negatively if the result of the poll is 
unfavorable (Chia and Chang 2015). 
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Second, media outlets lend additional credibility to a message when the content of that 
message is surprising given the source’s ideological stance, because they provide that message 
despite the fact it contradicts their own perceived slant. Whereas a liberal source presenting 
information that favors liberal causes may be derided as biased, the same information should be 
more difficult to dismiss from a conservative outlet (Baum and Groeling, 2009). This might alter 
perceptions of poll results by leading otherwise motivated individuals to consider the message 
they are receiving more carefully. Hence, the influence of motivated reasoning on credibility 
assessments might depend on whether respondents share ideological orientations with the source 
conveying the message as well as whether the information being presented is source-consonant 
or source-dissonant. In line with the literature on source credibility, I hypothesize that the impact 
of motivational processes should be moderated by aspects of the source reporting the poll. 
H3: Congruency between the ideological stance of the source and the respondent’s 
political views should reduce motivated reasoning. 
H4: Surprising results – i.e., poll results that run contrary to a source’s ideology – may be 
more difficult to counter-argue and thus more credible. 
Methods 
Design. Respondents were first asked about their positions on a variety of policy issues. 
Then, after a series of questions about political covariates, they were presented with two stimuli 
in the form of news stories that described poll results about gun control and abortion. In addition 
to randomizing the presentation order of the stories, three aspects of the stories were 
independently manipulated: the political position held by a majority of Americans (according to 
the survey), the news source presenting the story (Fox News, MSNBC), and the presence (or 
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absence) of details about poll methodology.14 After viewing the polls, respondents were asked to 
describe the poll results, which served as a manipulation check. Then they were asked a series of 
questions about how credible they found the poll.  The full set of permutations for each story can 
be found in Appendix C.  
Data. Data for the current study come from a survey experiment conducted with a large 
national sample of Americans.  The survey was conducted using the online survey platform 
Qualtrics with respondents who were quota sampled to match the U.S. population on age, race, 
sex, and party identification.  To fill these quotas, Qualtrics subcontracted to Survey Sampling 
International and Research Now, who used a combination of targeted invitations and dashboard 
links to invite individuals to participate in the study. Collectively, these firms maintain large 
online panels of survey respondents who were themselves recruited through a combination of 
self-registration, online recruiting, partnership recruitment through company rewards programs, 
social media, and river sampling (cf. Baker et al. 2010). 
 Data collection was completed in two periods, with some data collected on June 17, 2015 
and the rest collected between June 29 and July 5, 2015. The data collection was stopped briefly 
between July 18 and 29, because there was a mass shooting event in the U.S. Overall, 1,226 
individuals completed the survey out of 3,285 who either responded to the invitation or clicked 
on a dashboard link (37% completion rate). Most incomplete surveys were due to individuals 
who were excluded from the study because they were in demographic quota categories that had 
already been filled (N=1,973). In addition, 86 respondents were dropped because they failed a 
series of attention filters that Qualtrics used to identify “quality” respondents. The instructions 
called for a careful and reasonable completion time and asked respondents to complete the 
                                                 
14 Note that the detail manipulation will be discussed in the next chapter and the results pertaining to that are not 
included here although it is included as a control variable in the regression models. 
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survey in one sitting and without doing something else to ensure that other activities did not 
interfere with the manipulation. Finally, 15 individuals, despite passing the first set of attention 
filters, were dropped because they completed the survey in under 4 minutes, yielding a final 
sample of 1,211 respondents.   
In addition to the Qualtrics data, another data collection was carried out using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk in February, 2015 (N=987). Appendix A presents detailed descriptive statistics 
on both the Qualtrics and Amazon data. Results of all analyses were replicated on the Amazon 
sample as well and are reported in Appendix B.  
Outcome Variable. Perceived poll credibility. Three questions were used to measure 
perceptions of poll credibility. These questions were adapted from earlier studies of media 
credibility (Mosier and Ahlgren 1981; Presser et. al, 1998). Respondents were asked, “How 
informative do you find this poll result?”, “How accurate do you think the results of this poll 
represent public opinion on this issue in the United States?”, and “How trustworthy do you think 
the results of this poll are?” Responses to each of these three questions were recoded to scale 
from 0 to 1 and then averaged together to create an index (Gun Control M=.47, s.e.=.26, α=.89; 
Abortion M=.47, s.e.=.26, α=.88; Online Appendices D, E, and F).15 
Manipulated Variables. Majority Manipulation. For the gun control poll, respondents 
were randomly assigned a news story stating that, “57% of the public [supports/opposes] stricter 
gun controls”.  For the abortion poll, respondents were randomly assigned a story stating that, 
“55% of the public [supports/opposes] abortion” (Coding: support:1, opposition:0).  
                                                 
15 Low reliability scores are not considered very problematic for knowledge indexes because they represent overall 
information people have and might not have a uni-dimension. See Online Appendix H of Study 1 of Chapter 2 for 
the results of item-by-item analysis of political knowledge. 
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Source Manipulation. The news stories that respondents saw for each of the two issues 
were attributed at random to either Fox News or MSNBC. These news sources were chosen 
because they are viewed as strongly conservative (Fox News) or liberal (MSNBC) in their 
orientations (Groeling 2008; Coding: Fox:1, MSNBC:0). For the combinations of manipulations, 
see Table 2. For examples of how the stories looked, see Figure 5. 
Table 2. Manipulation Combinations 
Manipulation Source Result 
Story 1 Fox News Majority Opposes Stricter Gun Controls 
Story 2 Fox News Majority Supports Stricter Gun Controls 
Story 3 MSNBC Majority Opposes Stricter Gun Controls 
Story 4 MSNBC Majority Supports Stricter Gun Controls 
 
Figure 5. Hypothetical news report examples 
  
Covariates. Gun Control Attitudes. Respondent’s attitudes toward gun control were 
measured with a series of four questions.  Respondents were asked, “Overall, do you support or 
oppose stricter gun control laws in the US?” Respondents were then asked to, “Please indicate 
your support or opposition to the following specific gun control laws” for three additional items.  
These included “Stricter laws for gun sales,” “Stricter laws for ammunition sales,” and 
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“Universal background checks.” Responses to all four questions were recoded to scale from 0 to 
1 and then averaged to create an index (M=.68, s.d.=.33, α=.93). 
Liberal-Conservative ideology. Respondents were asked, “When it comes to politics do 
you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of 
the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, or haven't you thought 
much about this?” (M=.51, s.d.=.28).  
Political knowledge. Political knowledge was assessed with a five-question multiple-
choice battery on issues that had recently been in the news.  Respondents were asked to “Please 
indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false” for a series of five questions 
on issues like health insurance and unemployment (See Appendix D for full wording).  For each 
of these items, respondents could select, “definitely true,” “probably true,” “probably false,” 
“definitely false,” or “no idea/don’t know.”  For questions where the correct answer was true 
responses were coded 1 for “definitely true,” .5 for “probably true,” and 0 for all other responses.  
For questions where the correct answer was false responses were coded 1 for “definitely false,” 
.5 for “probably false,” and 0 for all other responses.  Values for all five questions were averaged 
into a single index (M=.54, s.d.=.24, α=.53, see Appendix H for alternative coding results). 
Methodological Knowledge. A three-item quiz evaluated respondents’ methodological 
knowledge regarding basic information that would be necessary for a critical reading of poll 
reports.16 Correct responses were coded 1 and all other responses were coded 0, and the three 
items were averaged into an index (M=.40, s.d.=.33, α=.42; Appendix D).  
                                                 
16 The multiple choice questions were about sampling, the margin of error, and data collection. See Appendix D for 
question wording. This battery was presented after manipulations and dependent variables to avoid priming 
respondents to pay attention to the methodological details in the detail poll report conditions.  
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Poll interest. Four questions were used to assess respondents’ interest in public opinion 
polls. Respondents were asked, “How interested are you in reading various poll results reported 
in the media?” Respondents were also asked three questions on, “How frequently do you read 
polls reported in various media outlets such as newspapers, online news sites, and social media at 
the different times given below?” (in general, during election campaign, and the last month 
before elections). 
Constructed Variables. Disagree with poll (Disagreement). A dummy variable was 
created to identify individuals whose own position disagreed with the poll results for each of the 
issues.  Disagreement with the poll was coded 1 if 1) the respondent generally supported gun 
control (Gun Control Attitudes>.5) and if Majority Manipulation was assigned such that a 
majority opposed gun control or if 2) the respondent generally opposed gun control (Gun Control 
Attitudes<.5) and if Majority Manipulation was assigned such that a majority supported gun 
control. All others were coded 0. The same coding strategy were used for abortion (Gun Control-
M=.45; Abortion-M=.53). 
Source-ideology Consonance (S-I Consonance).  A dummy variable was created to 
identify cases where the respondent’s liberal-conservative ideology aligned with that of the news 
source presenting the information. This variable was coded 1 if a respondent reported a liberal 
ideology (liberal-conservative ideology<.5) and the source of the poll was MSNBC or if a 
respondent reported a conservative ideology (liberal-conservative ideology>.5) and the source of 
the poll was Fox News.  All others (including those with a liberal-conservative ideology of .5) 
were coded 0 (M=.34). 
Source-message Dissonance (S-M Dissonance). A dummy variable was created to 
identify cases where the poll result presented by a media outlet did not match what would be 
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expected of the news source’s slant.  This variable was coded 1 if MSNBC presented evidence of 
a conservative majority (public opposes gun control/abortion) or if Fox News presented evidence 
of a liberal majority (public supports gun control/abortion).  All others were coded 0 (M=.49). 
Finally, control variables (age, sex, race, place of birth, marital status, education, and income) 
were included.  
Analytical procedures. To test the hypotheses proposed in the study, I needed to 
determine whether individuals were disproportionately likely to discredit poll results they 
disagreed with, whether the tendency to discredit results was stronger among the most 
knowledgeable respondents, and whether aspects of the presentation of those poll results 
mitigated the relations observed. Accomplishing this required that I regress the perceived 
credibility of each poll onto a number of predictors that were not directly measured in the survey. 
Key variables, such as the disagreement with a poll result or the consistency of source and 
message cues, had to be constructed from responses to other questions in the study. Further, if 
political knowledge indeed conditioned the effects of motivated reasoning – as I hypothesized 
and as others had found – then moderators of these processes could only be properly tested by 
interacting them with both disagreement and knowledge measures. These analyses thus took the 
form of three-way interactions. Specifically, I tested H1 by examining whether individuals who 
disagreed with a poll result found that result less credible. H2 was tested by interacting this 
disagreement measure with political knowledge. To test H3 and H4, both disagreement and 
knowledge were interacted with constructed measures of source-ideology consonance and 
source-message dissonance, respectively.  
Results 
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Table 3. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control 
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  
Disagreement -.14 *** .02  .00  .03  .02  .04  .00  .05  
             
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.26 *** .06  -.28 *** .07  -.30 *** .08  
                 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.10  .07      
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.03  .08      
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .08  .12      
                 
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             -.01  .07  
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.02  .08  
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .08  .12  
                 
                 
Intercept .46 *** .03  .40 *** .03  .39 *** .03  .40 *** .04  
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  .00  .02  
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.05 ** .02  -.06 *** .02  -.06 *** .02  -.06 *** .02  
S-I Consonance .02  .01  .01  .01  .05  .05  .01  .02  
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  -.01  .05  
Poll Interest .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03  
Political Knowledge -.12 *** .03  .00  .04  .00  .05  .01  .05  
                 
N 1205  1205  1205  1205  
R-square .18  .19  .19  .19  
F Test (df) -  21.06*** (1)  1.20 (3)  .47 (3)  
Notes. ** denotes p value lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against 
Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested against the Baseline 
Model. See Online Appendix M for the models that control for age, sex, race, education, income, political interest, and ideology. See 
Online Appendix N for the models that exclude poll interest. 
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 Individuals who encountered poll results suggesting that a majority of Americans did not 
share their views on gun control found those results less credible than did individuals who 
received information that the public shared their views. In an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model 
predicting the credibility of the gun control poll, respondents found results much less credible if 
their own view disagreed with the results (b=-.14, s.e.=.02, p< .001; Table 3, column 1). For a 
typical respondent for whom all other variables were at their mean values, being in disagreement 
(as opposed to agreement) with the poll result decreased the credibility of a poll by 14% of the 
range of the outcome index. The results of the poll were also less credible to respondents if the 
polls suggested that a majority wanted additional gun control (b=-.05, s.e.=.02, p< .01) and if the 
respondents were more politically knowledgeable (b=-.12, s.e.=.03, p<.001). Respondents who 
were the most interested in polls tended to find the results more credible, regardless of content 
(b=.37, s.e.=.03, p< .001). Overall, these results supported H1. 
Figure 6. Interaction of Political Knowledge and Agreement with the Poll Results 
 
 Respondents’ political knowledge moderated the extent to which their disagreements 
with poll results translated into perceptions that gun control polls were not credible. The 
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interaction between political knowledge and poll disagreement was strongly negative (b=-.26, 
s.e.=.06, p< .001; Table 3, column 2).  Including this interaction also resulted in a significant 
improvement in model fit (F=21.06, df=1, p< .001).  Figure 6 illustrates how gun control poll 
credibility diverged for a typical respondent (with mean values for all other variables in the 
model) depending on whether that individual agreed or disagreed with the poll results as the 
level of knowledge increased. For the least knowledgeable respondents, disagreement with a poll 
result was unrelated to poll credibility, such that there was no perceived credibility difference 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the results (difference<.01). But for the most 
knowledgeable individuals, disagreement translated into a precipitous credibility drop accounting 
for 26% of the range of poll credibility (difference= -.26). This provided support for H2. 
Aside from political knowledge, the potential role of respondents’ methodological 
knowledge (about polls) in their credibility assessments were tested as well. The same 
relationship was observed. Those respondents who had more methodological knowledge, when 
they encountered an unfavorable poll result, discredited it much more strongly than those 
respondents with low levels of methodological knowledge about polls (b= -.10, se=.04, p<.05, 
Table 4). 
To test whether source-ideology consonance or source-message dissonance moderated 
the effects of motivated reasoning, these variables were each included in a set of three-way 
interactions. Specifically, H3 held that source-ideology consonance would reduce credibility 
gaps between those who agreed and disagreed with the results, compared to situations where 
individuals held ideologies that differed from the news source. H4 argued that respondents 
whose views disagreed with the poll results would find it harder to discount source-dissonant 
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messages than messages in line with a source’s typical slant. To test each explanation, the 
hypothesized variable was interacted with both political knowledge and poll disagreement. 
Table 4. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting the 
Perceived Credibility  
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
 Coef. se  
Disagreement -.10 *** .02  
     
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  -.10 * .04  
     
Intercept .42 *** .02  
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.05 ** .02  
S-I Consonance .03 + .01  
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  
Poll Interest .36 *** .03  
Methodological Knowledge -.05 + .03  
     
N 1208  
R-square .19  
F Test (df) -  
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge Effects model. See Online 
Appendix M for the models that control for age, sex, race, education, income, political interest, 
and ideology. See Online Appendix N for the models that exclude poll interest. 
 
 None of the proposed moderators of motivated reasoning appeared to be operating in the 
case of gun control.  Source-issue consonance was not significantly related to credibility on its 
own, nor through interactions with political knowledge, disagreement, or both (H3; Table 3, 
column 3, Figure 7 left).  Indeed, the inclusion of all three of these additional terms did not 
improve model fit (F=1.20, df=3, p=.31).  Similar null results were observed for source-message 
dissonance (H4; Table 3, column 4; F=.47, df=3, p=.70, Figure 7 right).  
Additional Analyses 
 
Abortion Replication. The results substantially held true for the abortion case as well. I 
obtained the same results for H1 through H4 (see Online Appendix J). 
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Figure 7. Source cue moderators for the political knowledge-disagreement interactions 
 
  
Notes. Left: Source-respondent ideology match; Right: Source-result dissonance 
 
Party Identification Moderation. I also tested for differences between Democrats and 
Republicans in the effects of motivated reasoning as well as across all hypothesized moderators 
(Online Appendix K). When running the same models on subsets limited to either Democrats or 
Republicans, the interaction of disagreement and knowledge (H2) was only significant among 
Democrats. Whereas Democrats engaged in motivated reasoning with increased political 
knowledge, for Republicans the decrease in credibility scores were mostly independent of 
knowledge moderation, at both the low and high ends of the knowledge scale. The other results 
did not differ for Democrats and Republicans.  
Disagreement Strength Analysis. (Distance from midpoint) An additional analysis 
incorporating attitude strength revealed that results were similar to those of the disagreement 
dummy variable. Across all hypotheses and research questions, the only notable difference was 
that the interaction of knowledge and disagreement did not reach significance for some of the 
abortion models (Online Appendix L).  
Summary of Results 
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H1: Confirmed – Individuals discredit unfavorable issue polls more. 
H2a: Confirmed – This bias is stronger for those with greater political knowledge. 
H2b: Confirmed – This bias is stronger for those with greater methodological knowledge 
H3: Not confirmed – The match between respondent and source ideology does not 
moderate this bias. 
H4: Not confirmed – The mismatch between source and the expected message from 
source does not moderate this bias. 
Discussion 
The current study is the first to investigate the dynamics of motivated reasoning in the 
public’s interpretation of poll results as they are reported in the media. Across two highly salient 
and closely contested political issues, it found evidence that motivated reasoning processes 
appear to guide credibility assessments of public opinion polls. Specifically, respondents’ prior 
attitudes were among the strongest predictors of how credible they found poll results, with 
respondents reporting lower credibility for results that did not coincide with their preexisting 
beliefs. And this discounting of poll results predominantly occurred among individuals who had 
high levels of political knowledge. In this vein, the current results replicate findings from a 
growing body of research suggesting that people engage in motivated reasoning processes, and 
these effects are strongest for the most knowledgeable individuals (Lodge and Taber 2013; 
Kahan et al. 2013, Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 2015).  
These findings also speak to the recent studies that detect motivated reasoning in related 
domains. Most closely, a recent study by Van der Meer and Hakhverdian (2016) found that 
people showed less interest in reading poll stories which show unfavorable results. Baekgaard et 
al. (2017) found that politicians process empirical policy-relevant information through partisan 
 57 
lens as well (also see Friedman, Lerner, and Zeckhauser, 2015). Kernell and Mullinix (2018) 
found that partisans hold misperceptions about the integrity of elections based on whether their 
favored candidates won the election.  
Contrary to expectations from the source credibility literature, I did not find evidence that 
contextual factors moderated the influence of these motivational processes. I had expected that 
individuals might accept uncomfortable information when their ideology either matched that of 
the media outlet presenting the poll or when the information presented by the poll differed from 
what would be expected of the media outlet (Baum and Groeling 2009). Hence, it appears that 
the results, and not source cues, determined the credibility that individuals attached to a given 
poll.  
As noted above, I found no evidence that source cues moderated the influence of 
motivated reasoning on poll credibility. This result is surprising given the extensive literature on 
source cues in media effects (see e.g., Kumkale Albarraccin, and Seignourel 2010; Chia and 
Chang 2015). Counter-attitudinal poll results that stemmed from sources that ideologically 
matched the respondent were no more credible than counter-attitudinal results from oppositional 
sources.  Similarly, determinations of credibility did not depend on whether the information was 
expected or unexpected given the perceived bias of the source.  These results suggest that the 
information respondents received trumped the influence of the source; at least in the context of 
poll results, source cues may be peripheral in evaluations. These null results on source effects in 
the polling context echo findings in a recent dissertation (Burgess, 2010). It appears that credible 
sources may lack the capacity to undercut motivated reasoning in public opinion polls’ 
perception. This is an interesting finding that in some way conflicts with the hostile media 
perceptions observed for poll reports (e.g. Chia and Chang, 2015). Yet, is important to clarify 
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that Chia and Chang (2015)’s dependent variable was hostile media perception, which asked 
about the perceived bias in media coverage instead of poll credibility. One possible explanation 
for this difference could be that directly asking respondents how biased they thought the media 
were would trigger a general skepticism and prime respondents to focus on source cues more 
than they otherwise would. 
There are a few limitations with the current study. For one, our central outcome measure 
is respondents’ self-reports of perceived poll credibility; this differs from both the weight 
individuals attach to a poll result and actual attitude change (cf. Mutz 1998). As with any self-
report measure, we cannot be sure that respondents’ reported impressions of credibility fully 
index the credence they associate with the reported poll result and thus its importance in their 
judgments. We also cannot be certain that these measures capture the likely influence of the polls 
on attitudes.  Nonetheless, earlier evidence suggests that these processes are likely to be closely 
related (Petty and Krosnick 1995). 
Second, although I find similar results across two important and unrelated public opinion 
issues in American politics, results might be sensitive to differences across issues and contexts. 
Many reported poll results have to do with presidential approval or the relative standing of 
candidates during a campaign. Party identification and political ideology might be much more 
important in assessing the credibility of such polls. Similarly, the credibility of horse-race polling 
may depend on the dynamics of the specific election campaign. Finally, the level of controversy 
around an issue could be another important moderator for the triggering of motivational biases. 
These contexts merit future research. The current study also suggests that there might be 
significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in how motivational processes work. 
This also begs for further study. 
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Empirical Study 2: Biases in Competitive Electoral Contexts 
 
Introduction 
 
In the contemporary media environment, people are increasingly barraged by public 
opinion polls. Citizens are charged with the responsibility of evaluating varying quality 
information that could influence their political beliefs and actions. Given that individuals 
encounter so many polls and the methodological quality of those polls varies greatly, it is important 
to understand how people process the conflicting messages. 
This challenge is particularly difficult in the context of elections. Media outlets report on 
multiple polls every day, and consequentially, results sometimes conflict with each other 
(Hillygus, 2011; Pasek, 2015). On the other hand, not all polling evidence has robust 
methodological quality; due to declining response rates, sampling decisions, and the rise of online 
polls, today, many polls have limitations in their methodology. Hence the methodological strength 
and quality of evidence could sometimes be weak (Baker et al., 2013). Overall, the multiplicity of 
evidence, inconsistency of results, and varying levels of methodological quality constitute a 
cacophonous and polarized information environment and public discourse around polling in 
contemporary political communication.  
Conflicting messages could facilitate individuals’ tendency for biased assessments of 
evidence, leading people to pick and choose from multiple pieces of available data. Building on 
the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2013), the first empirical study 
found that people evaluate polls based primarily on their results and assert that polls favoring 
preferred issue positions are disproportionately accurate (also see Chia and Chang, 2017 and 
Tsfati, 2001). Hence, whether and how these biases might unfold when people encounter multiple 
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polls with either consistent or inconsistent results and similar or variable methodological qualities 
remains to be investigated. 
This empirical study examines biases in the public’s perceptions of election polls, 
subsequent effects on electoral predictions, and individual level moderators of these biases in the 
context of horserace polling. It relies on a survey experiment conducted using a large, nationally 
representative sample of Americans gathered in June 2016, during the presidential election 
campaign. Respondents were presented with results from two polls that showed either the same 
candidate leading in each (consistent results) or different candidates leading (inconsistent results). 
The polls were either presented as having consistently strong or varying methodological quality. I 
then examined how these competing messages shaped individuals’ perceptions of the polls and 
electoral predictions, as well as the role of respondents’ education in these judgments.  
Whether inconsistent findings in reports might fuel biased perceptions or lead to more 
balanced evaluations is not very clear. Research in competitive framing showed that competing 
frames might cancel each other out in some circumstances, but whether this would be the true for 
perceptions of opinion reports remains to be tested (Chong & Druckman, 2007; 2010; Sniderman 
& Theriault, 2004; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; although see Nisbet, Hart, Myers, & Ellithorpe, 
2013 for different findings).  
Partisan Biases in Public Perceptions of Election Polls. Election polls matter; they 
communicate the relative standing of the candidates to political elites, candidates, and the public 
(Patterson, 2005). In this process, polls can even influence whether and how people will vote (e.g. 
Hardmeier and Roth, 2001; Stolwijk, Schuck, de Vreese, 2016). Sometimes slight differences in 
the projected margins between the candidates can alter citizens’ propensity to participate in 
elections (Rothschild and Malhotra, 2014). In line with motivated reasoning theory, individuals 
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have prioritized directional goals that lead them to discount the messages that challenge their 
preexisting views and accept messages that bolster their views (cf. Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 
2013). Hence, individuals will disproportionately disregard unfavorable election polls compared 
to favorable polls that have equivalent or even poorer methodological quality. 
Given the extreme polarization during elections, there are strong reasons to think that 
perceptions of pre-election surveys may be particularly biased. In the run-up to an election, media 
outlets constantly report on polls bearing information about the relative standing of the candidates 
(Patterson, 2005). Because a large number of polls are produced by many sources, ordinary 
individuals are likely to encounter polls with inconsistent (varying) methodological qualities and 
results (Pasek, 2015). To the extent that individuals may prefer some substantive results over 
others, this deluge of information allows them to act on their motivations. That is, if people are 
predisposed to find favorable polls more credible, they are likely to have an arsenal of data – 
namely the universe of available polling evidence – with which to accomplish that goal. 
If individuals are selectively processing polls to serve motivational goals, I would expect 
to observe two distinct processes when they encounter conflicting results:  
H1: First, they should find that poll results where a favored candidate is in the lead are 
more credible than those suggesting a disfavored candidate is in the lead.  
H2: Second, they should generate expectations about the likely victor in line with these 
determinations.  
H3: In contrast, when individuals encounter multiple polls with consistent results – that is, 
when they do not see evidence they can latch on to in support of their favored view of 
reality or see only evidence that is consonant with that view – they should process the 
results in a consistent manner.  
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H4: These polls should uniformly shift expectations about the election toward the leading 
candidate. 
Do Ordinary Individuals Recognize the Methodological Quality of Polls? One 
opportunity to reduce biases in individuals’ processing of polls lies in reports of their quality 
indicators. Such information is important because election poll reports vary not only in the results 
they project but also in the quality of the data used to produce them (Hillygus, 2011; Pasek, 2015). 
Ideally, individuals should confer greater credibility upon polls that use higher quality methods 
and should use these disproportionately to update their electoral expectations.17 But it is unclear 
whether individuals have an interest in evaluating poll methodology, or even whether they are 
capable of doing so. Although some studies suggest that individuals know precious little about 
methodological aspects of surveys (Traugott and Kang, 2000), it is possible that the increasing 
provision of methodological information in media reports has subsequently fostered awareness (cf. 
Bhatti and Pedersen, 2016). Moreover, amidst frequent polling critiques and the discussions of 
“polling failures” in the media that follow unexpected election outcomes, the quality of polls is 
increasingly capturing public attention. Similarly, the increased popularity of data journalism, with 
outlets such as FiveThirtyEight, the New York Times Upshot, and Pollster.com, bring polling 
methods into a more central focus of public discussion.  
RQ1: I thus consider whether people will recognize quality differences when they 
encounter polls with similar results to be an open research question.  
When results are inconsistent, however, individuals should be more attentive to the quality 
of polls. Theories of dual information processing suggest that inconsistent results should lead to 
                                                 
17 High quality polls are typically derived from probability-based samples with large sample sizes, and they provide 
the most accurate portraits of elections (Baker et al., 2010). 
 63 
higher elaboration likelihood and thus greater consideration of relevant factors such as quality 
details (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).  
H5: People who encounter inconsistent poll results should allocate more attention to 
methodology to reconcile conflicting findings. That is, when contradictory polling results 
are characterized by varying quality, individuals should be less biased in their assessments 
than when those same results are of consistent quality. They should place more weight on 
the poll with higher methodological quality. 
Do methodological quality cues mitigate or enhance motivational biases? To the extent 
that individuals recognize quality differences between polls, it is important to examine whether 
and how this recognition interacts to mitigate or bolster their motivational biases. Whether and 
how differing methodological quality among polls - robust or poor – might influence the relative 
accuracy assessments of those polls remains an open question. For one, methodological details 
might mitigate people’s motivational biases. With regard to political beliefs and perceptions in 
related areas, recent research has shown that corrective attempts can reduce partisan biases (cf. 
Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010; also see Nyhan et al., 2017). 
In the context of polls, a person might see a high-quality result showing a favored candidate losing 
and be predisposed to discredit the data; however, recognizing that this poll has robust quality 
might offset their bias. Alternatively, methodological details of polls might be selectively 
interpreted, thereby amplifying biases. As people’s prior attitudes influence their assessments of 
evidentiary quality (cf. Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), quality indicators could serve as fodder for 
individuals to reinforce their biases instead of reducing their tendency to dismiss evidence.  
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Given these conflicting priors, when individuals encounter conflicting poll results, it is 
unclear whether variations in quality will enhance or mitigate motivational biases compared to a 
scenario where polls are of equivalent quality (comparing equivalent vs varying quality polls).  
RQ2: Are individuals disproportionately more likely to confer credibility to favorable poll 
results when they encounter polls with varying methodological quality? 
RQ3: Do individuals’ expectations of the likely victor become more or less entrenched 
when they encounter polls with varying methodological quality? 
Finally, studies of motivated reasoning have found that more sophisticated individuals are, 
paradoxically, the most likely to engage in biased processing. Specifically, individuals who have 
higher levels of political knowledge (Miller et al., 2015), numeracy (Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & 
Slovic, 2013), and education (Taber and Lodge, 2006) tend to display more bias in their evaluations 
of political messages. This is presumably because they can effectively counter-argue dissonant 
claims. 
H6: For this reason, I expect that more educated respondents will display more bias across 
all conditions. 
To keep the study as brief as possible and to ensure that our measure of sophistication 
was not endogenous to experimental conditions, I used respondent education which was 
available from GfK. Notably, these measures of sophistication may not correlate well with each 
other (Låg et al., 2014). Although both education and knowledge index respondent sophistication 
in various ways, there are notable differences between these individual differences. 
Methods  
Design. To test these hypotheses and research questions, I fielded a large national survey 
experiment designed to assess Americans’ reactions to hypothetical poll reports. Data were 
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collected between June 5 and 20, 2016 using GfK KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based 
sample of Americans recruited via address-based sampling to complete surveys online. Data 
collection was funded by a Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) Short 
Studies Program Grant (NSF Grant 0818839, Jeremy Freese and James Druckman, PIs). All 
measures were collected in the same survey following a larger unrelated TESS study. It was not 
possible to test potential spillover effects from this earlier study, as it leveraged a complex 
conjoint design (Transue, Lee, Aldrich 2009). Because the design of this earlier study was 
balanced, however, it was unlikely to introduce biases. 
Individuals from KnowledgePanel were invited by email to complete the survey and 63.6% 
of invited individuals did so. Cumulative with panel recruitment, the response rate (CUMRR) was 
2% (Callegaro and Disogra, 2008). For this study, a total of 2,078 individuals were randomly 
assigned to 12 experimental conditions designed to answer two overarching questions. In addition 
to the results presented here, which examine how characteristics of polls alter the perceptions and 
influence of poll reports, a second set of hypotheses tested how aspects of media coverage might 
further moderate these effects in Chapter 3. The current study focuses on the 959 respondents who 
were assigned to the five poll characteristic conditions (analysis of the remaining conditions are 
presented in the Empirical Study 3 in the next chapter). These conditions made it possible to 
investigate the all hypotheses and research questions identified above. The study was pre-
registered at EGAP - Evidence in Governance and Politics, ID #s 20160629AA <http://egap.org/> 
See Appendix P for anonymized preregistration details. The education moderation was noted but 
not numbered in the preregistration. Additional information about the sample can be found in 
Appendix O. 
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Procedure. During survey administration, respondents were first presented with what they 
were told was a screenshot of a news article. The article presented two election polls about 
Americans’ preferences in the 2016 presidential election. I manipulated whether the polls showed 
the same or different candidates leading and whether the polls were of consistently high or of 
variable methodological quality (one low and one high quality). The poor methodological quality 
poll had a convenience sample, low response rate, small sample size, and high margin of error; the 
high quality poll had a nationally representative sample with a high response rate, and a large 
sample with a low margin of error. Following these articles, respondents were asked to rate the 
relative accuracy of the polls and then to render a prediction about what would happen “if the 
election were held tomorrow.” Finally, they were debriefed. 
Although it is possible that respondents might compare our poll stories to what they had 
seen in the real news coverage, this is not likely to bias our results for two reasons. First, random 
assignment ensured that even if real polling exposure had an effect, it was symmetric for all 
respondents. Second, around the time of data collection there were numerous polls showing 
favorable results for both candidates, leading us to think that the believability of our manipulation 
stories was uncompromised.   
To manipulate methodological quality, high quality news stories reported on polls with a 
representative national sample that had a 21% response rate and a 2% margin of error and a low 
quality poll with an online convenience sample that had a 5% response rate and a 6% margin of 
error. When quality levels varied, the high quality poll was always presented second. The ordering 
of low vs high quality within news stories was not randomized. Whether a low or high quality poll 
came first will not introduce a bias; the random assignment of respondents and the bipolar nature 
of the dependent variable balances this ordering.  
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See Table 5 for the five combinations of these factors and their details and Appendix P for 
all manipulation stories and considerations about how they were produced. I leveraged in the 
preregistration the bipolar nature of the dependent variable and clarified what tests are to be 
conducted on which conditions and how, hence I did not need all manipulations to be in balance 
(i.e. full factorial). 
Table 5. Design of the Experimental Conditions 
C First Poll 
Details 
Second Poll 
Details 
Quality Results Abbrev. Sample 
Size 
Used in the Analysis of 
 (KnowPolitics) (Public-
Metrics) 
    H1-2 H3-4 RQ1 H5 RQ2-3 
C1 Clinton lead, 
high quality 
Trump lead, 
high quality 
Same Inconsistent DR  316 X - - - X 
C2 Clinton lead, 
low quality 
Clinton lead, 
high quality 
Variant Consistent dD 161 - X X - - 
C3 Trump lead, 
low quality 
Trump lead, 
high quality 
Variant Consistent rR 164 - X X - - 
C4 Trump lead, 
low quality 
Clinton lead, 
high quality 
Variant Inconsistent rD 158 - - - X X 
C5 Clinton lead, 
low quality 
Trump lead, 
high quality 
Variant Inconsistent dR 160 - - - X X 
Notes. Abbreviations: D=Democrat lead, R=Republican lead, lowercase letters show poor methodological 
quality, uppercases show robust methodological quality. 
 
 Perceived relative accuracy of the second poll. I measured credibility by focusing on the 
perceived relative accuracy of the polls. Following the manipulation, respondents were asked: 
“Comparing the two polls directly, which poll do you think is more accurate in representing the 
public support for the likely candidates in this election?” Seven response options were “The first 
poll (KnowPolitics) is much more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)” [coded: 0], “The 
first poll (KnowPolitics) is somewhat more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)” [.16], 
“The first poll (KnowPolitics) is a little more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)” [.33], 
“Neither poll is more accurate than the other poll” [.50],  “The second poll (Public-Metrics) is a 
little more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)” [.66], “The second poll (Public-Metrics) is 
somewhat more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)” [.83], “The second poll (Public-
Metrics) is much more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)” [1].  
 68 
Figure 8. Example hypothetical news report 
 
 When I operationalize bias in terms of the real methodological quality levels of election 
polls, the truth benchmark is tricky if we look at only one poll result and how it is perceived by a 
person. This is because even experts do not fully agree what constitutes a high quality poll. For 
example, is a 23% response rate a good enough response rate today or according to the standards 
fifteen years ago? Yet, when we examine relative methodological quality by measuring 
individuals’ perceived relative accuracy regarding multiple elections polls, this yields a more 
objective measure of bias, because it is clear that one poll has stronger methodology than the other 
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one.18 Hence, the movements in the relative perceived accuracy measure indexes the respondents’ 
acknowledgment of methodological quality in relation to comparison of two hypothetical polls, 
and thus provides a good measure for computing bias. 
 Electoral predictions. Respondents were asked: “If the election were held tomorrow and 
it was between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, which candidate do you think would win and 
become the next President of the U.S.?” Seven response options were “Clinton is much more likely 
to win” [coded: 0], “Clinton is somewhat more likely to win” [.16], “Clinton is a little more likely 
to win” [.33], “Both candidates are equally likely to win” [.50], “Trump is a little more likely to 
win” [.66], “Trump is somewhat more likely to win” [.83], “Trump is much more likely to win” 
[1]. 
Party identification (Party ID). Partisanship was measured with the traditional branched 
question that first asked whether respondents are Republican, Democrat, or Independent. Those 
who selected either party were asked a follow-up question about the strength of their identification 
(example: strong Republican vs. not a very strong Republican), and Independents were asked a 
follow-up question about whether they leaned towards either of the two parties or that they were 
fully independent. These four questions were combined to create a measure of party identification 
strength with seven points, ranging from 0 (strong Republican) to 1 (strong Democrat). 
The predisposition to disagree (“the bias”). To index the extent to which respondents 
were predisposed to disagree with the result of the second poll, I reverse-coded the party-
identification variable for respondents in experimental conditions where the second poll result 
showed a Democratic (Clinton) lead. Thus, the resulting measure indexed the match between 
                                                 
18 In evaluations of relative accuracy, as opposed to evaluations of a single poll in itself, methodological quality 
provides a stronger truth benchmark because it is clear that one poll is methodologically better than the other. 
Without the adequate knowledge about polling quality, recognizing high quality is a harder task for ordinary 
citizens. 
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respondent partisanship and the second poll’s result (i.e. predisposition to disagree with the second 
poll result).19 This variable ranged from 0, when the respondent’s party ID was strong and matched 
the leader in the second poll, to 1, when a respondent’s party ID was strong and did not match the 
leader in the second poll. For example, when a Trump-leading poll came second, strong 
Republicans were coded 0 (indicating the least predisposition to disagree with the second poll) and 
strong Democrats were 1 (indicating the highest predisposition to disagree with the second poll) 
with weaker partisans and independents evenly spaced between these extremes. 
Education. During recruitment to the panel, respondents were also asked about their 
education levels with four response options “less than high school” [0], “high school” [.33], “some 
college” [.67], and “college degree and more” [1]. For details, see Appendix O. 
Analytical Procedure. RQ1 and H3 were tested using independent sample t-tests. H1, H2, 
RQ2, H4, and H5 were tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimation. The first 
dependent variable (relative credibility) did not have a normal distribution; however, to be 
consistent in predicting the second dependent variable (perceived probability of Trump win), and 
to conduct the mediation analysis between the two dependent variables, OLS regressions were 
implemented.20 Item-nonresponse was minimal and did not vary across conditions. Inclusion of 
political interest as a control variable did not change the results (Appendix R). Education was 
included as a control variable because of the interaction tests and its relevance as a predictor of 
respondent ability to recognize methodological quality. As this was an experimental study and the 
use of weights on regressions is debated (see e.g. Gelman, 2007), I report regressions that were 
run on unweighted data; the weighted results did not differ.21  
Results 
                                                 
19 Note that the second poll was always the higher quality of the two when quality was inconsistent. 
20 I also ran the all analyses with ordinal logit regression, and there were no changes in the results (See Appendix V). 
21 I used weighted data to identify the prototypical American to produce the interaction plots. 
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Competing Poll Results. Much of the time, respondents tended to not discriminate 
between the credibility they conferred to the two polls they encountered. When the polls were of 
equivalent methodological quality (among C1 respondents), 69% of respondents correctly asserted 
that the polls were equally accurate. When one poll was of considerably higher quality than the 
other (C2 through C5 respondents), however, almost the same proportion of respondents asserted 
that the polls were equally accurate (60%, on average for C2 through C5). Despite these neutral 
perceptions of accuracy, respondents overwhelmingly had predictions about which of the two 
candidates would win if the election were held the following day. Only 22% of respondents, across 
all conditions, thought both candidates were equally likely to win (distributions in Appendix O, 
Table O2). 
 When people did discriminate between polls of equivalent quality, they overwhelmingly 
did so in accordance with their partisanship (H1). As shown in Table 6, partisans who were 
predisposed to find a poll result unfavorable – as Democrats did for the Trump-leading poll in C1 
– tended to report that the poll was less accurate than did those for whom the result was agreeable 
(b= -.17, se= .03, p< .001, Column 1). Overall, 27% of strong Democrats asserted that the poll 
where Clinton led was more accurate compared to 10% who thought the Trump poll was better. In 
contrast, 33% of strong Republications regarded the Trump-leading poll as more accurate, with 
only 5% reporting that the Clinton poll was preferable (See Table O2 in Appendix O). Figure 9A 
presents the relationship between relative accuracy of the polls for a prototypical American by 
party identification. 
These partisan biases appeared to spill over into respondents’ assessments of who would 
win the election. Not only did I find that respondents exhibited partisan biases in their predictions 
of the election outcome (H2), but the relative accuracy of the two polls was closely associated with 
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expected outcomes even when party identification was controlled. Overall, Democratic 
respondents were far more likely to expect that Clinton would win whereas Republican supporters 
expected that Trump would win (b= -.56, se= .05, p< .001, Table 6, Column 2; Figure 9B). 
Controlling for education and party identification, when respondents thought that the poll with 
Trump leading was more accurate, they were much more likely to believe that Trump would win 
(b= .44, se= .08, p< .001, Table U1, Appendix U). This suggests that evaluations of poll accuracy 
were related to the electoral expectations above and beyond partisanship. 
 
Table 6. OLS Regressions predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll (H1) and the 
perceived chances of Trump win (H2) when polls have inconsistent results but equivalent methodological 
quality (Condition 1) 
  Perceived Relative 
Poll Accuracy (H1) 
  Perceived Chance of 
Trump Win (H2) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Predisposition to Disagree -.17 *** (.03)         
Democratic Respondent         -.56 *** (.05) 
                
Intercept .62 *** (.03)   .79 *** (.04) 
Education -.04   (.03)   -.11 * (.05) 
N 299   306 
R2 .11   .34 
Notes. Disagreement is the short name for Predisposition to Disagree. For H1, higher scores represent 
greater credibility being conferred to the poll that shows Trump lead. For H2, higher scores in the 
outcome variable represent respondent perceptions of a Trump win as more probable. † denotes p lower 
than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
When respondents were shown polls with similar results, their predisposition to disagree 
with the results did not uniquely predict the perceived relative accuracy of polls. Although quality 
differed, respondents were not sensitive to this information when both polls’ results were 
unfavorable (H3), nor did their election predictions shift in the direction of the poll results (H4). 
See the Appendix S for more details. 
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Figure 9. Interaction plots. The plots on the left show the predicted perceived relative accuracy of the 
second poll according to the typical American adult. Right plots show the predicted probabilities of a 
perceived Trump victory. The dotted lines at y= .5 are for visual help in comparing the slopes. 
 
Methodological Quality of Polls  
In general, before accounting for motivational biases, when the quality of polls differed 
among polls with similar results, people tended to recognize the better-quality polls. Two-thirds 
of respondents differentiated the polls (i.e. did not state that they were of equal accuracy), and a 
majority (68%) of those who differentiated indicated that the objectively better poll was more 
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accurate (t= 3.37, p< .001, RQ1). This was also true when the results of two polls were conflicting; 
overall, 75% of respondents recognized the better poll was indeed more accurate (t= 4.72, p< .001, 
H5). Notably, the recognition of higher quality polls was no more pronounced for inconsistent poll 
results than consistent poll results (t= -1.10, p= .27). 
Party affiliations shaped perceptions of accuracy when respondents encountered polls with 
conflicting results. This tendency to prefer favorable polls did not fully override the corrective 
influence of methodological quality, however. When polls had varying quality, individuals 
predisposed to disagree with the results were more likely to discredit them than those predisposed 
to agree with the results (b= -.08, se= .04, p= .04),22 at the same time, these individuals were still 
more likely to identify the higher quality result as more accurate than to assert that their preferred 
result was the more accurate one (dashed line in Figure 9C). This inflated sense of accuracy with 
favorable poll is a weaker bias than what was observed when conflicting polls were of equivalent 
quality (b= .10, se= .05, p= .06, Table 7, Column 1).23 It indicates that partisan biases were smaller 
when people were exposed to polls with varying methodological qualities (RQ2). Similarly, 
exposure to varying quality polls, as compared to equivalent quality polls, led to a reduction of 
partisan bias in respondents’ expectations that their favored candidate would win (b= .17, se= .06, 
p= .01, Table 7, Column 2). As seen in Figure 9D, the differing quality condition had a shallower 
slope, indicating that expectations were less polarized when quality varied (RQ3).24 
Education Moderation. Across the board, more educated respondents were more likely 
to recognize higher quality polls. When polls were of equivalent quality (condition 1 only), 
                                                 
22 This significance test refers to the slope of the dashed line in Figure 9C (the impact of disagreement on credibility 
among polls with inconsistent quality and results). Regression is in Table S3 in Appendix S. 
23 The inclusion of the interaction term (Disagreement X Inconsistent Quality) improved the baseline model 
significantly, F(2, 600)=9.40, p<.001. 
24 I also tested whether consistency vs inconsistency among poll results would mitigate partisan biases. See 
Appendix U. There was no effect.  Finally, as an additional (mediation) analysis, I tested whether perceptions of 
credibility mediated the role of partisan bias in shaping subsequent electoral predictions, see Appendix U. 
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education was not associated with perceived accuracy (b= -.04, se= .03, p= .20; Table 6, Column 
1). In conditions where the polls’ quality differed, highly educated respondents recognized the 
better polls as more accurate (b= .13, se=.03, p< .001, Table 8, Column 2).25 Among those who 
graduated from high school, only 18% correctly identified the better poll; in contrast, among those 
with a college degree, 42% recognized the better poll.  
 
Table 7. Predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll (RQ2) and the perceived chances of Trump win (RQ3) 
when comparing polls that have equivalent vs varying methodological quality (Conditions 1, 4, and 5) 
  Perceived Relative Poll 
Accuracy (RQ2) 
  Perceived Chance of 
Trump Win (RQ3) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Predisposition to Disagree (Disagree) -.18 *** (.04)         
Democratic Respondent         -.55 *** (.05) 
Inconsistent Quality Condition .02   (.03)   -.10 * (.04) 
Disagree X Inconsistent Quality .10 † (.05)         
Democratic Respondent X Inconsistent Quality          .17 ** (.06) 
                
Intercept .58 *** (.03)   .81 *** (.04) 
Education .02   (.03)   -.13 *** (.03) 
N 605   614 
R2 .07   .28 
Notes. For RQ2, higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to the 
first poll; for RQ3, higher scores in the outcome variable represent respondent perceptions of a Trump win as more probable.  † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
Education moderated biases in poll perceptions, although not always in the hypothesized 
direction (H6). Below, I present the results of these analyses as they pertain to our hypotheses. For 
the sake of parsimony, and because education did little to moderate electoral expectations beyond 
mean differences (more educated respondents were more likely to expect a Clinton victory; see 
Kennedy et al., 2017), education results for electoral predictions are presented in Appendix T. 
In testing H1, I initially found evidence that individuals asserted that polls they were 
predisposed to agree with were of higher quality than those they were predisposed to disagree with.  
 
                                                 
25 In testing for RQ2a (Table 7, Column 1), education coefficient is not significant because it includes C1 where poll 
qualities were same, which cancelled out the effect of education coming from C2 and C3. 
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Table 8. Predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll (the higher quality one when the quality of polls is 
varying)) by Education   
Inconsistent Results & 
Equivalent Quality 
 
Consistent vs 
Varying Quality 
 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Predisposition to Disagree (Disagree) -.30 *** (.07)   -.30 *** (.08) 
Inconsistent Quality Condition -     -   -.14 * (.07) 
Inconsistent Results Condition -     -    -   -  
Disagree X Inconsistent Quality -     -   .24 * (.11) 
Disagree X Inconsistent Results -     -    -   -  
Disagree X Education .19 * (.10)   .19 † (.11) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education -     -   .25 * (.10) 
Inconsistent Results X Education -     -    -   -  
Inconsistent Quality X Disagree X Education -     -   -.23   (.16) 
Disagree X Inconsistent Results X Education -     -    -   -  
                
Intercept .68 *** (.04)   .68 *** (.05) 
Education -.14 * (.06)   -.14 * (.07) 
                
Conditions Included C1   C1, C4, C5   
N 299   605   
R2 .12   .07   
F-Test F(1)=4.07*   F(3)=2.92*   
Notes. For H1, higher scores represent greater credibility being conferred to the poll that shows Trump lead. For RQ2,  
higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to the first poll. F-tests  
compare the models to the corresponding baseline models reported in Table 6. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, **  
lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Figure 10. Interaction plots. The plots show the predicted probabilities of the perceived relative accuracy of the 
second poll, as moderated by education levels, according to the typical American adult. 
 
 77 
In contrast to H6, this bias appears to have been stronger among lower education respondents than 
highly educated respondents (b= .19, se= .10, p= .04, Table 8, Column 1; Figure 10A). 
 I had found in RQ2 that differing quality mitigated motivational biases compared to 
equivalent quality. When individuals encountered polls with inconsistent results and varying 
quality, respondents displayed small and similar biases regardless of education levels (Figure 
10B). This meant that the influence of quality variations operated principally by reducing bias 
among low education individuals (b= .25, se= .10, p= .01, Table 8, Column 2; compare solid line 
in Figure 10B to the solid line in Figure 10A). 
Summary of Results 
 H1: Confirmed – Respondents found poll results where a favored candidate was winning 
as more credible than those suggesting otherwise. 
 H2: Confirmed - Respondents generated expectations about the likely victor in line with 
these own preferences. 
H3: Not confirmed – Respondents were not sensitive to this information when both polls’ 
results were unfavorable. 
H4: Not confirmed – Respondents’ electoral expectations did not change when both polls’ 
results were unfavorable. 
 RQ1: When the quality of polls differed among polls with similar results, people tended to 
recognize the better-quality polls. 
H5: Confirmed – When poll results differed, respondents mostly recognized the better poll 
accurately before accounting for their biases.  
RQ2: Partisan biases in the perceived accuracy of polls were smaller when people were 
exposed to polls with varying methodological qualities. 
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RQ3: Partisan biases in electoral expectations were smaller when people were exposed to 
polls with varying methodological qualities. 
H6: Not confirmed –  Mostly, greater education led to less biased evaluation. 
Discussion 
 
Amidst a sea of election polls, Americans pick and choose which results to believe based 
in part on their own party affiliations. The current study establishes the prevalence of motivated 
reasoning in evaluations of the 2016 U.S. election polls as well as in subsequent expectations about 
the election outcome by experimentally manipulating results in the context the saturated 
preelection information environment. We found that quality differences between polls served as 
an informational corrective against partisan biases. Further, high education respondents were less 
susceptible to biases; if they viewed varying quality polls, they conferred more credibility to the 
higher quality poll although it was unfavorable. Finally, I also found that biased perceptions of the 
accuracy of polls subsequently influenced electoral expectations. 
Evidence that individuals selectively process preelection polls builds on an extensive prior 
literature. Most notably, this sort of biased processing is indicative of partisan motivated reasoning 
(cf. Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2013). Americans use their partisanship as a lens through 
which to evaluate the credibility they assign to various poll results, and these, in turn, reinforce 
biased perceptions of electoral outcomes. These findings build on evidence from public policy 
polls in the Empirical Study 1, where results were disproportionately discredited by respondents 
who learned that their position on an issue was at odds with the majority’s view. In the current 
study, when exposed to multiple polls in the campaign context, people selectively chose which 
polls to believe by discrediting ones that showed unfavorable information for their presumed 
candidate preference. These results may explain why partisan attacks against the validity of polls, 
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such as “rigged polls” in the 2016 campaign, can gain widespread interest and support in the public 
(Collison, 2016).  
In this study, I show that making methodological quality of evidence more salient in the 
context of news reports could sometimes mitigate partisan biases. Especially when respondents 
encountered polls that varied in their quality, they tended to recognize the stronger evidence for 
public opinion more than when they encountered similar quality polls. Similarly, inflated certainty 
in individuals’ election predictions that their favored candidate would win was effectively reduced. 
In the Empirical Study 1, the presence (vs. absence) of methodological details seemed to act as 
ammunition for counter-arguing against unfavorable issue polls. In the horserace context, 
however, where many simultaneous poll results are presented in the media, differing levels of 
quality led respondents to make more objective judgments about polls and the election outcome. 
These findings add to research showing the potential of corrective attempts against motivational 
biases and misinformation (cf. Bode and Vraga, 2015; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emerson, 2010). 
On the practical front, too, these findings are encouraging for endeavors like AAPOR’s 
Transparency Initiative and highlight the importance of media reporting that is cognizant of the 
methodological quality and limitations of public opinion data (Bhatti and Pedersen, 2016).  
These findings also suggest that it is valuable to give people more data - by including more 
polling data from previous or contemporaneous similar polls - to contextualize the results of any 
given singular poll which may push them into thinking about polls’ quality (e.g. Silver, 2016). 
Polling-average panels that list and summarize the most recent few polls on a table (e.g. 
RealClearPolitics, Pollster etc.) may be especially useful for readers. This nurturing of more 
nuanced understanding should then reduce partisan evaluations of polling evidence. On the 
practical front, however, pollsters and journalists should ensure that different results of polls are 
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not misinterpreted by the public, as sometimes the variations among results could be just “phantom 
changes” (Lauderdale and Rivers, 2016). 
Education Level and Motivated Reasoning. Finally, the specific ways and contexts with 
which polling evidence is communicated will lead to different assessments by different individuals 
– depending, in part, on their education levels. The results showed that respondents with both low 
and high education were susceptible to biases, yet these biases operated in different ways: When 
there was no difference between polls on the basis of quality (i.e. when poll quality was consistent), 
the least educated respondents were the most biased. When encountering poll results and 
methodological qualities that varied, low education respondents’ biases were reduced. These 
results imply that low education individuals exhibit greater bias when no quality differences are 
apparent. This finding is similar to what other research on policy information suggested (Mérola 
and Hitt, 2015).  
This mixed finding is surprising, however, in light of the findings from Empirical Study 1 
presented before which showed that the respondents with greater political knowledge were more 
likely to discredit public policy polls that showed their views in the minority. Therefore, the current 
results do not fully replicate that finding as well as findings from other studies in related areas (e.g. 
Kahan et al., 2013; Miller et al. 2015; Taber and Lodge 2006). However, it is important to note 
that these studies did not use the same constructs for respondent ability (education, political 
knowledge, numerical ability, polling literacy), so they might not be directly comparable. 
However, when respondents are not predisposed to elaborate but quality differences are 
apparent, higher education respondents recognized the better of the two polls only when the results 
were favorable. This indicates greater bias for more educated respondents, because they treat the 
polls as equally accurate when they substantially varied in their quality. Whether this bias 
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constitutes greater motivated reasoning, however, is debatable. According to motivated reasoning 
theory, individuals who dislike particular messages are motivated to find ways to counter-argue 
and rationalize the disproportionate discrediting of the disliked message (Taber and Lodge, 2013). 
Thus, our suggestion that more educated individuals differentiate polls based on quality when their 
results are favorable but not when their results are unfavorable is not fully consistent with the 
mechanisms proposed for motivated reasoning.  
On the practical front, these results also imply that there are potential benefits of 
emphasizing poll quality. Although low and high education respondents seem to react in different 
ways, attempts at increasing polling literacy in general might be helpful in drawing people’s 
attention to methodological quality. Another way to address this may be to deliver stronger and 
more direct messages that highlight and explain methodological quality, such as an expert 
commentary. 
Limitations and Future Research. These findings come with a few limitations that could 
be addressed in future research. First, it is hard to conduct experiments in the middle of an election 
year. Although random assignment prevents a potential bias, future work should incorporate how 
these results stand in relation to the actual presentation of poll results at the time of the campaign. 
Relatedly, the manipulation effects on electoral expectations are small, expected to be temporary, 
and should not be overstated. This makes sense given that there are potentially many other factors 
shaping individuals’ electoral expectations, although their party affiliation and polling exposure 
are likely to be some of the most important factors. 
Second, media sources are kept constant across experimental conditions. Empirical Study 
1 did not find any effect of media sources, whereas Chia and Chang (2017) demonstrated that 
exposure to unfavorable poll results fueled hostile media perceptions. Future research should 
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investigate whether and how media source effects operate in the competitive information 
environment of horserace coverage when results from various media sources contradict or confirm 
each other. 
Relatedly, although polls are ubiquitous in election coverage, and many campaign stories 
refer to recent previous (or other contemporaneous) poll findings, people are not always exposed 
to multiple polls simultaneously. The process of updating beliefs in response to sequential polls 
may differ from the simultaneous exposure tested here (cf. Tormala and Petty, 2001). Hence, future 
research could examine how consecutive exposure to polling within the context of long election 
campaigns could shape perceptions and beliefs (cf. Jonas et al., 2001).  
Whereas the TESS data provided a nationally representative sample, I had to rely on party 
identification as a proxy variable for inferring respondents’ candidate support. This might not have 
been ideal in an election where we saw a significant political coverage about the quality of the 
candidate choice - dismay by Democrats against the Democratic candidate and vice versa for 
Republicans (Newport and Dugan, 2016). Finally, both dependent variables were bipolar scales, 
which might have introduced midpoint response bias for some respondents who might satisfice by 
choosing the easiest (most acquiescent) midpoint option (cf. Garland, 1991).  
Empirical Study 3: Cherry-picking from Diverse Quantifications of Public Opinion 
 
Introduction 
 
Today, coverage of public opinion relies on diverse metrics beyond the traditional polls. 
Polling averages, forecasting models, prediction markets and analyses of social media buzz are 
increasingly part of the mainstream coverage along with the traditional polls. While these metrics 
gauge public opinion, they substantially differ in what they show, as discussed in the Introduction 
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chapter in detail. A crucial question prevails: What do people make of these entirely different 
metrics? 
An extensive literature in psychology, communication, and political science leads us to 
expect that members of the public would not be critical as methodological experts and pundits in 
evaluating and comparing such reports. The vast literature on political knowledge documents that 
people are not well informed about politics (Carpini & Keeter, 1997). People are not so 
knowledgeable about polling, either (Traugott & Kang, 2000). Still, if some of the new digital 
tools (such as constantly-updated forecasting reports) are perceived to be, or are in fact, “better” 
quantitative metrics of public opinion, then there is a possibility that these reports would be 
perceived as more accurate by individuals. The popularity and success of Nate Silver in 2012 could 
be one example of how the public might be exposed to the rhetoric of “better” evidence in these 
reports (Butterworth, 2014). As an exploratory question, first, I investigate how people might be 
responsive to the type of these public opinion metrics and recognize their distinctions: 
RQ1: Do people distinguish between different types of reports when they evaluate their 
perceived credibility? 
However, not all individuals should be equally sensitive to the differences between the 
diverse metrics of public opinion. They might differ in how they evaluate reports along a set of 
theoretically-relevant individual characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors. To further explore some 
individual differences, I examine the correlates in the credibility evaluations: 
RQ2: How are demographic (education, age), sophistication (political interest, knowledge, 
numeracy), and media-related (exposure to reports, general media attitudes) associate with 
individuals’ perceptions of diverse public opinion metrics? 
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 Considerable research in science communication showed how people’s evaluations of new 
technological developments, such as nanotechnology, are shaped by their prior attitudes and how 
media frame the news (e.g. Druckman and Bolsen, 2011). I expect the similar biased information 
processing to influence how people make sense of emergent forms of public opinion metrics. 
According to motivated reasoning theory, people rely on their motivations when they 
evaluate the new messages and sort them based on whether the new messages are favorable to their 
own positions and attitudes (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002). People engage 
in counter-arguing or discounting of the credibility of unfavorable stimuli to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. The biases I demonstrated in Empirical Studies 1 and 2 should also be at work in 
people’s perceptions of diverse metrics of public opinion and how they compare them. 
If motivational biases are to dominate these judgment processes when people constantly 
encounter diverse forms of digital metrics in the horse race, then people should confer more 
credibility to the metrics that show their candidates winning instead of the alternative types of 
reports that might suggest otherwise. In short, motivations could trump the distinctions between 
different quantifications. For example, an election prediction market based model result giving 
Clinton very high probability of winning could be perceived as much more credible by a Clinton 
supporter instead of a latest poll result or the polling average that actually show a close race. Even 
in cases when the results of diverse metrics are similar (all showing a single candidate winning), 
some metrics would be perceived as more credible than others: For example, a poll result might 
show that the desired candidate has 52% of the vote, and a forecasting model might show an 85% 
chance that this same candidate will win. The latter could be perceived as a better metric by the 
people who support that candidate. These biases could then lead people to reinforce their prior 
positions and form biased perceptions of the public opinion:  
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H1: People will discount credibility of reports that show an unfavorable candidate 
(candidate nominated by the party that the respondent does not identify with) winning. 
Moreover, some individuals can exhibit this bias more strongly than others. The role of 
ability to counter-argue is a key mechanism in motivated reasoning that has been demonstrated by 
recent research (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Miller, Saunders, and Farhart, 
2015; Kahan et al., 2013). I expect to replicate findings from Empirical Study 1: 
H2a: The effect of unfavorable messages on perceived credibility will be stronger for 
individuals with higher political knowledge 
H2b: The effect of unfavorable messages on perceived credibility will be stronger for 
individuals with higher numeracy.  
Finally, motivational biases would be expected to take effect when people encounter 
multiple and different types of public opinion reports – a scenario that is highly likely in today’s 
digital data journalism during election years. Previous research has also shown that motivational 
biases impact selective exposure and selective attention processes (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 
2011). Given that citizens are exposed to multiple types of public opinion reports, I expect that 
they would engage in such motivationally-driven selection processes in circumstances that prompt 
them to compare and pick some reports over others:  
H3: People will pick and choose (rank higher) the report that shows their own party’s 
candidate winning as opposed to the report that shows the rival party’s candidate winning, 
irrespective of the type of report. 
For the exploratory part (RQ1 and RQ2), I conducted a small survey and for the theoretical 
testing part (H1, H2s, and H3), I conducted an experiment. I present these as two separate studies 
below as the samples and design are slightly different. 
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Empirical Study 3a: Exploring the public’s engagement with diverse metrics  
To pursue research questions 1 and 2, an exploratory online survey was conducted to 
understand what people think of diverse public opinion metrics as well as their exposure to them. 
By asking their views about these reports in general, this study attempts to understand whether 
people differentiate and make sense of these reports. As the public’s engagement with diverse 
public opinion metrics has not been studied before, this survey serves as an important exploratory 
and descriptive endeavor. 
Methods 
Data. The data was collected on August 8, 2016 from 200 MTurk Prime workers (IRB 
approval for both studies as obtained on August 2, 2016). Amazon’s new platform for academic 
research – MTurk Prime –provides additional information about the sampling procedure that was 
not retrievable in the traditional MTurk platform (see Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). 
Only those respondents who live in the U.S., have a 99% approval rate in their Amazon HITs, and 
previously completed 1000 other tasks on the platform were allowed to take the survey. All 
respondents were compensated with small monetary funds in exchange for the voluntary 
participation. The completion rate of the task in MTurk was 88%, and the average HIT submission 
time was 15.7 minutes, whereas the bounce rate was 19%.26 The survey completion time on the 
other hand, as calculated by Qualtrics, was 10.3 minutes.27  
Measures. As respondents might not be familiar with specific terms about opinion metrics, 
they were provided with a brief explanations about each of the five types: polls, polling averages, 
forecasting models, analysis of social media buzz, and election prediction markets. Each 
                                                 
26 Completion rate is the % of respondents who accepted a HIT and submitted it successfully. Completion time is the 
time that it takes respondent accepting a HIT and submitting their answer. Bounce rate is the number of people who 
viewed the HIT and did not accept to take it.  
27 For demographics: Appendix Y. 
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explanation included a list of examples and an example with a clickable link (Appendix Z). The 
survey progression locked for 30 seconds to encourage and ensure that respondents read and 
engage with the information provided. After this, respondents were led to the questionnaire. 
The respondents were first asked about their exposure to these reports, “How frequently do 
you read the following type of election related reports in the news media?”, with response options, 
“Never”, “Once a month”, “Several times a month”, “Once a week”, “Several times a week”, and 
“Everyday”.  
Perceived Credibility. Respondents were asked three questions to evaluate the perceived 
methodological quality of diverse reports: representativeness, accuracy, and relevance of the 
metric for the election. These three items would tap into their lay perceptions of the foundational 
methodological distinctions between the diverse metrics. For representativeness, respondents were 
asked “How representative do you think the following type of election related reports are in terms 
of showing information about the whole American electorate?” with response options “Not 
representative at all”, “Slightly representative”, “Somewhat representative”, “Very 
representative”, and “Extremely representative.” For accuracy, respondents were asked, “How 
accurately do you think the following type of election related reports portray the public support 
levels for the presidential candidates?” with the response options ranging from “Not accurate at 
all” to “Extremely accurate.” For relevance, respondents were asked “How relevant do you think 
the information in these reports are in predicting the results of the presidential election in 
November?” with response options ranging from “Not relevant at all” to “Extremely relevant.”  
All items are recoded to range from 0 to 1, and then averaged into an index measure of perceived 
(methodological) credibility (PMC).28  
                                                 
28 Reliability scores for Polls: α=.92; Polling-averages: α=.93; Forecasting-models: α=.92; Analysis of social media 
buzz: α=.86; Election-prediction markets: α=.92. 
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After answering these questions separately for each metric type, participants were asked to 
rank-order them: “If you were to make a prediction about the winner of the election, which one of 
the following types of election related reports would you rely on the most and the least?” and they 
were asked to write their general evaluation for each report type in an open-ended question. 
Participants were then asked about their interest in general election news: “How interested are you 
in 2016 election-related news?” The question had five response options ranging from “Not 
interested at all” to “Extremely interested.”  
Ability Correlates. Political knowledge was measured with six items; it was specifically 
about respondents’ knowledge of the 2016 election candidates and campaign. This scale is relevant 
for the assessment of respondents’ real engagement levels with the current election.29 Second, 
numeracy measured participants’ general ability with numbers. This is a very relevant ability 
measure in the context of assessing their differential levels of engagement with various quantitative 
election reports. Three items were used from a validated numeracy scale (Weller et al., 2013).30 
Finally, demographic questions were also asked.31 
As most of the newer forms of public opinion are digital-native and digital-only metrics, 
respondents were also asked about the mode of their news diet: “Do you get your political news 
mostly through offline (TV, newspaper, radio) or online (news websites, social media, phone 
applications) resources?” with seven response options ranging from “Only offline” to “Only 
online”.  
                                                 
29 An example item is “Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Democrats?” and each question had two response 
options, one was correct and one was wrong (Appendix Z). 
30 An example item is “If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets?” and each item had five response options, only one of them being correct (Appendix Z). 
31 The study asked respondents their age, sex, education level, income, and party identification too (Appendix Z). 
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Finally, respondents answered four statements about their overall attitudes toward media 
and election coverage (media skepticism). For example, they evaluated, “Media provide 
interesting, engaging reports and stories regarding the election” (reverse-coded, with higher scores 
showing greater criticism) with five response option ranging from “Not true at all” to “Extremely 
true”.32 
Analytical Strategy. First, the qualitative examination of respondents’ comments in the 
open-ended questions provided an initial insight for understanding their familiarity and perceptions 
of these reports. Then, OLS regression was used to predict the outcome variable (perceived 
methodological credibility, PMC) to observe whether and how the perceptions of these reports 
would differ across a number of key predictors.  
Finally, ranking of the reports was predicted by using the seemingly-unrelated regression 
(SUR) estimation. The variances in ranking of each report would be correlated with each other, 
because the ranking of one is inherently related to the ranking of another report (Henningsen, 
Hamann, & others, 2007), hence this special regression technique is used to predict the ranking 
order. 
SUR estimates directly compare the different election reports as they predict the ranks 
respondents assign. Respondents ranked the five different reports, so the possible response options 
for the outcome variable (ranks) ranged from 1 to 5. Every report has received a value, and they 
were recoded as 1= .4, 2= .3, 3= .2, 4= .1 where the recoded values represent the relative strength 
(higher in the ranking) with equal intervals and these values add up to 1. After this recoding, the 
rank values each respondent assigned to each report are run in a system of regressions and the 
                                                 
32 For descriptive statistics, see Appendix AA. 
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results provide regression results predicting rank order of each report by accounting for the 
dependency between the rankings of different models. 
 
Figure 11. A representation of how respondents ranked the different metrics 
Results 
A reading of the all respondents’ comments revealed a substantial level of critical 
understanding between the differences and limitations of the diverse public opinion metrics. In 
this regard, there were two distinct type of comments. Some comments were methodological in 
nature (“completely irrelevant, social media/search represents a very small portion of the 
population”, “A good picture that washes out individual poll biases”, “Higher margin of error”), 
others consisted of accusations of media being biased (“Useless due to slant of developer”, “These 
tend to be skewed, as the people running them word question to promote their own interests”, 
“They are lies concocted by the media!”). Whereas traditional poll reports were mostly viewed as 
being “useless” and “biased”, polling averages and forecasting models were seen as “being more 
sophisticated/scientific” and “being more representative.” Views on election prediction markets 
pointed to accuracy due to “money being involved,” while social media analyses reports were 
criticized as only focusing on “Internet using populations” and as being “irrelevant” for predicting 
who would win the election. These results suggest that many people were able to distinguish 
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diverse opinion metrics and critically evaluate them in either methodological or non-
methodological ways (RQ1).33 
Further, OLS results showed important demographic and media-consumption related 
differences in how people perceive the public opinion reports. There was no association between 
demographic variables and PMC. The only exception was that higher education lead to greater 
PMC for polling averages (b=.37, se=.21, for some college; b=.55, se=.30 for college; b=.35, 
se=.20 for postgraduate, Table 9). Greater exposure consistently lead to greater perceived 
methodological credibility for traditional polls (b=.12, se=.05, p<.05), polling averages (b =.18, 
se=.05, p<.001), forecasting models (b=.15, se=.05, p<.01), and for analyses of social media buzz 
(b=.09, se=.04, p<.05, see Table 9). Neither interest in the election nor greater online news use (vs 
offline) were related to the PMC for any of the reports. Controlling for all the variables, political 
knowledge and numeracy were not predictive of PMC, either, in almost all reports. The only effect 
was the large predictive coefficient numeracy had on the PMC of election prediction markets (b=-
.54, se=.23, p<.05, Table 9). Finally, media skepticism had a large and highly significant negative 
coefficient for the credibility of all types of reports: polls (b= -.34, se=.08, p<.001), polling 
averages (b=-.30, se=.08, p<.001), forecasting models (b =-.38, se=.09, p<.001), election 
prediction markets (b=-.36, se=.08, p<.001), and analyses of social media buzz (b= -.24, se=.07, 
p<.001, Table 9). All these results provide insight for RQ2. They show that people’s exposure and 
general views of the media are consistently related to their evaluations of these reports, whereas 
numeracy seems to matter for the credibility of election prediction markets only. 
SUR results indicated some meaningful differences in how people compare the multiple 
reports to each other, and these effects especially mattered for forecasting models. Both greater 
                                                 
33 See the dataset for all comments. 
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political knowledge (b=.13, se=.05, p<.05) and greater numeracy (b=.10, se=.03, p<.01) led to a 
higher ranking of forecasting models relative to the other four metrics (Table 11). On the other 
hand, greater political knowledge (b=-.09, se=.05, p<.10) and greater numeracy (b=-.06, se=.03, 
p<.05) led to lower ranking of the traditional polls compared to the other metrics (Table 10). 
Finally, more negative views about the media in general lead to greater ranking of analyses of 
social media buzz relative to the other metrics (b=.03, se=.01, p<.5, Table 10). These results 
provide insight for both RQ1 and RQ2. 
Table 9. OLS Regression Results Predicting the Credibility of Diverse Election Reports – Study 1 (Empirical Study 3a) 
 Polls  
Polling 
Averages 
 
Forecasting 
Models 
 
Election Prediction 
Markets 
 Media Analyses 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept 3.79 *** (.48)  3.35 *** (.51)  3.84 *** (.52)  4.13 *** (.50)  3.72 *** (.43) 
Edu (Some college) .01  (.20)  .37 + (.21)  .21  (.22)  -.02  (.21)  .15  (.18) 
Edu (College) .29  (.28)  .55 + (.30)  .44  (.31)  -.07  (.29)  -.03  (.25) 
Edu (Postgraduate) -.04  (.19)  .35 + (.20)  .11  (.21)  -.18  (.20)  .02  (.17) 
Election Interest .02  (.06)  -.04  (.06)  -.09  (.07)  .02  (.06)  .00  (.05) 
Online News Use  .05  (.04)  .03  (.04)  .05  (.04)  .03  (.04)  -.01  (.04) 
Exposure .12 * (.05)  .18 *** (.05)  .15 ** (.05)  .02  (.05)  .09 * (.04) 
Political Knowledge .10  (.36)  -.03  (.38)  .32  (.39)  -.09  (.37)  -.38  (.32) 
Numeracy -.34  (.22)  -.25  (.23)  -.19  (.24)  -.54 * (.23)  -.25  (.20) 
Media Skepticism -.34 *** (.08)  -.30 *** (.08)  -.38 *** (.09)  -.36 *** (.08)  -.24 *** (.07) 
          
N 200  200  200  200  200 
R-square .18  .19  .18  .16  .17 
Notes. Outcome variable is the credibility index composed of representativeness, accuracy, and relevance of these reports in 
general in gauging the public support in election campaigns. Age, gender, and income are also controlled for and they have no 
significant association with any of the models. Coef. denotes OLS coefficients, se denotes standard errors. † denotes p lower than 
.10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed.  
 
Table 10. SUR Estimation of the Relative Ranking of Election Reports – Study 1 (Empirical Study 3a) 
 Polls  
Polling 
Averages 
 
Forecasting 
Models 
 
Prediction 
Markets 
 
Analyses of 
Media Buzz 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .41 *** .06  .15 * .06  .08  .07  .30 *** .06  .06  .06 
Election Interest .00  .01  .00  .01  -.01  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01 
Online News Use  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01 
Exposure .00  .01  .01  .01  .01 + .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
Political Knowledge -.09 + .05  .06  .05  .13 * .05  -.05  .05  -.05  .05 
Numeracy -.06 * .03  .03  .03  .10 ** .03  -.04  .03  -.02  .03 
Media Skepticism .00  .01  .00  .01  -.02  .01  -.01  .01  .03 * .01 
N 200  200  200  200  200 
R-square .06  .02  .11  .04  .04 
Notes. Outcome variable is the relative ranking score of the five different election reports. Coef. denotes the change in the 
ranking where positive indicates that an increase in a variable is associated with an increase in the relative ranking of the election 
report. se denotes standard errors. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. 
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All tests are two-tailed. Models that include the demographic variables did not differ from these results and demographic 
variables’ results did not predict anything, hence this simplified model is presented. System N= 800. 
 
Summary of Results 
RQ1: There is some suggestive evidence that respondents recognize the differences 
between diverse metrics. 
RQ2: Media cynicism had a persistent negative correlation with the evaluations of all types 
of public opinion reports. 
Discussion 
These results suggest that people can distinguish diverse reports and that there are 
important differences in how people evaluate them. The differences in respondent comments, as 
illustrated with the representative examples, suggest that most of the public are responsive to the 
representativeness and validity differences between the reports. Simultaneously, their general 
evaluations of specific media channels or media at large colored their judgments of these reports 
instead. OLS findings imply that greater exposure/familiarity with these reports bolster their 
credibility, although negative views about the media lowers it. This suggests that when people 
encounter different types of metrics, their evaluations of each of them are rather similar along these 
demographic, political, and media use correlates. Yet, when they are prompted, more directly, to 
compare them, their views of traditional polls and forecasting models seem to differ from others. 
They pick forecasting models as the most sophisticated metric with increasing knowledge and 
numeracy and avoid the single traditional poll reports. A lot of critique on limits of traditional 
polling in 2016 campaign period (and the lack of an equal amount of critique on newer metrics) as 
well as recent polling failures (e.g. Greece, Canada, Columbia, and Brexit) might have contributed 
to such differential skepticism about polls (e.g. Lepore, 2015; NYT Room for Debate, 2015). 
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The following limitations should be noted. First, Amazon MTurk is not generalizable to 
the U.S. population. Future studies should test larger and more representative samples. Second, 
respondents might have specific attitudes towards mainstream vs alternative news outlets. 
Although most of the mainstream news outlets integrate these diverse metrics in their horse race 
reporting, some of the well-known original sources of these alternative metrics are blogs and sites 
like 538, RealClearPolitics, Vox, and Predictit. Although media skepticism, which is included as 
a control variable in the models, is a proxy for measuring this, it does not really address it. Hence, 
future investigations should also consider the nature of media sources and how they would matter 
for public perceptions. 
Empirical Study 3b: Measuring public reactions to distinct types of public opinion reports 
Introduction 
Whether the increasing diversity of public opinion reports leads to susceptibility to 
motivational biases remains to be investigated. People’s reactions to three different types of public 
opinion reports (polling averages, forecasting models, and analyses of social media buzz) were 
measured within the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Participants were exposed to 
hypothetical news reports via an online survey-experiment. Reports showed results favoring either 
Republican candidate Donald Trump or Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. After reading the 
manipulation stories, participants’ reactions were measured along with a set of other questions. 
Methods 
Data. The sample consists of a total of N=400 MTurk respondents. The survey was 
constructed in Qualtrics and data was collected on August 8-9, 2016 with the completion rate of 
91%, the average HIT submission time of 11.7 minutes, and bounce rate of 15%.  Respondents in 
Study 1 were not able to participate. 
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Measures. Manipulations. Each participant was assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions where they viewed various combinations of results for the three types of public opinion 
reports (a polling-average, a forecasting models, and an analysis of social media buzz) about the 
presidential candidates Clinton and Trump’s standings. A brief descriptions of these metrics were 
also included in the reports. To avoid cognitive overload of evaluating and comparing five different 
metrics and to keep survey length manageable, only three (instead of all five that were examined 
in the Empirical Study 3a) types of metrics were included in this design. Each respondent saw all 
three types of reports. Polling average results always showed Clinton ahead, whereas social media 
analysis reports’ and forecasting model reports’ results varied in all possible combinations (CC, 
TT, TC, CT, Table 11, see Figure 12 for an example).34 These combinations of news stories 
provide a realistic sampling of diverse metrics that the respondents might have observed in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election by focusing on the more popular ones.35 After seeing each report, 
they responded to the survey questions. 
Table 11. Manipulation combinations for Study 2 (Empirical Study 3b) 
  Polling Average Forecasting Model  Social Media Buzz 
Condition 1 Clinton ahead Clinton ahead Clinton ahead 
Condition 2 Clinton ahead Trump ahead  Trump ahead 
Condition 3 Clinton ahead Clinton ahead Trump ahead 
Condition 4 Clinton ahead Trump ahead Clinton ahead 
 
First, participants evaluated the representativeness, accuracy, and relevance of the reports 
as in Study 1 (see the Appendix Z for question wordings that slightly differed from Study 1). All 
                                                 
34 The asymmetry regarding polling average reports, which always show a Clinton lead, is intended to leverage the 
external validity and believability of the news reports. At the time of the data collection, there was a wide Clinton 
lead in all available polling averages. Also, the news stories were made to look like real screenshots; so logos have 
been integrated (Appendix AB). 
35 The balance-check tests revealed that only political interest was significantly different in the baseline comparisons 
between the four conditions, hence it will be included as a control variables in the regressions (Appendix AC), 
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items were recoded to range from 0 to 1, and then averaged into an index measure of perceived 
methodological credibility (PMC)36.  
Figure 12. Hypothetical news report example 
 
After seeing all three stories and answering these questions individually for each of them, 
respondents also evaluated these reports in direct comparison, by ranking them” “If you were to 
be make a prediction about the winner of the election, which one of the election related reports 
you have seen would you rely on the most and the least?” They ranked the three stories, hence 
each story received a rank value of either 1, 2, or 3.37 
 A “disagreement with news story result” variable was constructed to measure the extent of 
a report’s favorability to a respondent. It is computed by multiplying the party identification value 
of each respondent (1=Strong Democrat to 7=Strong Republican) with the result of the specific 
election report they have seen which showed a Trump or Clinton lead (separately calculated for 
                                                 
36 Reliability scores for Polling averages: α=.91; Forecasting models: α=.93; Analysis of social media buzz: α=.91. 
37 Like in Study 1, the rank scores were re-coded in a way to sum up to 1: 1= .66, 2= .33, and 3= 0. Also, the 
interaction effects with political knowledge and numeracy are hypothesized and examined for the OLS models. 
Theoretically, and analytically, whether such interactive effects would also apply for selective comparisons between 
multiple reports is beyond the scope of this study. 
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each of the three stories that every respondent read).38 This measure indexes the extent of 
motivational bias. Aside from these, respondents answered most of the same questions reported in 
Study 1. 
Analytical Strategy. As in Study 3a, OLS regression was used to predict credibility 
assessments of individual reports while SUR was used to predict ranking of different reports.39  
Results 
OLS Results showed that motivational bias is an important factor driving individuals’ 
evaluations of all three reports. Greater disagreement was significantly predictive of substantial 
drops in perceived credibility for polling averages (b= -.12, se=.03, p<.001), forecasting models 
(b= -.11, se=.02, p<.001) as well as analyses of social media buzz (b= -.09, se=.02, p<.001, Table 
12). Moreover, the significance of this main effect persisted across half of the consecutive models 
when additional interaction terms were entered. These results provide strong support for H1.40  
Political knowledge had a number of different effects that provided evidence for H2 only 
partly whereas numeracy of respondents did not matter at all. In baseline models, increasing 
political knowledge lead to lower credibility assessments for both forecasting models (b=-.64, 
se=.29, p<.05) and analyses of social media buzz (b=-54, se=.27, p<05), yet this main effect 
disappeared in the interaction models (Table 12). Political knowledge interacted with disagreement 
only in models predicting the credibility of forecasting models. As hypothesized, the effect of 
                                                 
38 The resulting disagreement vector gives the highest score to a strong Democrat who sees a report showing a Trump 
lead or to a strong Republican who sees a report showing Clinton lead; whereas on the other hand, a strong Democrat 
seeing a Clinton lead has the smallest value in this disagreement vector.  
39 OLS models tested the PMC index on the three types of election reports through four consecutive models. The 
Baseline Model includes all control variables. Disagreement Model is the addition of disagreement as a key 
predictor. Knowledge Interaction Model tests the interaction of disagreement and political knowledge. Numeracy 
Interaction Model tests the interaction of disagreement and numeracy. Knowledge and numeracy interactions were 
tested separately; in this way, multicollinearity and challenges in the theoretical interpretation are avoided. 
40 Supplementary Analyses: Item-by-item analysis of the outcome variable as well as direct comparison of Study 1 
and 2 models are provided in Online Appendices F and G, which provide further support for the main conclusions.  
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disagreement on credibility was particularly strong for those more knowledgeable respondents (b= 
-.23, se=.10, p<.05, Table 12). The three dimensional plot in Figure 12 represents the nature of 
this interaction of the two continuous variables. As seen in Figure 12, greater political knowledge 
exacerbated the discounting of credibility for those in disagreement with the election report result,  
Table 12. OLS Regression Results Predicting the Credibility of Three Experimental Election Stories – Study 2 (Empirical S. 3b) 
 Baseline Model  
Disagreement 
Model 
 Knowledge 
Interaction 
 Numeracy 
Interaction 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Polling Average                
Intercept 2.58 *** .26  3.04 *** .28  3.37 *** .45  3.00 *** .34 
Election Interest .03  .04  .03  .04  .03  .04  .03  .04 
Political Knowledge .13  .27  .07  .27  -.36  .55  .07  .27 
Numeracy .23  .18  .21  .17  .22  .17  .28  .34 
Disagreement     -.12 *** .03  -.22 + .12  -.11  .07 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge         .13  .15     
Disagreement X Numeracy             -.02  .09 
N 391  391  391  391 
R-square .01  .06  .06  .06 
F-change -  F(1)=22.17***  F(1)=.81  F(1)=.04 
Forecasting Model                
Intercept 2.93 *** .28  3.11 *** .27  2.67 *** .32  3.02 *** .30 
Election Interest .03  .05  .06  .04  .06  .04  .06  .04 
Political Knowledge -.64 * .29  -.64 * .28  -.10  .36  -.63 * .28 
Numeracy .19  .19  .15  .18  .17  .18  .26  .24 
Disagreement     -.11 *** .02  .07  .08  -.08  .05 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge         -.23 * .10     
Disagreement X Numeracy             -.04  .06 
N 391  391  391  391 
R-square .01  .10  .12  .11 
F-change -  F(1)=38.80***  F(1)=5.70*  F(1)=.50 
Analysis of Social Media Buzz                
Intercept 2.68 *** .26  2.85 *** .26  2.59 *** .30  2.89 *** .27 
Election Interest .06  .04  .05  .04  .05  .04  .05  .04 
Political Knowledge -.54 * .27  -.45 + .26  -.10  .34  -.45 + .26 
Numeracy -.41 * .18  -.36 * .17  -.37 * .17  -.41 + .22 
Disagreement     -.09 *** .02  .03  .08  -.11 * .05 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge         -.15  .09     
Disagreement X Numeracy             .02  .06 
N 391  391  391  391 
R-square .03  .10  .10  .10 
F-change -  F(1)=28.41***  F(1)=2.61  F(1)=.13 
Notes. Outcome variable is the credibility index composed of representativeness, accuracy, and relevance of these reports in 
general in gauging the public support in election campaigns. Coef. denotes OLS coefficients, se denotes standard errors. + 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F-test 
changes reported in the Disagreement Models show the difference between the Baseline Model and Disagreement Model, other 
F-tests compare against the Disagreement Models. 
 
 99 
but for those who are not in disagreement, individual differences in political knowledge did not 
lead to such interactive effect. This result provides support for H2a, but only for forecasting 
models. Numeracy, on the other hand, did not moderate any of the disagreement effects on PMC 
in any of the election report types (H2b). 
SUR estimates showed that motivational biases matter, but also suggested that rational 
evaluations might have an effect too. Disagreement was consistently and negatively related with 
the ranking degree of a metric, although with a small coefficient (b= -.01, se=.001, p<.001 for 
forecasting models, and b= -.01, se=.001, p<.001 for media analyses reports; for polling averages 
the effect was not significant, b= -.01, se=.01, p<.10; see Table 13), which shows some evidence 
supporting H3. However, results also showed that the control variable of numeracy was positively 
predictive of forecasting models’ higher position in ranking (b=.10, se=.04, p<.05) and was 
negatively predictive of media analyses reports’ ranking score (b= -.17, se=.04, p<.001, Table 13). 
 
Table 13. SUR Estimation of the Relative Ranking of Election Reports – Study 2 (Empirical Study 3b) 
 
Polling Average  
Forecasting 
Models 
 Media Analyses 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .44 *** .07  .33 *** .06  .33 *** .07 
Election Interest .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01 
Political Knowledge .02  .07  .01  .07  -.02  .07 
Numeracy .07  .04  .10 * .04  -.17 *** .04 
Disagreement -.01 + .01  -.01 *** .00  -.01 *** .00 
            
N 390  390  390 
R-square .01  .06  .06 
Notes. Outcome variable is the relative ranking score of the five different election reports. Coef. denotes the change in the 
ranking where positive indicates that an increase in a variable is associated with an increase in the relative ranking of the election 
report. se denotes standard errors. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. 
All tests are two-tailed. System N= 1170, Note that one election report is taken as a baseline so that the procedure is conducted 
twice where another election report is taken as a baseline to produce the results for the baseline election report in the first system 
analysis. The results are the same when the baseline election report is changed. 
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Figure 13. Interaction of Disagreement and Political Knowledge Predicting the Credibility of Forecasting Models – 
Study 2 (Empirical Study 3b) 
 
 
Notes. Three-dimensional graph shows the predicted probability of credibility judgments regarding the forecasting 
models subjects saw on the vertical dimension (higher scores are on top). The left side horizontal dimension 
represents the respondents’ disagreement with the forecasting report result (higher scores represented closer to the 
front corner). The right side horizontal dimension represents the political knowledge (higher scores represented 
closer to the corner close to the reader in the perspective). The lighter tone represents more accumulation of 
respondents. An R package was utilized (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2010). 
 
 Summary of Results 
 H1: Confirmed – People discredited unfavorable results in all types of reports. 
 H2a: Partially confirmed (only for forecasting models) –  Those with greater political 
knowledge discredited unfavorable forecasting model reports more. 
 H2b: Not Confirmed – Respondents’ numeracy had no moderating effect on credibility 
evaluations. 
 H3: Confirmed – When directly comparing distinct reports, people tended to rank the ones 
that showed favorable evidence higher irrespective of reports’ methodological and substantial 
differences. 
Discussion 
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Overall, these results document that motivational biases are prevalent and substantial in 
both individual assessments of diverse public opinion metrics as well as in how people compare 
them. Which of the candidates the reports show as winning in the race seems to matter more than 
the methodological nature and distinctions between the diverse metrics of public opinion. This 
provides evidence in line with some other work which showed motivational biases in the 
assessments of polls (e.g. Empirical Studies 1, 2; Chia and Chang, 2015). Moreover, there is some 
evidence that, in the evaluation of forecasting models, this bias is more pronounced with greater 
ability to counter argue. This replicates the Empirical Study 1 finding that showed the increased 
bias with people who are more knowledgeable as well as other findings in the literature (e.g. 
Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2013b; Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2015).  
On the other hand, there is some evidence that comparative evaluations might be based on 
respondents’ political involvement and ability as well. Analyses of rankings showed that whereas 
biases are still prevalent, more numerate people tended to prefer forecasting models over other 
forms, and especially avoided analyses of social media buzz. This suggests that people still exhibit 
some capacity to differentiate between the reports irrespective of their results’ favorability, 
especially when they are directly prompted to compare them. In such comparison contexts, where 
central-route processing is arguably more dormant, their accuracy motivations might be triggered 
more (Kunda, 1990). 
These findings from Study 3b come with a few limitations. First, unlike Study 3a, the 
Amazon sample is less of a problem for experimental studies, and the Study 3b had a considerably 
larger sample size. Yet, the believability of the manipulations is an issue, as they were tested in 
the middle of the 2016 horse race. It is hard to design such messages in the middle of an election 
campaign year when respondents are being bombarded with such tracking data nearly every day. 
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Another limitation arises as a side effect of trying to produce more believable stories. The news 
stories included some source logos, and it is possible that some source effects could have spilled 
over to the credibility judgments. Future research should try to sterilize these effects from media 
source evaluations or find a way to examine how much of an effect they have. Finally, we cannot 
know whether there would be order effects (such as carry-over effects) when respondents evaluate 
multiple reports consecutively - although the randomization in the presentation of the three reports 
minimizes the possibility of any such order effects. 
General Discussion for Empirical Study 3 
Overall, across the both studies, the results show that people are able to distinguish between 
these diverse metrics, but they fall prey to their motivational biases when they form their judgments 
about the perceived methodological credibility of these reports. The more interactive, graphical, 
and engaging features of such digital reporting tools could be an important change in the way the 
public makes sense of the public opinion statistics at large (Coddington, 2015; Lewis & Westlund, 
2015). Yet, people evaluate these reports mostly based on their results instead of their 
methodological differences (see Lodge & Taber, 2013). This is an illustration of severe bias, which 
implies that people will hold onto and even bolster their biased perceptions of public opinion if 
they pick and choose from diverse metrics (for example, a Clinton supporter will discredit polls as 
well as polling averages that suggest a Trump win possible). Such sustained biases in perceptions 
of public opinion could then retain and even fuel political polarization on the horse race metrics in 
the elections (see Nir, 2011). These perceptions could also amplify the shock that unexpected 
election outcomes would produce in public perceptions. 
 Another concern is about the implications for public trust in the media. The results of these 
two studies suggest that ordinary citizens are increasingly familiar with these tools and they are 
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frequently exposed to them. Given the quantitative turn of journalism (Coddington, 2015), these 
results could be good news for data journalism, as people’s evaluations will improve with 
increasing familiarity. However, results have worrying implications for media trust in a number of 
ways as well. First, the excessive coverage of polls and campaign performance (at the expense of 
issue coverage) might bolster the public’s negative views about the media (see Cappella & 
Jamieson, 1997). Similarly, data-driven journalism might amplify such skeptical assessments by 
the public. Second, people’s bias-driven negative assessments of news reports might spill over to 
their perceptions of media sources. They can easily blame the media as biased, as some of the 
comments in open-ended questions in Study 1 suggested (i.e. hostile media perceptions, Chia and 
Chang, 2015).  
Indeed, such partisan disbelief and polarization around public opinion metrics have been 
at the center of public discussion in the 2016 election: “The declining authority of statistics – and 
the experts who analyze them – is at the heart of the crisis that has become known as ‘post-truth’ 
politics.” (Davies, 2017).  This is why we have seen extensive media coverage on partisan claims 
such as “rigged polls,” “the quality of online news-website polls (asking people who won the 
presidential debates),” and “oversampling of Democrats in the polls”. Whether more options and 
different types of evidence fosters cherry picking of evidence matters greatly. Hence, future studies 
should continue to examine these psychological processes and figure out their implications for 
media trust and political attitudes in today’s highly cacophonous information environment.  
Future research should also examine whether data journalism is living up to its promise of 
increasing public engagement and communicating public opinion reports effectively (see media 
critiques of data journalism in Bounegru, 2014; Satell, 2014). Journalistic coverage could provide 
important tangible solutions to mitigate people’s motivational biases when they process public 
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opinion reports. Content analyses have shown that methodological details are not adequately 
presented in the media for traditional polls (Bhatti & Pedersen, 2015). It is likely to be a similar 
case for the new quantifications, although data journalism outlets such as 538, Vox, the NYT 
Upshot seem to have enhanced informative reporting. However initial evidence suggests that 
transparent reporting is problematic in digital outlets, too (Turcotte et al., 2017). Hence, the 
findings from this study once more underline the importance of transparent and informative 
communication of the distinctions, limitations, and relevance of diverse public opinion metrics 
within the contemporary practice of digital data journalism. 
Indeed, during the 2016 election, it seemed that all evidence suggested a Clinton win (95% 
forecasting predictions), but the nominal values in these reports as opposed to traditional polls 
showing values around 48% to 52% support were interpreted uncritically by ordinary citizens as 
well as many members of the political elite. Such different metrics might create unrealistic 
expectations about elections. A recent Pew Report came out that examined these effects. Messing, 
Westwood, and Lelkes (2018) found that exposure to forecasting model results increased the 
perceived likelihood of winning and suppressed turnout. Hence, overall, whereas we see this 
technological shift from traditional polls to data journalism, the new types of public opinion 
reports, which provide more diverse types of results and metrics, might fuel motivational biases 
and prove unhelpful in accurately communicating public opinion and uncertainty of findings. 
General Summary for Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I have shown the prevalence of motivated reasoning in public perceptions 
of public opinion reports. I have documented the strong bias in both the issue and electoral 
contexts, in traditional polls and new quantifications of public opinion, and shown how educational 
and political sophistication characteristics of people as well as source cues moderate these biases. 
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Overall, people are strongly biased in their assessments, and the ideological affinity of the source 
transmitting poll results does not matter for the evaluations of polls. While increases in political 
knowledge and methodological knowledge are strongly related to a greater tendency to engage in 
motivated reasoning, education results are less clear. The effects of source cues are trumped by the 
favorability of reported results; hence source cues did not moderate the bias. I also showed how 
biased perceptions are also related to perceptions of public opinion (electoral expectations in Study 
2). Overall these results provide strong reasons for us to worry about the detrimental consequences 
of motivated assessments of public opinion reports. 
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Chapter 3 
 
How Can We Mitigate Biased Processing of Public Opinion Reports? 
 
 In this chapter I present empirical studies to test the feasibility of three different 
journalistic solutions to mitigate individuals’ motivational biases in their processing of public 
opinion reports. These are (1) adequate disclosure of methodological details, (2) the presentation 
of aggregated and contextualized evidence with the explanation of methodological logic, and (3) 
expert commentaries focusing on methodological quality. Most of these journalistic practices are 
already employed in news coverage of public opinion reports to some extent, although 
inconsistently utilized. Hence, I examine their effectiveness both in terms of being a current 
practice and recommendation for future media coverage. Specifically, I investigate their 
effectiveness in mitigating individuals’ biased processing of public opinion reports by relying on 
their broader potential of shifting the focus of individuals’ judgment processes to methodological 
quality of evidence. The premise here is that by making the methodological quality of public 
opinion reports a salient and consequential factor in individuals’ assessments we might be able to 
crowd out their tendency to focus on the favorability of the results in biased ways. 
 Theoretically, these journalistic remedies will be tested through the application of the 
motivated reasoning theory and the effectiveness of corrective attempts as moderators of this 
bias. Methodological details, the logic of aggregated evidence, and expert comments are three 
important informational correctives against individuals’ motivational bias in their assessments of 
public opinion reports. I test whether these features in news reports moderate the effects of 
motivational bias in people’s perceived accuracy of the reports. Given prior inconsistent 
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literature which showed that corrections are at times effective (Bode and Vraga, 2015; 2017), do 
not work effectively or consistently (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010; Nyhan et al., 
2017; Wood and Porter, 2017), and sometimes even have backfiring effects by amplifying 
individuals’ biases (Nyhan and Riefler, 2010), these remedies might or might not be effective 
reducing motivated reasoning. 
In the first and third empirical studies of this chapter, I test the effectiveness of these 
techniques through extensions of the experimental studies reported in Chapter 2.  For the second 
empirical study, I introduce a new study with new data collection. 
Empirical Study 1: Methodological Transparency in News Reports 
 
Introduction 
 
Unlike many other forms of reporting, individuals who hear about poll results are often 
given the tools to evaluate the quality of the evidence. There are significant efforts to increase 
the methodological disclosures in poll reports, such as the Transparency Initiative of the 
American Association for Public Opinion Research,41 and these efforts extend to journalists’ 
practices as they are encouraged to include these details and provide adequate links to even 
greater methodological details elsewhere (e.g. Sonck and Loosveldt 2008; Turcotte et al., 2017). 
Where methodological details are available along with public opinion reports’ results, 
there are strong normative reasons to think that they should mitigate the influence of 
motivational biases. To the extent that individuals read about the sampling design, sample size, 
and margin of error of a poll, for instance, they may be able to draw conclusions about a report’s 
objective quality. This, in turn, could lead to more objective judgments.  
                                                 
41 https://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/Transparency-Initiative.aspx  
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But there is also reason to be skeptical about this corrective’s potential. Studies in related 
domains have shown that attempts to correct misperceptions sometimes backfire due to 
motivated reasoning (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Through this process, negative information about 
candidates can sometimes render them more likeable (Redlawsk 2002), and it appears to take a 
large amount of corrective information to override initial perceptions (Redlawsk, Civettini, and 
Emmerson 2010). So, although additional information about a poll’s methodological quality 
should increase confidence in the credibility of the results, individuals – especially those most 
knowledgeable - could also use this information as a basis for arguing against the poll’s 
conclusions (cf. Lodge and Taber 2003). Hence, I investigate the effect of methodological details 
as a research question as details can both enhance or reduce motivated reasoning.: 
RQ1: Do presence of methodological details increase or decrease motivated reception of 
public opinion polls?  
Methods 
The data for the test of methodological details is part of the first empirical study reported 
in Chapter 2. In this experiment, aside from results of polls and the source of media reports, I had 
also manipulated whether news reports had adequate methodological details or not. Hence, the 
respondents actually had two different versions of the hypothetical stories in terms of absence of 
presence of methodological details. Note that the results reported in Chapter 2 controlled for this 
effect, but did not test the theorized moderation effect, which is RQ1 here. 
Figure 14. Example news story examples 
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 Detail Manipulation. Respondents in a detailed condition received information about the 
poll’s margin of error, sampling mode, sample size, subsample statistics, response rate, and 
question wording. Respondents in a no detail condition were only provided with the proportion 
of Americans who held each attitude according to the poll. (Coding: detail:1, no-detail:0; Online 
Appendix G).  
RQ1 was investigated by interacting disagreement and knowledge with the experimental 
condition of methodological details. 
Results 
The detailed reporting manipulation did nothing to either strengthen or mitigate 
motivational effects (RQ1; Table 14, column 5; F=.67, df=3, p=.57, Figure 15).  The 
disagreement and knowledge interaction was robust against moderation by any of these factors 
(See Online Appendix I). 
However, methodological knowledge appeared to moderate the effects of the 
methodological detail manipulation on credibility. Without controlling for the detail 
manipulation, there was a significant interaction effect of methodological knowledge and 
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disagreement on credibility (b=-.10, s.e.=.04, p<.05; Table 15, column 1). When all other 
variables are at their mean values, this indicates a predicted difference of 10 percent of the range 
of credibility scores. In the 3-way interaction model, there was an interaction approaching 
significance between methodological knowledge and detail manipulation (b=.10, s.e.=.06, p=.08; 
Table 15, column 2; Figure 16A). This indicates that when a respondent disagreed with a poll 
and was knowledgeable about poll methodology, the presence of detail did not matter; and 
credibility was discounted in line with their motivations. However, when a respondent was in 
agreement with the poll, for those who were methodologically sophisticated, the credibility of 
detailed polls tended to be higher than those without detail (RQ1; Figure 16B). This means that 
the difference between those who agreed and disagreed with polls were slightly larger when 
details were presented. 
Table 14. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control 
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement -.14 *** .02  .00  .03  -.02  .05 
         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.26 *** .06  -.26 ** .08 
            
Disagreement X Detail         .04  .07 
Political Knowledge X Detail         .05  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail         -.01  .11 
            
Intercept .46 *** .03  .40 *** .03  .42 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.05  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.05 ** .02  -.06 *** .02  -.06 *** .02 
S-I Consonance .02  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  -.01  .01 
Poll Interest .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03 
Political Knowledge -.12 *** .03  .00  .04  -.02  .05 
            
N 1205  1205  1205 
R-square .18  .19  .19 
F Test (df) -  21.06*** (1)  .67 (3) 
Notes. ** denotes p value lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
F change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the 
Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested against the Baseline Model. See Online 
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Appendix M for the models that control for age, sex, race, education, income, political interest, 
and ideology. See Online Appendix N for the models that exclude poll interest. 
 
Figure 15. Methodological detail interaction with political knowledge 
 
Table 15. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting the 
Perceived Credibility  
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement -.10 *** .02  -.13 *** .03 
        
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  -.10 * .04  -.06  .06 
        
Gun Disagreement X Detail     .07  .04 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .10 + .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     -.08  .08 
        
Intercept .42 *** .02  .45 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.06 * .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02 
S-I Consonance .03 + .01  .03 + .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  -.01  .01 
Poll Interest .36 *** .03  .36 *** .03 
Methodological Knowledge -.05 + .03  -.10 * .04 
        
N 1208  1208 
R-square .19  .19 
F Test (df) -  1.61 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge Effects model. See Online 
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Appendix M for the models that control for age, sex, race, education, income, political interest, 
and ideology. See Online Appendix N for the models that exclude poll interest. 
 
 
Figure 16. Methodological Knowledge Interaction for Gun Control. Plot represents the predicted 
credibility levels by interaction terms for a respondent whose response to all other variables is at 
their mean value. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
Summary of Results 
 RQ1: Details mostly did not matter. If anything, there was suggestive evidence that 
details might increase biased processing of respondents with greater methodological knowledge. 
Discussion 
Results assessing the influence of details in poll reporting are somewhat discouraging. 
Although the transparent presentation of results is a normative good in and of itself, it appears 
that such transparency might not translate into increased poll credibility. Suggestive evidence 
that details may raise credibility among methodologically knowledgeable individuals who agree 
with the poll results implies that such details may not be entirely irrelevant, but it appears that 
they may enhance, rather than mitigate, the effects of motivated reasoning. Given that most poll 
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reports disclose the summative finding from a poll in their headline/title, it is likely that 
motivational processing is triggered early and dominates the rest of the readers’ engagement with 
the news story, thus amplifying biased perceptions even more (see Andrew 2007). Nonetheless, 
the effects of methodological detail merit further research. 
Although the detailed reporting conditions in this design were all indicative of adequate 
methodology, it is unclear whether respondents would have been aware that this was the case.  It 
would thus be valuable in future studies to assess respondent perceptions of methodological 
quality as a separate construct. Future research should also manipulate the objective quality of 
the polling methods reported (such as comparing a representative poll with a 25% response rate 
to a non-representative poll with a 5% response rate).  
Empirical Study 2: Contextualized Reporting with More Data and Theoretical Information  
Introduction 
How do ordinary news consumers react to aggregated polling reports on public opinion? 
Aside from traditional polls, among different metrics of public opinion, especially in the election 
contexts, polling averages dominate the news coverage. What distinguishes polling averages from 
other distinct metrics of public opinion reports is that they provide clearly more reliable evidence 
because they provide a summative statistic about many of the same things (polls). These 
aggregated metrics provide more reliable results as they cancel out individual polls’ biases and 
limitations by averaging all available evidence (Jackson, 2005). In turn, journalists increasingly 
refer to polling-average results when they report new singular poll findings.  
Moreover, journalists and experts explicitly point out that people should look at polling 
averages in news reports and on data journalism sites (e.g. Silver, 2012; 2016; Jackson, 2016; 
Cohn, 2016). News reports listing differing results from the most recent surveys and presenting a 
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summative average score representing the trend also provide a more nuanced and contextualized 
representation of public opinion to the news readers. Such reporting, in turn, could lead to more 
rational engagement with public opinion evidence. As findings in Chapter 1 show, people tend to 
discredit unfavorable poll results, hence polling average stories with more contextualization and 
evidence could mitigate motivated reception of the evidence. 
A More Contextualized News Coverage: Providing Polling Averages. With increased 
computation in the public opinion industry, digitalization of news coverage, and popularization of 
data journalism platforms, the media coverage of public opinion polls increasingly relies on polling 
aggregations (Traugott, 2009). Polling averages started to get popularized especially in election 
coverage, where there are many polls, but they are also increasingly incorporated into issue and 
approval rating coverage as well.42 Outlets such as FiveThirtyEight, Pollster, RealClearPolitics, 
CNN Poll of Polls, and the New York Times Upshot provide instantly-updated polling averages 
by pooling all available results. These reports typically show both the list of original poll results 
and an average metric summarizing the recent trend. Other news platforms also source polling 
averages from the data journalism platforms’ in their news reports when they cover the election, a 
policy issue, or provide the results of a new poll. This helps to contextualize the results of new 
singular poll findings. As Cox and Katz (2016) point out: 
“We think a quantitative forecast can help people to take a step back from obsessing over 
the latest daily poll release. By averaging polls together and arriving at a probabilistic 
forecast, the aim is to help people take a more nuanced view of the campaign, one that is 
less driven by whatever the latest polling number happens to be, and instead summarizes 
all of the available evidence, with the context of history.”  
This increased focus on polling averages is a positive development in news coverage, 
because polling averages are methodologically better. There are many polls with differing results 
                                                 
42 For example, see HuffPost Pollster’s polling average tracking of public views on Obama health care law - 
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/us-health-bill  
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and varying levels of methodological robustness. Hence, by averaging all available results, polling 
averages provide more reliable estimates by cancelling out biases and other methodological 
contingencies associated with individual polls (e.g. Jackman, 2005; Hillygus, 2011; Pasek, 2015). 
Hence, pundits and journalists highlight the value of looking at polling averages (e.g. Silver, 2016; 
Jackson, 2016; Cohn, 2016). 
While media outlets increasingly integrate polling averages and experts promote them 
openly, how ordinary individuals evaluate polling averages is not known. Given findings 
documenting partisan biases in perceptions of individual public opinion polls in Study 1, whether 
individuals are responsive to higher quality of aggregated evidence is important. Recognizing that 
polling averages provide a stronger set of evidence, individuals might be less susceptible to 
motivated reasoning.  
Although people are not interested in and knowledgeable about details of polling (Traugott 
and Kang, 2000), there are two major reasons that they may be responsive to the stronger 
methodological quality of polling averages. First, the simple logic of aggregation is part of 
everyday life. People engage in gathering evidence from multiple sources in simple decisions such 
as shopping (i.e. checking prices to see the market value). Second, the ways that experts openly 
promote looking at polling averages could resonate with citizens.  
H1a: Thanks to a more nuanced and contextualized reporting with aggregated evidence, 
news readers will perceive polling averages to be more accurate than individual poll results 
H1b: The effect observed in H1a will be especially strong when the logic of aggregation 
is explained. 
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People process evidence of public opinion in biased ways and nurture their skewed 
perceptions of public opinion (cf. Nir, 2011; Tsfati, 2015). I expect to replicate findings in the 
previous empirical study:  
H2a: Unfavorable results will be discredited to some extent in both polls and polling 
averages. 
H2b: Unfavorable polling average results will be discredited more than favorable ones 
whether or not they have explanations of the logic behind averaging. 
Above and beyond this bias, polling averages might still serve as a strong informational 
corrective against partisan processing of public opinion evidence. Compared to singular poll 
findings, in the case of polling averages, individuals might be less susceptible to partisan 
evaluations. Aside from acknowledging polling averages as a stronger set of evidence, the very 
fact that polling averages include singular polls from diverse sources (different media outlets and 
pollsters), hence a more contextual and nuanced reporting of evidence might especially inoculate 
against accusations of bias.  
H3a: Individuals will engage in less motivated reasoning, not dismissing unfavorable 
results coming from polling averages as much as those coming from singular poll results.  
H3b: This reduction in bias will be more evident if the logic of polling aggregation is 
explained. 
Finally, individuals might vary in the extent to which they evaluate polling averages. 
According to motivated reasoning theory, those individuals who are more sophisticated engage in 
more biased processing (Taber and Lodge, 2013; Kahan et al.,2013; Miller, Saunders, Farhart, 
2015). Individuals with greater issue-related political knowledge and poll methodology knowledge 
discredit unfavorable issue polls disproportionately more, as shown in the previous empirical 
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studies. Yet, recent research shows that most sophistication constructs do not correlate well (Låg 
et al., 2014) and they have distinct influence on motivated assessments (Pasek and Weeks, 2017). 
In this study’s data collection, I was able to test three different sophistication variables. The three 
constructs range in their specificity in terms of their relation to the respondents’ perceived 
credibility. 43 This allows me to replicate previous findings and compare different sophistication 
constructs in terms of whether their influence on perceived credibility of polling evidence is 
similar. Hence, I expect: 
H4a: Individuals with greater education will engage in more biased processing.  
H4b: Individuals with greater methodological knowledge will engage in more biased 
processing.  
H4c: Individuals with greater election-related political knowledge will engage in more 
biased processing.  
Methods 
Data. The data were collected online through Qualtric between June 27 and June 30, 2016. 
The response rate was 10% and the total sample size was 1288. Qualtrics subcontracted to Survey 
Sampling International and Research Now, who sample from large online panels of survey 
participants (cf. Baker et al., 2010). 
Procedure. I designed a survey experiment in the context of the 2016 US. Presidential 
election in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in 
which they read hypothetical news stories that included polling results. After the treatment, 
respondents provided their reactions in a series of questions, and then proceeded to a second round 
                                                 
43 While education level is the most general one, election related political knowledge is more closely related to 
individuals assessments of polling evidence, and their methodological knowledge about polling is the most specific 
one. 
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of manipulation and questions before being debriefed. The empirical report focuses on only one 
set of results, those concerning at time 1 (the first round of news stories and respondents’ reactions 
to them); the rest of the tests are beyond the scope of this manuscript’s topic.44 All design details, 
manipulations, and analyses were preregistered at Evidence in Governance and Politics, ID #s 
20160628AA. 
Manipulations.  I manipulated polls’ results to show either Clinton or Trump in the lead, 
either in the form of a single poll or a polling average, and half of the polling average stories 
included a journalistic explanation about the logic of polling averages and why individuals should 
rely on them.  See Appendix AF for the full combination of experimental conditions and the 
hypothetical news stories. 
Table 16. Manipulation combinations  
  Substantive Result Report Type 
Condition Set 1 Clinton ahead singular poll 
Condition Set 2 Clinton ahead polling average 
Condition Set 3 Clinton ahead polling average with explanation 
Condition Set 4 Trump ahead singular poll 
Condition Set 5 Trump ahead polling average 
Condition Set 6 Trump ahead polling average with explanation 
Note. For more detailed manipulation conditions, see the preregistration details in Appendices 
for Empirical Study 2 in Chapter 3 
 
 Outcome variable. Perceived credibility of the polling report is tapped by three items 
asking about its accuracy, trustworthiness, and informativeness which are then averaged into an 
index of perceived credibility. Accuracy was asked “How accurate do you think this polling 
average is in representing the public support for each of the candidates in this election?” with 
five response options “Not accurate at all”, “Slightly accurate”, “Somewhat accurate”, “Very  
Figure 17. Hypothetical stories (top: singular; bottom: polling-average)  
                                                 
44 The time 2 manipulations were designed to measure order effects and belief updating, but also had some design 
flaws. 
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accurate”, “Extremely accurate”. For full question wording for other items and other questions, 
see Appendix AG. The three items of the outcome variable had high reliability (α= .97) and were 
combined into a credibility index. I ran analyses with this index, but results also separately 
replicate with individual items as well. 
Voting intention. At the beginning of the study, the respondents were asked, “If the 
election for President were held today and the candidates were Donald Trump, the Republican, 
and Hillary Clinton, the Democrat, for whom would you vote - or wouldn't you vote?” and the 
response options were “Hillary Clinton,” “Donald Trump,” “Some other person,” “Would not 
vote.” The order for the first two options was randomized. 
Unfavorable result. To build a single bias predictor variable and reduce the number of 
interaction terms, I re-coded the voting intention variable in relation to the polling result each 
respondent saw to index an unfavorable result. For example, a Trump voter receives 0 if they are 
assigned to a news story with a favorable polling outcome for Trump, and 1 if the respondent 
encounters an unfavorable polling outcome for Trump, and vice versa for the Clinton case.45 
Sophistication variables. After the manipulations, respondents also answered questions 
about their education level, 2016 election related political knowledge, and methodological 
knowledge about poll.  
Education was asked as “What is your education level?” with 11 response options ranging 
from “No schooling completed” to “Doctorate degree,” and was recoded into four categories “High 
school and less,” “Some college or less,” “College degree,” and “More than college degree.” 
                                                 
45 As an alternative measurement of perceived bias, I also computed the unfavorable result variable by using 
respondents’ party identification. I tested this because due to respondents who chose “Some other person” and “Would 
not vote”, I lost 73 respondents when I use voting intention. Nevertheless results did not change. 
 121 
A political knowledge battery asked six election-related knowledge items. For example, 
one item asked “Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Republicans?” with response options 
“Donald Trump” and “Ted Cruz.” Each question had two response options, one true and one false. 
The scores in six questions were averaged into an index.  
A methodological knowledge battery asked four questions designed to test the respondent’s 
knowledge about polling methodology. For example, one item asked “Assuming all other 
characteristics are the same, which of the following poll results would you be most confident 
represents a candidate who is supported by a majority of people?” with four response options that 
were “When the candidate got 47 % support, with a 2 % margin of error”, “When the candidate 
got 51 % support, with a 2 % margin of error”, “When the candidate got 54 % support, with a 2 % 
margin of error”, and “Both 2nd and 3rd options show that the candidate is being supported by the 
majority”.46 
Analytical procedures. I conducted OLS regressions to predict the perceived accuracy of 
polling reports. The models included the bias predictors and sophistication variables in the 
interaction analyses. Note that conditions had slight differences in terms of the exact polling 
results. These differences were intentionally included to create small variability and to replicate 
another study by Rothschild and Malhotra (2014) looking at the influence of the level of magnitude 
in polling results. The conditions that are compared in each test were pre-registered prior to data 
collection, so this variability does not constitute a problem. Moreover, the results did not change 
when I tested the different set of conditions separately. 
Results 
                                                 
46 Reliability was low for both political knowledge (α= .18) and methodological knowledge (α= .32). This low score 
is not a problem given that it is a predictor variable and has no underlying construct dimension. Also, for an unrelated 
analysis beyond the scope of the current manuscript, I also asked about respondents’ certainty of their response after 
they answered knowledge items.  
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Across the board, individuals tended to recognize polling averages as slightly more 
credible. I find that viewing results from a polling average as opposed to singular poll report led 
to slightly higher perceived credibility (b=.04, se=.02, p=.02, Table 17, Column 1), controlling for 
whether the respondent’s preferred candidate is leading or not. This finding provides evidence in 
support of H1a. Among polling aggregation stories, however, there was no moderating influence 
of the explanation of logic behind polling averages across the board (b=-.04, se=.03, p=.21, Table 
18, Column 1; not supporting H1b).  
 While respondents tended to distinguish between polling averages and polls in their 
evaluations of credibility, they consistently displayed partisan bias based on the results of these 
reports. When they encountered reports with unfavorable results, suggesting their preferred 
candidate losing, there was a strong reduction in the perceived credibility of the report as 
opposed to the credibility conferred to a report that included favorable results (b=-.14, se=01, 
p<.001, Table 17, Column 1). This supports H2a. Among the polling average stories, this bias 
persisted despite the explanation of the logic behind polling averages as well (b=-.13, se=.03, 
p<.001, Table 18, Column 1; H2b supported). 
 Across the board, providing results in polling averages as opposed to singular polls did 
not reduce individuals’ motivational bias. There was no interaction between favorability and 
report type (b=.01, se=.03, p=.73, Table 17, Column 2) and between favorability and journalistic 
explanation about polling averages (b=.05, se=.06, p=.34, Table 18, Column 2). These findings 
do not lend support to H3a and H3b, 
 Although individuals evaluated polls in partisan ways, there are some differences among 
them based on their sophistication levels – only in the case of education levels. When results of  
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Table 17. Perceived Credibility of Polling Reports by Favorability of Results, Report Type, and Sophistication Measures  
  Baseline Model 1   Baseline Model 2   Education Model   
Election 
Knowledge Model   
Methodological 
Knowledge Model 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .47 *** (.01)   .47 *** (.01)   .48 *** (.02)   .62 *** (.06)   .52 *** (.03) 
Unfavorable result -.14 *** (.01)   -.14 *** (.02)   -.10 *** (.03)   -.04   (.08)   -.14 *** (.03) 
Report Type (polling average=1) .04 * (.02)   .03   (.02)   .04   (.04)   .10   (.10)   .08 † (.04) 
Education                 -.02   (.04)                 
Election knowledge                         -.21 ** (.08)         
Methods knowledge                                 -.10 * (.05) 
Unfavorable X Report type         .01   (.03)   -.09   (.05)   -.18   (.13)   -.06   (.06) 
Unfavorable X Education                 -.10   (.06)                 
Unfavorable X Election knowledge                         -.13   (.10)         
Unfavorable X Methods knowledge                                 .00   (.06) 
Report type X Education                 -.02   (.07)                 
Report type X Election knowledge                         -.09   (.13)         
Report type X Methods knowledge                                 -.10   (.08) 
Unfavorable X Report type X Education                 .25 * (.11)                 
Unfavorable X Report type X Election knowledge                         .26   (.17)         
Unfavorable X Report type X Methods knowledge                                 .14   (.11) 
N 1031   1031   1004   1017   1013 
R-square .08   .08   .09   .12   .10 
Note. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Table 18. Perceived Credibility of Polling Reports (Polling-Averages only) by Favorability of Results, Explanation of Logic, and Sophistication Measures 
  Baseline Model 1   Baseline Model 2   Education Model   
Election Knowledge 
Model   
Methodological 
Knowledge Model 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .52 *** (.02)   .53 *** (.03)   .52 *** (.07)   .82 *** (.12)   .68 *** (.05) 
Unfavorable result -.13 *** (.03)   -.15 *** (.04)   -.24 * (.10)   -.37 * (.17)   -.29 *** (.07) 
Explanation of logic -.04   (.03)   -.06   (.04)   .02   (.10)   -.19   (.16)   -.20 ** (.08) 
Education                 .01   (.03)                 
Election knowledge                         -.39 * (.16)         
Methods knowledge                                 -.34 *** (.10) 
Unfavorable X Explanation         .05   (.06)   .00   (.15)   .28   (.23)   .22 * (.11) 
Unfavorable X Education                 .03   (.04)                 
Unfavorable X Election knowledge                         .30   (.23)         
Unfavorable X Methods knowledge                                 .32 * (.14) 
Explanation X Education                 -.04   (.04)                 
Explanation X Election knowledge                         .17   (.22)         
Explanation X Methods knowledge                                 .30 * (.14) 
Unfavorable X Explanation X Education                 .03   (.06)                 
Unfavorable X Explanation X Election knowledge                         -.31   (.30)         
Unfavorable X Explanation X Methods knowledge                                 -.37 † (.19) 
N 327   327   317   321   320 
R-square .07   .07   .08   .11   .11 
Note. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Figure 18. Interaction Plots for Different Sophistication Moderators 
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polls and polling averages are favorable, there is no variance in credibility assessments, as 
respondents are not motivated to counter-argue against the credibility of the message, and there 
is no influence of differing education levels. Yet, when results are unfavorable, respondents 
discredited individual poll stories even more (b=.25, se=.11, p=.02, Table 17, Column 3; 
supports H4a). On the other hand, respondents with higher education levels conferred more 
credibility to polling averages, as opposed to singular polls, even when their results were 
unfavorable. High education respondents treated unfavorable and favorable polling averages 
similarly, which lends strong support for H4a while at the same time showing a mitigation of 
bias in the case of polling averages. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 18.1 in which the line 
representing the perceived credibility associated with polling average reports that present 
unfavorable results increased with higher education as opposed to the evaluations of singular 
polls. 
 However, I did not find similar results for respondents with higher election-related 
political knowledge (b=.26, se=.17, p=.14, Table 17, Column 4) and higher methodological 
knowledge about polling (b=14, se=.11, p=.22, Table 17, Column 5). As seen in Figures 3.2 and 
3.3 respectively, although there seems to be some similar trends for polling averages, results are 
not significant. 
 Among polling average stories, respondents’ sophistication levels did not alter their 
biased assessments in relation to explanation of logic behind aggregating. There was no 
moderation by respondents’ education levels (b=.03, se-.06, p=.65, Table 18, Column 3; Figure 
18.4) and election related political knowledge (b=-.31, se=.30, p=.30, Table 18, Column 4; 
Figure 18.5). However, the methodological knowledge about polling seemed to have an 
influence on respondents’ responsivity to the journalistic explanation of aggregation logic, with 
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only marginal significance (b=-.37, se=.19, p=.06, Table 18, Column 5). As seen in Figure 18.6, 
when respondent encountered unfavorable results, their perceived credibility did not change at 
all in relation to their methodological knowledge and the presence of a journalistic explanation, 
and the credibility difference between favorable and unfavorable polls seems to shrink when the 
logic explanation is included.  
Summary of Results 
 H1a: Confirmed – News readers perceive polling averages to be more accurate than 
individual poll results. 
H1b: Not Confirmed – There was no moderating influence of the explanation of logic on 
the credibility of polling averages. 
H2a: Confirmed – Unfavorable results were disproportionately discredited no matter they 
came from singular polls or aggregations. 
H2b: Confirmed – Unfavorable polling average results will be discredited more than 
favorable ones regardless of whether they include explanations of the logic or not. 
H3a: Not Confirmed – Polling averages did not reduce biased processing overall. 
H3b: Not Confirmed – Explanation of the logic in polling average did not reduce biased 
processing overall. 
H4a: Not Confirmed – Respondents with greater education had less biased evaluations if 
the report type was a polling average instead of a singular poll. 
H4b: Not Confirmed –  Methodological knowledge did not have a moderating effect (did 
not reduce or increase biased processing). 
H4c: Not Confirmed – Election related political knowledge did not have a moderating 
effect (did not reduce or increase biased processing). 
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Discussion  
 People generally find polling averages more credible than singular polls, although this 
difference is rather small. More importantly, individuals discredit quantitative evidence about 
public opinion, regardless of whether it comes from polls or polling averages. However, for high 
education respondents, I find that there is a mitigation of bias when they encounter aggregated 
evidence; yet this mitigation is not observed for election-related political knowledge and 
methodological knowledge. There seems to be no added benefit of a journalistic explanation 
about the logic of aggregation. These results together provide both a replication of motivated 
reasoning and new evidence about public perceptions of a new form of public opinion coverage. 
 The results underscore the strength of partisan evaluations of public opinion evidence and 
particularly the role of motivated reasoning. The finding that more educated respondents discredit 
unfavorable singular trial heat polls more strongly provides a replication for the Empirical Study 
1 in the Chapter 2 that showed more issue-related politically knowledgeable respondents 
discredited unfavorable issue polls. In the current study, similar increased bias patterns, despite 
being insignificant, were observed for election-related political knowledge and methodological 
knowledge as well. Together, this set of findings add to the literature in related domains which 
challenges knowledge-deficiency models of public understanding of quantitative evidence (e.g. 
Kahan et al., 2013). 
 At the same time, I find a corrective potential of aggregation reports for biases in public 
perceptions, at least for highly educated respondents. Although high education respondents 
displayed stronger bias in singular poll evaluations, they recognized the higher quality of polling 
averages by not dismissing unfavorable poll averages as much as singular polls. This finding shows 
the value of aggregation and higher quality evidence in public opinion coverage and potentially 
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when communicating other quantitative and scientific evidence to the public (cf. Nyhan et al., 
2017).  
 At large, our findings highlight one particular problem that fuels skewed perceptions of 
public opinion and polarization in American politics. If individuals evaluate systematic evidence 
about public opinion in such biased ways, they will distrust pollsters, journalists, and politicians 
whom they think do not respond to their preferences (e.g. Chia and Chang, 2017). Such biased 
perceptions of polling evidence could, by extension, even fuel biases in perceived legitimacy of 
election outcomes (Manski and Delavande 2012) or similar other official statistics such as census 
results (e.g. Wines, 2017). 
 On the practical front, what should pollsters and journalists do? Although I find only 
modest effects, experts should emphasize such aggregated metrics when reporting singular new 
poll results. Moreover, the logic behind aggregation should be better explained, coupled with 
attempts to increase public polling literacy. To be more effective, journalists can provide these 
explanations in visually more salient and interactive information boxes in online news stories. As 
public opinion experts and scholars, our broader aim should be promoting a more nuanced and 
contextualized understanding of public opinion evidence to minimize partisan cherry-picking as 
much as possible. 
 A few limitations pave the road for future research. First, believability of the manipulations 
is an issue given that the data is collected during an election campaign. Second, while trying to 
design realistic news stories, I had variations in visual details and pictures of stories, which might 
reduce equivalence of stories (e.g. Noggle and Kaid, 2000). Yet, given that even the ideologically-
slanted sources did not moderate biased perceptions of polls (Empirical Study 1 in Chapter 2), I 
expect such peripheral features to matter much less, and even if they influenced respondents, the 
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balanced conditions should cancel out any systematic effect on our results. Third, the current study 
was pre-registered, but at the time of preregistration some theoretical and methodological ideas 
were not sufficiently developed, leading to some unclear hypotheses for the second part of the 
study (see preregistration details). In future experimental research, it might be useful to obtain peer 
feedback before preregistration, such as the peer review before data collection context organized 
by Lupia and Nyhan (2016). 
Empirical Study 3: Expert and Partisan Commentaries in News Reports 
 
Introduction 
 
“It Wasn’t the Polls that Missed, It Was the Pundits.” (Trende, 2016) 
Political communication scholars have long noted that polls – issue polls, horserace polls, 
approval ratings – have a central position in the communication of public opinion (Patterson 2005) 
and that an excessive focus on polls comes at the expense of substantive issue discussions (Capella 
and Jamieson, 1997). In particular, Chapter 2 documented that individuals disproportionately 
discredit polls and other metrics that show unfavorable results (see also Tsfati, 2001) and exhibit 
this bias more strongly with greater political sophistication but less with greater education.  
Yet, aspects of the media presentation of polls have the potential to shape the 
interpretations of poll results and could thereby either mollify or exacerbate partisan biases. In 
today’s cacophonous and polarized media ecosystem, there are many polls and a much larger body 
of competing interpretations of polling evidence. Poll findings reach ordinary citizens in the form 
of news reports, which usually include extensive punditry to produce more engaging stories and 
help readers make sense of the results (Brettschneider, Donsbach, and Traugott, 2008; Matthews, 
Pickup, Cutler, 2012).47 In these reports, various pundits (e.g. academics, data journalists, polling 
                                                 
47 Over the course of the 2016 election, I have collected more than 90 pre-election commentaries and op-eds 
debating the methods and information in public opinion reports (see the Appendix AH for Empirical Study 3 in 
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experts, or partisan representatives) weigh in on the quality of the evidence presented. And 
comments matter, because what pundits say might have more influence on people than the polls 
themselves (Trende, 2016). Given most individuals’ lack of interest in and sufficient knowledge 
about polls (Traugott and Kang, 2000), pundits should presumably have an influence on how 
people process and interpret poll findings (cf. Bode & Vraga, 2017; Feldman 2011a). Specifically, 
objective expert commentaries focusing on the methodological quality of polls could help mitigate 
individuals’ biases by highlighting their methodological robustness or weaknesses (cf. Dunwoody 
and Kohl, 2017). On the other hand, partisan commentaries or overall critiques of polls could 
instead bolster biases (cf. Suhay, Bello-Pardo, Maurer, 2018) due to their subjective nature. 
In this study, I investigate how expert or partisan commentaries on the results of election 
polls shape individuals’ evaluations of polls in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 
In an online pre-registered survey experiment on a nationally representative sample, I examine 
whether and how specific types of commentaries could have the potential to mitigate or amplify 
motivated reasoning in individuals’ judgments. Specifically, I test the corrective influence of 
objective expert judgments about the methodological quality of polls, (2) the influence of general 
expert critiques about polls, and finally (3) the polarizing influence of subjective partisan 
commentaries on people’s perceived accuracy judgments about polls.  
I focus on expert comments in greater detail as they might serve as an important 
informational corrective. I investigate partisan comments and general critiques as counterfactuals 
to the corrective potential of expert comments and in order to increase the ecological validity in a 
news environment where there are so many partisan comments and attacks against public opinion 
evidence.  
                                                 
Chapter 3). This collection is based on a convenience sampling which was the result of my encounters in news 
outlets and search engine results. 
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How Punditry Can Influence Public Reception of Polls. Pundits’ commentaries could 
have important and distinct influence on news readers’ interpretations of poll results during 
horserace coverage. At the most basic level, we can expect individuals to confer credibility to what 
pundits say, because they are not much interested in and knowledgeable about details of polling 
(Traugott and Kang, 2000). However, previous research suggests that the influence of pundits’ 
views would be more complicated, particularly interacting with individuals’ motivational biases. 
As findings in Chapter 1 document, people are biased in their assessments. Hence, the influence 
of commentaries will likely depend on the favorableness of the poll results. More specifically, 
commentaries might increase or reduce partisan biases in processing of polls, and how this will 
play out should depend on the nature of the commentaries. 
Expert Evaluations: Mitigating Biases or Backfiring? When the comments on polls 
come from experts who provide objective assessments of the methods and their limitations, 
individuals’ motivational bias could be mitigated to some extent. For example, when an individual 
receives direct information that the poll they dislike has a robust methodology, their motivational 
discrediting of that poll could be reduced. A growing literature on fact-checking and corrective 
attempts against motivational biases documents that direct and explicit attempts to mitigate biases 
are sometimes effective, especially when polls vary greatly in their methodological quality (e.g. 
Fridkin, Kenney, & Wintersieck, 2015; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). In science 
communication research, expert views on various issues influence the perceived accuracy of 
scientific claims (Dunwoody and Kohl, 2017; Bode and Vraga, 2017; Kohl et al., 2016; Lyons, 
2017). Yet, corrections do not work in all situations. And such informational attempts can 
sometimes backfire (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Hart and Nisbett, 2012); although recent research 
shows that backfiring effects are rare (Nyhan et al., 2017; Guess and Coppock, 2017; Chan et al., 
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2017). The conditions under which corrective expert comments either mitigate or bolster 
individuals’ partisan biases are thus unclear. 
The effects of expert commentary had been previously studied in a related but different 
context where political pundits either provided strategy-frame or substantive issue-based 
comments (see Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001). A previous review of election polls 
pointed at the importance of commentaries in media coverage because of the obfuscating nature 
of horserace coverage (e.g. Bartels & Broh, 1989). 
When people encounter multiple polls as part of horserace coverage, the consistency of 
results should determine how individuals respond to expert comments. When respondents 
encounter polls with similar results and varying qualities, and an expert debunks the poor-quality 
poll, being told about the limitations of the poor-quality poll may trigger individuals to be more 
skeptical of the other (also unfavorable) poll as well (cf. Nyhan and Riefler, 2010; Nyhan et al., 
2017). 
H1: Expert commentary will enhance motivated reasoning for polls with consistent 
findings: respondents will probably discredit pairs of unfavorable polls. 
When results are inconsistent, more elaboration in the form of a direct comparison of the 
polls is likely (c.f. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). People should be more likely to focus on the reasons 
for the inconsistency; and experts’ objective commentary, as a direct intervention, may provide a 
sensible explanation and a strong informational corrective. 
H2: When results are inconsistent, expert commentary will reduce partisan bias. 
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That is, when respondents encounter an unfavorable poll result, they will be less likely to 
discredit the poll if there is an expert commentary highlighting its robust methodological quality 
and more likely to affirm it when the result is favorable.48  
Finally, a general critique of polls might increase biased evaluations. As such critiques 
usually raise public awareness about the methodological issues and limitations of polling in 
general, it is likely that individuals might be more cynical (c.f. Capella and Jamieson, 1997).  
Hence, when individuals encounter an election poll which has an undesirable result (i.e. 
their candidate lagging), their heightened awareness of polling limitations in general – as 
primed by an expert debunking all polls – will be used as ammunition for selective 
discrediting of that poll (H3).49 
The Polarizing Influence of Partisan Commentaries. In contrast to expert views, there 
are reasons to think that partisan commentary will amplify motivational biases. The overt 
persuasive nature of opinionated news has been shown to effect political attitudes (Boukes et al., 
2014; Feldman, 2011c; Suhay, Bello-Pardo, Maurer, 2017), political learning (Feldman, 2011b), 
and perceptions of media bias (Feldman, 2011a) compared to non-opinionated straight news 
format. The attempts by partisans and campaign representatives to interpret poll findings could be 
perceived as manipulative by people who would question the impartiality of these sources (c.f. 
Chia and Chang, 2017; the hostile media effect). Thus, I expect that partisan commentary will 
enhance motivated reasoning and result in greater bias.  
                                                 
48 The alternative possibility of a “backfiring effect” when people encounter inconsistent poll results, although less 
likely, deserves discussion. Given that one poll is of poor quality and there is an expert explicitly debunking that poll 
by directly explaining its methodological limitations, this expert view should be a very strong informational 
corrective and mitigate the respondents’ tendency to discredit the unfavorable poll result that has a stronger 
methodology.  
49 This would constitute an increase in motivated discrediting, although not a backfiring effect, because such 
commentary is not targeted at a specific poll, but is on polls in general. 
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H4: That is, individuals will tend to regard a favorable poll result as more credible when 
that poll gets attacked by an out-partisan’s commentary. 
In sum, corrective expert comments on polls with consistent results and indiscriminate 
(overall) debunking as well as partisan comments to increase motivated reasoning while corrective 
expert comments on polls with inconsistent results should reduce individuals’ tendency to engage 
in biased evaluations. 
Finally, I investigate the moderating role of respondents’ education levels on all of the 
expectations above; I expect that, in line with previous empirical studies (cf. Kahan et al., 2013): 
H5: More educated respondents will be the most susceptible to motivational biases, as 
formal education gives them more ability to critique the methodological quality of polls.  
Methods 
This data constitutes the second part of the data of Empirical Study 2 of Chapter 2. The 
additional seven experimental conditions are explained below in detail, and other sections are 
kept as brief as possible. Please refer to the Empirical Study 2 of Chapter 2 for more detailed 
information about the variables. 
Design. Each respondent encountered one news story that included two poll reports about 
the contest between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election.  
Data. An online survey-experiment was implemented through GfK as part of the Time-
Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) Short Studies Program. The study was fielded 
from June 5 to June 20 2016, with 63.6% panel response rate and 2% cumulative response rate 
(CUMRR, Callegaro and Disogra, 2008). Total sample size was 2,078 in the 12 experimental 
conditions. Demographic composition details are in Appendix AI. The study was pre-registered at 
 135 
EGAP- Evidence in Governance and Politics, ID #s 20160629AA <http://egap.org/> See 
Appendix AK for preregistration details. In this empirical study, the full sample is used, N=2,078. 
Manipulated variables.  
Twelve experimental conditions were used to test the hypotheses, each of which consisted 
of a news story with two recent election polls. The poll results (showing Clinton or Trump lead), 
methodological qualities of the polls (poor vs robust), and presence of commentaries about polls 
(objective expert, subjective partisan, and general critique of polls) were randomly manipulated.50 
The robust methodology poll was based on a representative sample, low margin of error, high 
response rate, etc. – as opposed to the details of the poor-quality poll. Corrective expert 
commentaries [tested on conditions where methodological quality varied as either poor or robust] 
objectively debunked the poll with poor methodology and praised the poll with robust 
methodology. The debunking of polls was tested on experimental conditions where polls were of 
equivalent quality in which an expert attacked polls in general by pointing to their common 
limitations and mentioning the recent election prediction failures. Partisan comments [tested on 
conditions where polls were of equivalent quality] came from campaign representatives who 
attacked one poll, in which the campaign representative’s party lagged, as biased and endorsed 
one in which their candidate leads as a better metric. See Table 19 for all the combinations and the 
details, and Appendix AK for all versions of the manipulation stories.51  
 
 
                                                 
50 (a) Due to the randomization and bipolar nature of the dependent variable (perceived relative accuracy), how 
manipulation stories’ poll results compared to the body of actual poll results during the data collection time should 
not bias the results. (b) For the same two reasons, I was able to test our predictions without having full factorial 
design with a total of 12 experimental conditions. 
51 Each test relied on a specific comparison between multiple experimental conditions. As the condition 1 is compared 
against the combination of multiple conditions, it has been oversampled. These details have been preregistered as well. 
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Table 19. Design of the Experimental Conditions 
Conditions First Poll Details 
(KnowPolitics) 
Second Poll Details 
(Public-Metrics) 
Comment Abbrev. Sample 
Size 
Used in the 
Analysis of       
H1 H2 H3 H4 
C1 Clinton lead, high quality Trump lead, high quality None DR 316 - - X X 
C2 Clinton lead, low quality Clinton lead, high quality None dD 161 X - - - 
C3 Trump lead, low quality Trump lead, high quality None rR 164 X - - - 
C4 Trump lead, low quality Clinton lead, high quality None rD 158 - X - - 
C5 Clinton lead, low quality Trump lead, high quality None dR 160 - X - - 
C6 Clinton lead, low quality Clinton lead, high quality Expert dD-NP 160 X - - - 
C7 Trump lead, low quality Trump lead, high quality Expert rR-NP 168 X - - - 
C8 Clinton lead, low quality Trump lead, high quality Expert dR-NP 172 - X - - 
C9 Trump lead, low quality Clinton lead, high quality Expert rD-NP 163 - X - - 
C10 Clinton lead, high quality Trump lead, high quality Partisan DR-PN 140 - - - X 
C11 Trump lead, high quality Clinton lead, high quality Partisan RD-PN 159 - - - X 
C12 Clinton lead, high quality Trump lead, high quality Expert DR-NN 157 - - X - 
Notes. Explanation of Abbreviations: D (vs R) indicates a poll result showing the lead of Democratic candidate. Lowercase 
letters show poor methodological quality for that candidate, uppercases letters show robust methodological quality (for example 
rD shows a poor quality Republican leading poll and high quality Democrat leading poll). N is negative. P is positive.  
Figure 19. Hypothetical news story example 
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Outcome variable. Perceived relative credibility of the two polls was measured with a 
single question: “Comparing the two polls directly, which poll do you think is more accurate in 
representing the public support for the likely candidates in this election?” with seven response 
options.  
The other questions were party identification and education. See Empirical Study 2 in 
Chapter 2 for details. 
Predisposition to disagree (with the poll result). To index the extent to which a poll 
result was unfavorable to each participant, I used the party identification variable that was available 
in the dataset as a proxy for support for each candidate (i. e. Democrats assumed to prefer Clinton 
leading polls).  
Analytical Procedure. The research question and hypotheses are tested using interaction 
models in regressions. Nonresponse was negligible and did not vary by experimental condition.52 
Because the distribution of the dependent variable was not perfectly normal, I ran ordinal logit 
analyses as well. For ease of interpreting the interactions and plotting them, OLS results are 
presented in the text. See Appendix AL for the ordinal logit results, which were not different from 
the OLS. The results did not change when I employed the weights. When I controlled for the 
influence of political interest, our results did not change as well (Appendix AM).53 
Results 
Across the board, respondents discredited the polls that showed unfavorable results. This 
was true regardless of whether they encountered objective expert commentary (b=-.08, se=04, 
                                                 
52 The distribution of refusals across the experimental conditions was homogeneous to a large extent, ranging from 
3.5% to 5%. Only condition 10 had lower refusal rate than others (less than 1%, with only 1 respondent). For the 
outcome variable of election prediction, there was no outlier condition. 
53 I tested for the effect of political interest, because, political interest can influence respondents’ attention to details 
in the poll reports, and hence their perceptions of accuracy. 
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p=.03, Table 20, Column 2), a critique of polls in general (b=-.18, se=.03, p=<.001, Table 20, 
Column 3), or subjective partisan commentary (b=-.18, se=.03, p=<.001, Table 21, Column 4).54 
There was some level of motivated reasoning in perceived credibility of polls regardless of the 
presence and nature of punditry. 
Table 20. Predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll (the higher quality one when the 
quality of polls is inconsistent) 
  H1: Expert 
Comments on 
Consistent 
Results 
  H2: Expert 
Comments on 
Inconsistent 
Results 
 
H3: Expert 
Debunking of 
Polls in 
General 
  H4: Partisan 
Comments on 
Inconsistent 
Results 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
 
Coef.   se 
Predisposition to Disagree 
(Disagree) 
-.05   (.04)   -.08 * (.04)   -.18 *** (.03)   -.18 *** (.03) 
Commentary -.02   (.03)   .03   (.03)   -.06 † (.03)   -.08 ** (.03) 
Disagree X Commentary .07   (.05)   -.09 † (.05)   .07   (.05)   .06   (.04) 
                                
Intercept .46 *** (.03)   .53 *** (.03)   .60 *** (.02)   .58 *** (.02) 
Education .17 *** (.03)   .13 *** (.03)   -.02   (.03)   .02   (.02) 
                                
Conditions Included C2, C3, C6, C7  C4, C5, C8, C9  C1, C12  C1, C10, C11 
N 626   628   451   590 
R-square .07   .07   .09   .10 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to 
the first poll in all models; higher scores also represent greater perceived relative accuracy of the higher quality poll 
in H1 and H2. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All 
tests are two-tailed. Conditions compared for Commentary variable: H1: C2+C3 vs C6+C7; H2: C4+C5 vs C8+C9; 
H3:  C1 vs C12; H4: C1 vs C10+C11.   
 
Overall, the provision of expert commentaries in the news stories, which highlighted the 
poll with better methodological quality and debunked the poll with poor methodological quality, 
did not change people’s credibility judgments significantly (b=.07, se=.05, p=.15, Table 20, 
Column 1;Figure 20A).55 I also examined Clinton-leading and Trump-leading polls separately, but 
the results did not change (Appendix AN). 
                                                 
54 The predisposition to disagree coefficient is not significant in H1 model (Table 200, Column 1), because this 
analysis includes conditions in which polls results were the same, and our dependent variable - a bipolar item 
tapping relative credibility – cannot capture the bias. Those respondents who disliked both poll results could have 
selected the midpoint response option in the outcome variable (not differentiating between the polls). 
55 The inclusion of the interaction term (Disagreement X Expert on Consistent) did not improve the baseline model 
(without the interaction term) significantly, F(2, 621)=1.70, p=.18. 
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When presented with polls that had different results, expert commentary did not reduce the 
bias in perceived credibility either. Instead, if anything, it seemed to increase the bias against the 
unfavorable polls more than the case when there was no commentary at all, although this effect 
was only marginally significant (b=-.09, se=.05, p=.09, Table 20, Column 2).56Figure 20B 
represents this effect, where we can see a steeper slope (more bias) when there is expert 
commentary.57  
Figure 20. Interaction plots for commentary moderations 
 
                                                 
56 The inclusion of the interaction term (Disagreement X Expert on Inconsistent) did not improve the baseline model 
significantly, F(2, 623)=1.82, p=.16. 
57 To compare the influence of expert commentaries in polls with consistent and inconsistent results, I conducted an 
additional analysis which showed that expert commentaries worked to reduce biases significantly less when the results 
were inconsistent (b= -.20, se= .05 p< .001, Appendix AO). 
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On the other hand, overall debunking of polls by an expert seemed to result in less accuracy 
being conferred to the Trump-leading poll across the board (b=-.06, se=.03, p=.06, Table 20, 
Column 3). As seen inFigure 20C, especially for Democrats, the presence or absence of an overall 
polling critique did not make much difference. However, for Republicans, the overall critique 
decreased the inflated sense of credibility in the poll that showed Trump ahead when both polls 
had equal methodological quality.58 
Contrary to what I expected, I did not find an across-the-board increase of partisan biases 
when respondents encountered partisan commentaries. When a partisan attacked the second poll 
in the news story, whether it was a favorable result or not, did not matter, and respondents 
discredited the second poll more than in the condition where there was no commentary (b=-.08, 
se=.03, p=.01, Table 20, Column 4). Respondents discredited unfavorable polls more when they 
were attacked subjectively by a partisan comment; yet, respondents’ evaluations of favorable polls 
were also dampened if those polls were subjectively attacked in this fashion. This is an important 
across the board mean shift observable inFigure 20D.59 However, the presence of partisan 
comments did not lead to an increase in the motivated discrediting for an unfavorable poll result 
more than in the one observed in favorable poll results (b= .06, se=.04, p=.20, Table 20, Column 
4).60  
Education Moderation. Education moderated most of the effects of commentaries in 
important ways. When the results of the two polls were consistent, there was a significant 3-way 
interaction between disagreement with poll result, presence of expert commentary, and education 
                                                 
58 This suggestive Republican-Democratic heterogeneity in the effects is not statistically significant. 
59 Partisan commentary did not interact with disagreement, but this interaction improved the baseline model, F(2, 
585)=6.92, p<.01. 
60 As an additional analysis, I examined the influence of Trump-favoring and Clinton-favoring commentators 
separately, and the results did not differ (Appendix AN). 
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level (b=.34, se=.15, p=.03, Table 21, Column 1). As seen in Figure 21A, highly educated 
respondents were responsive to the corrective expert commentaries. When there was no 
commentary, they exhibited strong biases; but when commentary was present, they recognized the 
better quality of the unfavorable poll just like the poll with the favorable result. For low education 
respondents, there was no effect of expert commentary and these individuals did not differentiate 
among polls as much. This finding shows that there is a significant and real effect of expert 
correctives, but it is only present for highly educated respondents. Additional analysis showed that 
this effect was mostly observed for Clinton-leading polls (Appendix AM). 
When respondents encountered polls with inconsistent results, on the other hand, there 
were no significant effects of education (Table 21, Column 3). The interaction plot inFigure 21B 
suggests that less educated respondents were moving in the opposite direction of what experts 
promote, however this was not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, there was a significant three-way interaction between overall debunking 
of polls by an expert, predisposition to disagree, and education (b=-33, se=.16, p=.04, Table 21, 
Column 3). We can see that when I controlled for the education interaction, there was a significant 
interaction between predisposition to disagree and overall debunking commentary (b=.28, se=.11, 
p=.01, Table 21, Column 3). As seen inFigure 21C, overall debunking significantly lowered 
Republicans’ sense of inflated credibility for Trump-leading polls. There was also an interaction 
between overall debunking and education (b=.24, se=.10, p<.05, Table 21, Column 3), showing 
that this reduction in the inflated credibility for favorable polls was only true for low educated 
respondents. 
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Table 21. Predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll by education 
  H1: Expert 
Comments on 
Consistent Results 
  H2: Expert 
Comments on 
Inconsistent Results 
 
H3: Expert 
Debunking of Polls 
in General 
 
H4: Partisan 
Comments on 
Inconsistent Results 
  Coef.   Se   Coef.   Se   Coef.   Se   Coef.   Se 
Predisposition to Disagree (Disagree) .30 *** (.06)   -.06   (.08)   -.30 *** (.07)   -.30 *** (.07) 
Commentary .08   (.06)   .03   (.07)   -.21 ** (.07)   -.20 ** (.06) 
                                
Disagree X Commentary -.13   (.11)   -.17   (.12)   .28 * (.11)   .15   (.10) 
Disagree X Education -.27 * (.11)   -.04   (.12)   .19 * (.10)   .19 † (.10) 
Commentary X Education -.15 † (.09)   .00   (.10)   .24 * (.10)   .19 * (.09) 
Disagree X Commentary X Education .34 * (.15)   .13   (.16)   -.33 * (.16)   -.14   (.14) 
           -   -     -   -     -    - 
Intercept .39 *** (.04)   .54 *** (.05)   .68 *** (.04)   .68 *** (.04) 
Education .12   (.07)   .11   (.07)   -.14 * (.06)   -.14 * (.06) 
                                
Conditions Included C2, C3, C6, C7  C4, C5, C8, C9  C1, C12  C1, C10, C11 
N 626   628   451   590 
R-square .08    .08    .10   .11 
F-change  F(3)=2.93†    F(3)=.85   F(3)=2.13†   F(3)=3.50* 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to the first poll in all models; higher scores also 
represent greater perceived relative accuracy of the higher quality poll in H1 and H2. F-tests compare the models to the corresponding baseline models reported 
in Table 20. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. Conditions compared for 
Commentary variable: H1: C2+C3 vs C6+C7; H2: C4+C5 vs C8+C9; H3:  C1 vs C12; H4: C1 vs C10+C11.   
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Figure 21. Education interaction plots 
 
When it comes to the effect of partisan commentary, highly educated respondents were 
unresponsive to partisans’ subjective attacks; however, low-education respondents moved in the 
direction of the partisan comments (b=.19, se=.09, p=.03, Table 21, Column 4). As seen inFigure 
21D, the effect of partisan comments was only present for less educated respondents. When a 
commentary from a co-partisan attacked an unfavorable poll, low education respondents 
discredited the undesirable poll more even though the poll was methodologically equivalent to the 
favorable result. Yet, when a commentary by an opposition partisan attacked a respondent’s 
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presumably favored poll result, the respondent’s inflated sense of accuracy in that favored poll 
decreased as well.61  
Finally, as an additional analysis, I examined all hypotheses on a second dependent 
variable, which is the respondents’ expectations about the election outcome. I found strong bias in 
the expectations of respondents’ favorable candidates winning, but none of the expert and partisan 
commentaries had any influence on electoral expectations (Appendix AP). This makes sense given 
that commentaries had little influence even on individuals’ evaluations of polls. 
Summary of Results 
H1: Not confirmed – Expert commentary did not enhance motivated reasoning for polls 
with consistent findings. 
H2: Not confirmed – When results are inconsistent, expert commentary did not reduce 
partisan bias. 
H3: Not confirmed – There was no moderating effect of overall critique of polls. 
H4: Not confirmed – There was no moderating effect of partisan commentary. 
H5: Not confirmed – Generally education did not moderate these null findings. There was 
only one significant finding and it was in the unexpected direction. Those respondents with greater 
education levels responded to the corrective expert commentary in rational way, by not 
discrediting the unfavorable poll if the expert highlighted its methodological quality. But this was 
true only when poll results did not compete. 
Discussion 
I find that the extensive punditry linked to poll results has little influence in increasing or 
mitigating individuals’ motivational biases. While people pick and choose which polls to believe 
                                                 
61 Additional analysis showed that this effect was mostly observed when the partisan commentary came from a Trump 
campaign representative attacking the Clinton-leading poll (Appendix AN). 
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in, what commentators tell them seems to do little to influence individuals’ focus on the 
favorability of the results. Specifically, expert commentaries serve to mitigate individuals’ 
motivational biases, but these effects were limited to highly educated respondents and in 
competitive settings: where poll results differed, people remained attached to favorable poll results 
only. A general critique of polls also reduced the inflated sense of accuracy in Trump-leading polls 
among low education Republicans, although it is not clear how to interpret this finding. On the 
other hand, subjective partisan commentaries and overall debunking of polls seemed to influence 
less educated respondents, regardless of the favorability of the poll results. This set of findings 
reveals that pundit commentaries have a small and inconsistent influence on people’s perceptions 
of polls and their subsequent electoral predictions.  
Limited Effectiveness of Expert Comments. Expert commentaries can reduce motivated 
reasoning in poll perceptions. When an expert objectively explains to individuals which poll 
provides better evidence and lays out why by pointing out the methodological details that are 
presented in the news report, or when an expert attacks the limitations of polls in general, then 
individuals’ partisan biases are reduced. This direct intervention builds on previous mixed findings 
(in Empirical Study 1 in this Chapter) about how the mere presence of methodological details can 
bolster motivated evaluations of polls. These results imply that expert pundits can provide more 
accurate communication of public opinion poll results as their evidence-based explanations are 
persuasive. Increasing popularity of data journalism and polling blogs like FiveThirtyEight, 
RealClearPolitics, the NYT Upshot, can help people evaluate evidence more objectively, and 
thereby curb skewed perceptions of public opinion. These encouraging findings speak to the 
effectiveness of more direct corrective attempts against political biases and misinformation in 
other contexts as well (e.g. Bode and Vraga, 2017; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010).  
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Yet, these results are highly contingent and need further research. First, it is only more 
educated respondents who attend to the objective comments of the experts. This points to the 
increasing importance pf investing in polling literacy in society (cf. Traugott and Kang, 2000). 
Second, this reduction of bias was only observed when the results of the polls were consistent. In 
competitive contexts where results contradicted each other, there was a marginally significant 
trend that showed an increase in biased perceptions, especially for highly educated respondents. 
This suggests that more educated respondents are always more reactive to the comments, and 
although this produce a reduction of bias in some cases, when individuals encounter conflicting 
evidence, they opt in to believe in favorable findings despite expert warnings about the quality of 
evidence. (cf. backfiring effect, Nyhan and Riefler, 2010; see also Nyhan et al., 2017; Chan et al., 
2017).  
Partisan Comments Do Not Polarize. Partisan commentaries do not contribute to the 
accurate flow of information in poll communication, but they did not amplify the motivated 
discrediting of unfavorable polls either. When a partisan commentator attacks a poll he or she does 
not like (showing the rival candidate winning), there is an across-the-board decrease in the 
perceived accuracy of that attacked poll regardless of its favorability to the respondent, especially 
for low education respondents. This suggests that these individuals innocently “listen to” the strong 
partisan comments and move in the direction of what they argue for. Since both polls were actually 
of equivalent methodological quality, there is no reason to listen to the partisan comments as well. 
Hence this movement in response to partisan comments constitutes a detrimental effect, however, 
it does not constitute amplification of bias (cf. Feldman, 2011a; Boukes et al., 2014; Suhay, 2017). 
Why low educated respondents discredit unfavorable polls more but also lose confidence in the 
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accuracy of a favorable poll result remains unclear. One possibility is that these respondents were 
not able to recognize that the partisan comments were highly subjective and unfounded claims.62  
Implications for the Journalistic Coverage of Polls. Given that there is potential for 
mitigating individuals’ biases, journalists have an important responsibility in managing 
commentaries in news reports of polls more effectively and carefully. Journalists should ideally 
include objective expert commentaries when possible. Experts could objectively opine on the 
methodological aspects of specific poll results, point out their limitations or strengths, and remind 
news readers with the general issues in polling. Yet, expert commentaries do not constitute a 
complete solution. Education levels of individuals matter a lot too, which makes it crucial for 
expert commentaries to provide simple and clear explanations and avoid too much jargon. This 
also shows the need for interventions to improve polling literacy of the public (cf. Traugott and 
Kang, 2000).  
Similarly, only criticizing polls en masse is not effective in reducing biases as well. While 
it is good to remind the public about the limitations of polling, the traditional polls remain the most 
objective and systematic sources of evidence about public opinion (Callegaro and Yang, 2018). 
The use of social media, such as Twitter and Facebook content, despite the increasing 
popularization of big data analyses, is highly biased towards social media user demographics.  
 On the other hand, journalists should avoid including partisan or pseudo-expert 
commentaries in poll stories, because they do not bolster the accurate delivery and processing of 
poll results. Even though they do not further polarize individuals’ evaluations, they are not helpful 
either. In the contemporary news environment, full of misinformation, partisan tweaking of policy-
relevant information, and even fake news – what has been popularly referred to as post-truth and 
                                                 
62 The current study cannot compare the expert and partisan comments directly due to the nature of the experimental 
design.  
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post-fact society (Davies, 2016) – it is incumbent upon journalists and news organizations to fight 
against inaccurate and subjective claims against the polls in the media (e.g. “rigged polls”, 
“oversampling”, “un-skewed polls”, “fake polls”). 
 These findings on the influence of punditry on poll perceptions matter greatly in light of 
the structural changes taking place in today’s digital journalism. Contemporary horserace coverage 
is increasingly characterized by experts and institutions who provide polling averages, forecasting 
models, and election prediction markets (Kuru, 2016). Thus, the focus is increasingly on more 
data-driven and statistical reporting of the race, which challenges the traditional role of polls and 
punditry (Butterworth, 2014). Yet, as the forecasting models that suggested a 98% chance of a 
Clinton win led many to an inflated expectation of Clinton victory in the 2016 election, the 
effective communication of public opinion reports - what numbers mean, their contextuality and 
limitations - is ever more important (Messing, Westwood, Lelkes, 2018). And this underscores the 
importance of accurately communicating the scientific uncertainty in news reports; margin of error 
is an important quality indicator in the reliability of a poll result (cf. Fischhoff and Davis, 2014 
Jensen, 2008). This responsibility is incumbent upon not only the journalists, but also on the 
polling industry that the media outlets heavily rely on (see the AAPOR Transparency Initiative). 
Limitations and Future Research. Future research should disentangle the media source 
effects. First, our manipulations either came from experts or partisans, however, given the design, 
it was not possible to directly compare between expert (methodological) and partisan (non-
methodological) comments. Second, I used Yahoo News as the source in all stories. Previous work 
showed that source effects did not moderate the biases in perceptions of issue polls (Kuru, Pasek, 
Traugott, 2017). Where the poll story is reported (liberal-leaning, conservative-leaning, or neutral 
source) could be consequential, and hence the liberal and conservative outlets should be compared. 
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Third, within the context of contemporary data journalism, whether commentaries come from 
mainstream news sites or political data blogs and outlets (e.g. 538, RealClearPolitics, NYT Upshot, 
Pollster) is also a potentially important distinction, especially given that the source of messages 
matters more in competitive environments (Tormala and Clarkson, 2007). 
 The second limitation is the types and timing of commentaries. Future research could 
investigate the impact of news-reader comments on TV, in online news settings or the impact of 
being exposed to poll stories through opinionated social media sharing with one’s social network 
site friends (cf. Lee, 2012; McClain, Kuru, Pasek, 2017). Moreover, at a broader level, punditry is 
not limited to the interpretation of the statistical findings; experts and partisans weave the poll 
results into their coverage of the campaign and political issues. The interaction of such 
commentaries with issue poll results should be addressed in future work. Similarly, while many 
poll stories include commentaries, other comments come from other sources at different times. 
Especially when there is an important critique, comments tend to come after the original poll story 
is published. Whether and how these timing differences would matter is an important question, as 
timing seems to matter in the effectiveness of corrective messages (Garrett and Weeks, 2013). 
Finally, experts do not necessarily agree with each other all the time. Despite engaging in 
methodological and objective critiques, their final judgments can differ wildly (cf. Kuru, 2016; 
Kohl et al., 2016), and expert commentaries might be misleading and inaccurate as well, as was 
the case in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Trende, 2016; Lauderdale and Rivers, 2016). The 
current design assumes that experts will be viewed as credible, although this is an empirical 
question in itself as well. 
General Summary for Chapter 3 
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 In this Chapter, I have shown the limited effectiveness of a variety of journalistic 
strategies for mitigating individuals’ biased processing of public opinion reports. Overall, I have 
found that corrective strategies to make methodologically-based assessments of public opinion 
reports have only limited and contingent effectiveness in reducing partisan discrediting. I have 
shown that the presence of adequate methodological details, as opposed to absence, does not 
mitigate bias. If anything, those respondents with greater methodological knowledge tended to 
display greater bias if there were methodological details in the news report. Then I have shown 
that people display less bias when they evaluate aggregated and more contextualized evidence in 
the form of polling average stories. Those with greater education levels displayed less bias when 
they evaluated polling averages, but the presence of a theoretical explanation about the logic of 
aggregation did not have added benefits. Third, I have shown that expert comments directly 
debunking poor methodology polls and acknowledging the high quality polls had little influence. 
Such expert comments reduced motivated reasoning in assessments of polls only for those 
individuals with greater education and only when the polls results did not compete. Additional 
tests examined the influence of partisan comments and overall debunking of polls aside from 
expert comments; but these tests also did not find notable effects (i.e. in amplifying the 
motivational biases). Overall, these results indicate the persistence of motivational biases in 
people’s processing of public opinion reports and present mixed findings about how individuals’ 
education and knowledge factor into their responsiveness to these journalistic correctives.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Discussion 
 
 In this final chapter, I will first go through a summary of the all empirical studies. Then  
I will discuss theoretical and practical implications and contributions of these studies. Finally, I 
will discuss limitations and directions for future research and conclusion. 
A Summary of the Empirical Findings 
 In the first empirical section, Chapter 2 documented the extent of motivated reasoning in 
people’s perceptions of public opinion reports in different contexts. Empirical Study 1 found that 
individuals discredit issue polls that suggest their views are in the minority, and those with 
greater political knowledge and methodological knowledge displayed this bias more strongly. 
Empirical Study 2 found that people pick and choose among multiple polls based on the 
favorability of their results. Partisan biases are mitigated when the polls themselves vary in 
objective indicators of quality. More educated respondents are more likely to identify high-
quality polls, but they sometimes leverage this ability to reinforce their biases. Finally, these 
moderators influence respondents’ electoral expectations. Empirical Study 3 found that people 
compare diverse metrics of public opinion more based on the favorability of their results than 
their methodological differences. Although people recognize the differences between metrics to 
some extent, they still pick and choose in a biased way when they evaluate their credibility. More 
political knowledge also exasperated the motivated discrediting for some of the reports but not 
all. Overall, these three studies show that biases are prevalent in the assessments of public 
opinion polls in various issue and election contexts, in competitive contexts (multiple polls and 
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differing methodological qualities), and in different types of public opinion metrics (polls, 
forecasting models, analyses of social media buzz etc.). These studies also show that increased 
levels of political knowledge are associated with greater bias while there is a reverse trend with 
individual’s education levels. 
 In the second empirical section, Chapter 3 examined the effectiveness of journalistic 
strategies in the communication of public opinion reports that might be effective in reducing the 
biased reception of public opinion reports. Empirical Study 1 found that the presentation of 
methodological details did not help reduce bias; instead, those with greater methodological 
knowledge about polls seemed to latch onto this additional piece of evidence to counter-argue 
against and dismiss the unfavorable polls even more strongly. Empirical Study 2 found that those 
people with greater education levels exhibited less bias when they encountered unfavorable 
results in the form of aggregated and contextualized polling reports as opposed to singular 
traditional poll findings. Empirical Study 3 found that expert commentaries work to reduce bias 
for highly educated individuals when they encounter non-competing poll results, such that they 
pick and choose based on the favorability of results less often. Yet partisan comments seemed to 
move the credibility evaluations of individuals in a persuasive way, irrespective of whether the 
information is congenial to the respondent. Overall, these studies present a mix of results and 
show that such journalistic correctives have minimal mitigating effects at large in reducing 
biases. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Biased Evaluations of Public Opinion Reports 
 Collectively, these studies have shown the prevalence of biased processing in a variety of 
contexts. Evidence that individuals engage in motivated reasoning when encountering poll 
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results in the news is perhaps unsurprising.  Surveys on salient political issues like those 
examined here are bound to either confirm or disconfirm respondents’ preexisting beliefs. And 
when respondents learn that a majority of Americans disagree with their position on an issue, 
they should experience negative affect toward the new information (Lodge and Taber 2013; Nir 
2011). Specifically, the growing motivated reasoning literature suggests that this affective 
response results in a counter-argumentative process that respondents use to discount the new 
information (Lodge and Taber 2000). When people encounter public opinion reports that are not 
favorable, they tended to discredit its accuracy and credibility, discounted it relative to other 
favorable metrics and ranked it lower in terms of its accuracy. 
 These results complement similar finding in other research and related literature. In the 
polling context, for example, people tend to show more interest reading favorable results (Van 
der Meer and Hakverdian, 2016). Other research shows that people discount the sources as 
untrustworthy when they view unfavorable polls (Chia and Chang, 2017). Previously, Tsfati 
(2001) had found that people evaluate polls based on what they experience in their immediate 
social surroundings. Beyond public opinion reports, these sorts of biases are similar to what has 
been observed in climate change communication (e.g. Hart and Nisbett, 2011), health care (e.g. 
Pasek, Sood, Krosnick, 2015), new technology (e.g. Druckman and Bolsen, 2011), false rumors 
about political candidates (e.g. Weeks and Garrett, 2014), and fake news (e.g. Pennycook and 
Rand, 2017). In all these examples, people view evidence in light of its favorability to their own 
perceptions, beliefs, positions, preferences, or behaviors.  
Sophistication Moderation in Biased Processing 
Not so surprisingly, not all individuals engage in this biased processing in the same way 
and with the same intensity. According to the expectations in motivated reasoning theory, 
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individuals should discredit and successfully reject new information, especially if they have the 
capacity to argue against it. When they are more cognitively or informationally equipped to 
critically evaluate evidence, they will use this ability, unfortunately, in suboptimal ways by 
rationalizing favorable evidence disproportionately more and discrediting unfavorable evidence 
disproportionately more (Lodge and Taber 2013). In science communication and perceptions of 
numerical evidence, this is more specifically known as motivated numeracy (e.g. Kahan et al., 
2015). Such greater ability and sophistication is usually reflected by individuals’ political 
knowledge, education levels, methodological knowledge, and abilities. This is an important 
finding for understanding how the public makes sense of poll reports.  
 Across the studies, I almost always found that greater political knowledge, as well 
individuals’ methodological knowledge about polls, are indeed associated with more tendency in 
biased discrediting of public opinion reports. It shows that biased evaluations are not simple 
results of knowledge deficiency but instead reflect a rationalization process that is more akin to 
systematic and central route of processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984) 
and more specifically, the System Two Motivated Reasoning (Kahan, 2013). This finding 
implies that motivated reasoning in the context of public opinion reports is a very severe bias that 
is likely to be amplified with greater knowledge. 
Yet, across the studies, we have mixed set of findings regarding different ability 
characteristics of individuals. As seen in Table 22, education does not always behave in the same 
way as do political and methodological knowledge. This summary table shows that political and 
methodological knowledge behave more similarly, and those respondents who score higher tend 
to process public opinion reports in more biased ways, by discrediting the unfavorable results 
more or by not responding to the informational correctives. However, education in particular as a 
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general ability measure did not increase bias; instead those with greater education mostly had 
less bias in evaluating the reports. This effect was especially observed in the context of 
comparing the two polls the Empirical Study 2 in Chapter 2 and the Empirical Study 3 in 
Chapter 3. Note that the methodological differences between the studies that tested education and 
knowledge, especially on the outcome variable, could explain some of these differences as well, 
which is discussed in further detail in the limitations section later on. 
Table 22. A Summary of the Ability-Sophistication Moderators in Level of Discrediting 
Unfavorable Public Opinion Reports 
Individual Effects Moderator 
Type 
Moderation 
Result 
Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 1 
(perceived credibility of issue polls by respondent issue position 
and poll result) 
Political 
Knowledge  
More bias 
Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 1 
(perceived credibility of issue polls by respondent issue position 
and poll result) 
Methodological 
Knowledge 
More bias 
Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 2  
(perceived relative accuracy of election polls by candidate 
preference and poll result) 
Education Less bias 
Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 2  
(perceived relative accuracy of election polls by candidate 
preference, poll result, and varying methodological quality) 
Education No moderation 
Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 3  
(perceived methodological credibility of election metrics by 
candidate preference and metric results) 
Political 
Knowledge 
More bias 
 Chapter 2 - Empirical Study 3  
(perceived methodological credibility of election metric by 
candidate preference and metric’s results) 
Numeracy No moderation 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 1  
(perceived credibility of issue polls by respondent issue position 
and poll result) 
Political 
Knowledge 
More bias 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 1  
(perceived credibility of issue polls by respondent issue position 
and poll result) 
Methodological 
Knowledge 
More bias 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 2 (perceived credibility of poll by 
respondent candidate preference and poll’s result) 
Education More bias 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 2 (perceived credibility of metric 
by respondent candidate preference and metric’s result) 
Education Less bias 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 2 (perceived credibility of metric 
result by respondent candidate preference and poll results) 
Political 
Knowledge 
No moderation 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 2 (perceived credibility of metric 
result by respondent candidate preference and poll results) 
Methodological 
Knowledge 
More bias 
Chapter 3 - Empirical Study 3 (perceived relative accuracy of 
election polls by candidate preference, poll result, and expert 
commentary) 
Education Less bias 
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 What are the implications of these mixed findings for motivated reasoning theory? Why 
did I find different pattern of results for sophistication variables? It is seen that, as the most 
general measure of sophistication, greater education level is associated with less bias. These 
respondents should act in more rational ways due to their potentially greater analytical thinking 
skills. Yet, the confirmed hypotheses about political knowledge and methodological knowledge 
provide evidence that this bias is indeed motivated discrediting. Alternatively, more educated 
respondents might be more inclined to scrutinize the news reports in more detail, hence avoiding 
biased processing. Finally, these heterogeneous results also contribute to the recent findings that 
show low correlations among these constructs (Låg et al., 2014) and differing relationships with 
biased evaluations (Pasek and Weeks, 2017). 
Given these results, how do we know that this biased processing is motivated reasoning? 
For one, these studies documented that people disproportionately dismiss the same set of 
evidence based on the favorability of the results. Moreover, results mostly showed that more 
knowledgeable people displayed more bias, and increased education also was related to greater 
bias in one study (Empirical Study 3 in Chapter 3). I take these as also evidence for motivated 
reasoning. 
Alternative Explanations: Bayesian Updating and Expressive Responding 
According to Bayesian updating theory, people might not always definitively dismiss all 
unfavorable information (Gerber & Green, 1999). A study in German and Austrian samples 
found that increased political knowledge reduced wishful thinking in predictions about the 
election outcome (Meffert et al., 2011). However it is important to see that poll credibility and 
predictions in relation to polls are two different constructs (Gerber and Green, 1999). When it 
comes to prediction, people might be more accuracy-oriented rather than condoning their 
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immediate biases in evaluating individual poll reports (see Kunda 1990).63 Given a poll result 
that is unfavorable to them, people might update their prediction regarding the favorable 
candidate in realistic and objective terms, by incorporating the unpleasant poll finding to some 
level. Despite the fact that motivations would still be at work, this would constitute a case of 
Bayesian updating (cf. Bullock, 2009). However, recent research compared theories of motivated 
reasoning and Bayesian updating in the context of public opinion issues and found support for 
motivated reasoning (e.g. Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015b; Fischle, 2000).  
Another possibility is expressive responding and that the biases documented in the 
current studies are partly a methodological survey response phenomenon - a theoretical bias that 
is similar to overtly-expressed social desirability. Expressive responding happens when 
individuals state inaccurate beliefs not because they truly believe in them but only to cheerlead 
their own party, candidate, or issue positions in a deliberate way (Bullock et al, 2015). For 
example, a voter who does not like President Obama might state that he or she believes that he is 
foreign born or Muslim. Although they might know this is not true at all, they state this 
misinformation strategically to contribute unfavorable public knowledge and public opinion 
against Obama (cf. Berinsky, 2018). Recent research on partisan misinformation and 
misperceptions showed that some of the measured misinformation or partisan biases might in 
fact be due to expressive responding (Bullock et al, 2015). Whereas Berinsky (2018) showed that 
there is little evidence for expressive responding, Prior, Sood, and Khanna (2015) were able to 
reduce partisan differences in beliefs about economic facts by offering monetary rewards and 
describing the importance of the research which indicates evidence for expressive responding. 
                                                 
63 Research on the aggregated accuracy of voter expectations and ‘wisdom of crowds’ support this possibility ( 
Graefe, 2014; Wang, Rothschild, Goel, & Gelman, 2015). However, social influence (knowledge of majority 
standing) has been shown to impact the wisdom of crowd performance in a prediction task as well (Lorenz, Rauhut, 
Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011).  
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The current empirical studies’ designs had no way of directly testing the possibility of expressive 
responding influencing the results. My hunch is that even if there is indeed some level of 
expressive responding in individuals’ biased evaluations of public opinion reports, what people 
tell others, either literally or rhetorically, constitutes a misinformation and misrepresentation in 
the marketplace of systematic public opinion evidence in our communicative environment. 
Deleterious Consequences of Biased Processing of Public Opinion Reports 
The conclusion that motivated reasoning takes place in the public interpretations of 
public opinion reports should be concerning.  Unlike many other forms of information such as 
anecdotes, interviews, and focus groups, well-conducted public opinion reports are arguably one 
of social sciences’ most important contributions to public debate as they provide systematic and 
objective evidence that should guide public perceptions regardless of the favorability of the 
results.  Evidence that motivational processes influence these perceptions is hence very 
problematic. For one, the public dissemination of polling results may lead to an apparent “false 
consensus effect” among some members of the poll’s audience: if individuals regularly accept 
messages that the public agrees with them and reject messages that the public disagrees with 
them, this would result in their incorrectly thinking that “most people” believe what they do (cf. 
Ross, Greene, and House 1977). Additionally, such results refine previous findings that the 
public has general levels of poll skepticism and distrust in pollsters (e.g. Kim et al. 2011); I show 
that, in addition to overall trends, perceived credibility actually varies substantively at the 
individual level, and does so in a very polarizing manner. 
These results have implications for political elite perceptions and their policy-making 
preferences, too. Elite polarization might also result in part from a combination of motivated 
reasoning processes. Indeed, elites may be especially susceptible to motivational processes due 
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to their high levels of political knowledge and engagement. A lot of evidence suggests that 
policymakers pay attention to public preferences (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). These findings on 
motivated reception of public opinion reports may explain why legislators often have skewed 
perceptions of public opinion (Broockman and Skovron 2018). Also see Baekgaard et al. (2017) 
and Friedman, Lerner, Zeckhauser (2015) for recent work in related domains that document the 
biases political elites have in evaluating information. A working paper also showed that experts 
also exhibit ideological bias when they evaluate policy-relevant information (Banuri et al., 
2017). 
Moreover, the biases identified in this study have detrimental consequences for democracy 
at large. Biased perceptions of polls could have important downstream consequences ranging from 
attitude change to decisions about turnout and voting preferences (Moy and Rinke, 2012). To the 
extent that people selectively interpret polls based on their partisanship, they are likely to reinforce 
cleavages in society at large. Existing work already shows that poll results shape people’s 
perceptions of public opinion (Sonck and Loosveldt, 2010) and expectations about election results 
(Delavande and Manski, 2012; also see Daniller, Silver and Moehler, 2013). The motivated 
reception of polls could further bias these downstream effects of exposure. 
Similarly, the abundance of public opinion reports nurtures an environment that encourages 
people to cherry pick favorable metrics for themselves. With this selective interpretation, people 
could tune into media outlets that are likely to show them results that are disproportionately 
favorable to their preferred candidates (Stroud, 2010) and this bias could be exasperated by real 
biases in news media coverage of polls (Searles, Ginn, & Nickens, 2016) and the competitive 
multiple messages being delivered to the citizens (cf. Chong and Druckman, 2007). The findings 
from Empirical Study 3 in Chapter 2 especially resonate with the recent Pew study in which the 
160 
 
authors found that exposure to the forecasting reports, which show greater nominal values as 
compared to polls (95% chance of winning the election, for example), influence individuals’ 
perceptions in unique way and discourage them from turnout (Westwood, Messing, Lelkes, 2018). 
More data and more diverse data cause a confusion in public perceptions, and this confusion might 
especially be prone to perceptions that are driven by motivated reasoning.  
These processes might further skew assessments of what the public wants (cf. Nir, 2011; 
Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and increase beliefs in “rigged elections” (Sances and Stewart, 
2015) as well as negative views about both the political opposition and the media (i.e. Chia and 
Chang, 2017). By reinforcing existing partisan divisions, the biases identified here add to 
polarization in American society. Increasingly there are two Americas with very different views 
of what the country wants (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015), and polls, despite their ostensibly 
objective nature, may bifurcate Americans further.  
Effectiveness of Mitigation Strategies  
 Results showed that mere disclosure of methodological details does not help reduce 
individuals’ motivated processing. While this does not mean that we should stop presenting 
methodological details (cf. AAPOR Transparency Initiative), more research is needed to tease 
out under what conditions the methodological details might be more influential in individuals’ 
perceptions. It also shows that simply providing more information is not a solution in itself. 
Instead, how that information is presented and highlighted to the newsreaders might make a 
difference.  
 Aggregated-contextualized reporting results are more encouraging, as individuals with 
higher education displayed less bias when they saw evidence with context and aggregation. This 
finding implies that more information and explanatory journalism does not really help in this 
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specific scenario to reduce misperceptions. However, the fact that explanation of logic behind 
polling averages had no effect should be studied further, because journalists try hard to 
popularize more contextualized and aggregated reporting such as polling average (e.g. Silver, 
2012; 2016; Jackson, 2016; Cohn, 2016). This might indicate that it does not help to highlight 
polling averages for public to have more accurate judgments; or else, the journalists should find 
other and more effective ways when communicating the contextualized and aggregated evidence. 
 Expert commentaries do not help a lot, either. The only normatively positive finding is 
that more educated individuals listened to the what experts told them and chose the higher 
quality poll as more accurate. However, this was true only when multiple poll results did not 
compete, such that, when there was one favorable and one unfavorable poll, there was cherry 
picking; there was no corrective influence of expert comments. From a practical point of view, 
this gives us little hope, what use do expert commentaries have if they cannot be effective in 
competitive contexts (cf. Dunwoody and Kohl, 2017; Kohl et al., 2016)? 
Practical Implications and Recommendations 
Direct Recommendations 
 What should actors involved in public opinion reporting - in industry, academia, and the 
media - do to foster the accurate interpretation of public opinion evidence and mitigate 
motivational biases? The results from this dissertation has important practical implications and 
recommendations for these diverse actors as well, because not only have I shown the prevalence 
and nature of bias, but tested the effectiveness of journalistic correctives.  
It should be made very clear that I have not found much corrective effectiveness of these 
strategies to reduce motivated assessments of public opinion reports. As summarized in the 
previous subsection in the Discussion chapter, the influence of corrective attempts are very 
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minimal and contingent. Regardless, the findings I obtained are not conclusive in and of 
themselves. There might be other methodologies to assess the influence of these journalistic 
correctives, or there might be other ways to present them in the context of news reports in order 
to bolster their salience and effectiveness for ordinary news readers. 
 The polling industry should abide by adequate methodological disclosure, in line with the 
Transparency Initiative of the American Association for Public Opinion Research. 
 Industry actors should coordinate with journalists and academics more in preparing 
simplified public opinion reports for the lay public. 
 Media reports on public opinion evidence should have adequate methodological 
disclosure and links for detailed information elsewhere. 
 Methodological details in news reports should be accessible to public interpretation. They 
should include clickable information boxes defining concepts (such as margin of error) 
and some information about what counts as robust evidence (e.g. convenience samples 
are bad; poll results following big events such as mass shootings might not reflect long 
term opinions).  
 Media reports should include expert commentaries to discuss the results and 
methodological quality of the public opinion evidence being presented. 
 Expert commentaries should not directly attack the results, but instead focus on 
methodological quality and provide detailed theoretical explanations and logical 
conclusions in evaluating the evidence.  
 Partisan commentaries should be avoided. If campaign representatives’ partisan 
comments are included, they should be highlighted as being subjective and not evidence 
based to the readers. 
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 Data journalists who provide metrics others than polls – forecasting models, prediction 
markets, analyses of social media buzz – should be transparent about their data and 
analytical procedures. 
 Journalists should highlight aggregated evidence and its logic and stop focusing on 
singular evidence of public opinion a lot. 
Other recommendations 
During the writing of this dissertation, the American Association for Public Opinion 
Research put together an ad-hoc committee in response to the partisan rhetoric against polls in 
2016 election campaign period. I am serving as a committee member in this group and 
contributed to the initial report. Below I present a sample list of items that are included in this 
report. These ideas are included in various forms in the initial committee report as well (Ayers et 
al., 2017).  
 Academics should write more public commentaries to inform the public about research 
findings that document how they might be biased in their processing of public opinion 
reports (e.g. Kuru, Pasek, Traugott 2016; 2017b; Kuru, 2016; 2018). Such dissemination 
of research findings could increase self-consciousness and inoculate individuals against 
biased processing, as noted in the future research section below. 
 Public opinion evidence should be regarded as systematic and scientific research. It is 
mostly academicians’ responsibility to highlight the scientific nature of public opinion 
reports to the university students and the larger public – particularly journalists (e.g. 
Corzine and Woolley, 2018). They should defend partisan attacks against the systematic 
evidence (e.g. rigged polls, oversampling of Democrats, fake polls). 
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 Journalists should clearly communicate the differences between different metrics 
(forecasting models, prediction markets, analyses of social media buzz), and what they 
can and cannot communicate about the state of public opinion.  
 Social media outlets, such as in the case of Twitter Polls (Kuru, 2018), should include 
warning labels in order to clarify the unscientific nature of entertainment tools that are 
being manipulated by partisan outlets. 
 Polling literacy and education of the public – as well as journalists – should be increased 
with educational interventions. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are some theoretical and methodological limitations that need consideration in this 
dissertation. On the theoretical front, the studies mostly focused on the evaluations of public 
opinion reports and did not examine the subsequent effects on public perceptions or trust. Only 
two out of the six studies had an additional outcome variable of interest which is the electoral 
expectations of respondents. While the perceived credibility of public opinion reports provides 
us important information about people’s immediate judgments, these judgments are probably 
short-lived and do not have long-term effects. 
 Across the six studies, the outcome variable of interest varied slightly as well. While 
most of the studies used perceived credibility as an index of multiple items (accuracy, 
trustworthiness, reliability), the ones based on the nationally representative TESS data (data 
source for the empirical study 2 in Chapter 2 and the empirical study 3 in Chapter 3) had to rely 
on the single item of “accuracy”. Similarly, Empirical Study 2 in Chapter 2 and Empirical Study 
3 in Chapter 3 measured perceive relative accuracy with a bipolar dependent variable to index 
the comparisons of respondents, while the study comparing polls, forecasting models, and 
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analyses of social media buzz had ranking order as the dependent variable. These methodological 
variations in operationalizing the outcome variable and its variance enriches the rigor of the 
study, but we need to be careful about interpreting the results in general, especially when we 
compare the results of the studies’ conclusions. It would have been ideal to test these different 
ways of operationalization within the context of a single study in order to compare them directly 
and conduct ad-hoc tests to identify any possible methodological artefacts.  
Similarly, the conceptualization and operationalization of “bias” has also some 
limitations and variations across the empirical studies. What is bias when we talk about biased 
processing of public opinion reports? All of the studies quantified bias cross-sectionally by 
comparing between the groups who viewed different versions of the fundamentally same news 
reports. Future research should tease out within individual and long-term conceptualization and 
operationalization of bias. Second, the studies relying on the TESS data examined “perceived 
relative accuracy” in relation to a comparative truth benchmark – whether one poll has indeed 
more robust methodological quality or not. Given that even methodological experts can disagree 
on what constitutes a robust poll, measuring by referencing to the relative methodological quality 
of two polls makes the most sense (one poll had clearly much better quality compared to the 
other one (Baker et al., 2013). In contrast to this, in the rest of the studies, the bias is completely 
operationalized in a cross-sectional group comparison way, such that bias is not indexed in 
relation to its deviation from an objective indication of truth – accuracy. One final limitation is 
that not all public opinion reports’ results could be orthogonally categorized into unfavorable or 
favorable evidence. What should be made of tie results? Or how could we measure individuals 
who have ambivalent of middle-of-the-road preferences such that they could not be ideally 
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categorized as liking or disliking a clear result? Future research should address these issues to 
come up with a more sophisticated conceptualization and operationalization of bias. 
Aside from perceived credibility of public perceptions, these studies had a limited 
opportunity to examine further outcome variables such as perceptions of public opinion as well. 
Electoral expectations were also measured as a dependent variable in Empirical Study 2 in 
Chapter 2 and Empirical Study 3 in Chapter 3 (the TESS data). The effects were mostly null; 
although people were biased in their electoral expectations, due to design limitations, it was not 
directly discernible and entirely clear whether these effects were shaped as a result of the 
motivated processing of the polls that participants were engaged in. 
 There are some methodological limitations of the experimental designs as well. In a 
context where people encounter many public opinion reports nearly every day, the believability 
of the hypothetical news reports is always an issue. I have exercised utmost care to produce real-
looking news stories. This has sometimes created tensions between external (resemblance to real 
life contexts) and internal (theoretical inference) validity. For example, after the empirical 
studies using the TESS data showed that source did not matter, I have included a new source 
logo in all experimental conditions. This source was ideologically neutral and was kept constant 
across the conditions to make the hypothetical stories more realistic. Yet, source effects might be 
more salient in competitive contexts in which respondents had viewed multiple competing poll 
results. 
 The design of hypothetical news stories should be improved in future research in terms of 
stylistic elements as well. Considerable research in political psychology and science 
communication shows that the ways titles (Goidel and Ura, 2016), fonts, pictures, and 
quantitative graphics are designed could have an influence in people’s engagement with news 
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reports (cf. Cairo, 2013; e.g. Fagerlin et al., 2005). Research centers such as Center for Media 
Engagement provide many reports on how online website designs shape news readers’ 
engagement with information. Hence, especially with the increasing importance of data 
journalism which incorporate interactive graphs and visual presentation of data, these details’ 
potential influence in people’s processing of public opinion reports should be studied. 
Believability of the results of public opinion reports are also an issue when we consider 
people’s prior knowledge about the content and focus of the reports. For example, particularly in 
the election context, in which people get exposed to pre-election polls constantly, the 
believability of the hypothetical news stories might be compromised. Still, these potential issues 
are not likely to create a systematic bias as if there is any effect, it should be equally true in all 
experimental conditions. Further, aside from political knowledge, the studies controlled for the 
effect of and tested the moderating role of another knowledge construct - methodological 
knowledge – and found no differences (Chapter 2, Empirical Study 1). 
 Future research on this front could focus on a variety of domains to advance our 
understanding of how people process information in an increasingly social and mobile 
communication technology. Our studies on the credibility of online content should consider such 
features of the platforms (cf. Metzger, Flanagin and Medders, 2010). Particularly social media 
contexts provide each user a different experience of public opinion within their own personal 
networks and this could be influential on how they process public opinion reports that they 
encounter in social media (e.g. Baek, Jeong, Rhee, 2015; cf. Messing and Westwood, 2012). 
More broadly, in contemporary media ecosystems which have advanced and rapidly-evolving 
communication technology, individuals encounter political facts and misinformation through 
social media and mobile devices that increasingly integrate tools of data journalism. 
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Subsequently, people engage with scientific and political information in more interactive, visual, 
omnipresent, and dynamic (e.g. live updates, simultaneous fact-checking) forms. Hence, it is 
important to examine how interactive explanations of data and visual graphics concerning the 
representation of scientific and systematic facts shape individuals’ judgments (e.g. Cairo, 2016; 
Hawley et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2018). Research could also focus on users’ incessant and real-
time engagement with mobile news, mobile news applications, and use of social media for 
quantitative public opinion reports and other political or scientific evidence (e.g. Dunaway, Paul, 
Searles, 2016). Earlier research showed that there might be differences in online vs traditional 
polls, again showing the potential role of communication mode in shaping individuals’ 
processing (e.g. Kim, Weaver, Willnat, 2001). Similarly, how people engage with non-visual 
news such as on the radio, podcasts or the TV could be studied in future research.  
 Second, how elites engage in public opinion reports and rely on them in their decisions in 
policy-making processes should be further investigated. Understandably, we would expect 
important differences in their processing and behaviors due to the strategic and calculated 
behavior, unlike ordinary citizens. Some recent research has already started to tackle elite 
processing of evidence and potential for motivated reasoning (e.g. Baekgaard et al., 2017; 
Friedman, Lerner, Zeckhauser, 2015). 
 Not all public opinion evidence is quantitative. Another interesting area for future 
research is to investigate the role of “human voice” in an increasingly data-dominated news 
coverage about public opinion. While there is so much de-individuated public opinion data and 
its aggregation and re-processing in the cascades of endless news coverage, qualitative evidence 
is increasingly undermined. Although anecdotes, interviews, in-depth reporting about public 
opinion are still existent and provide valuable information, in an increasingly data-driven public 
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opinion reporting, we should investigate how hybrid reporting that uses both narratives 
(qualitative and anecdotal evidence) and quantitative evidence of public opinion reports could 
influence people’s perceptions and judgments of evidence (cf. Dillard et al., 2010).  
This resonates with the increasing importance of local journalism in the post-2016 
election era during. Many critiques raised issues with media conglomerates accumulating in 
coastal cities and how journalists relied on de-individuated aggregated data that is stripped of 
direct human voice and declining attention to local journalism (cf. Radcliffe and Ali, 2017; e.g. 
Abernathy, 2017). Yet, there are good examples of integrating narratives and quantitative data in 
public opinion reporting. The best journalistic example is the Associated Press reporting. In its 
reports, the AP presents polling evidence but also provides direct quotations from some 
respondents. Future research should examine how individuals process such narrative and 
quantitative evidence when they are bundled together as in the AP reporting (e.g. Alonso-
Zalzivar and Swanson, 2017). A large literature examining episodic and thematic frames (e.g. 
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), and the influences of narratives in media coverage have found 
important influence of anecdotal reporting in changing people’s perceptions (e.g. Dal Cin, 
Zanna, Fong, 2004; Otsfeld & Mutz, 2014; Wojcieszak & Kim, 2016). In the context of public 
opinion reports, one possibility is that narrative evidence could boost the credibility of numerical 
evidence (cf. Daschmann, 2000). 
One final direction for future research is meta-cognitive processes. In increasing science 
blogging and dissemination of simplified social research, ordinary individuals are increasingly 
exposed to social science findings. One of the most covered research findings is political 
polarization and partisan motivated reasoning in American politics. It is important to understand 
how people react to the reporting about these social scientific findings, particularly how their 
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engagement with this kind of information that is about their own cognitive processes might 
influence their perceptions of public opinion evidence that they encounter afterwards. For 
example, various findings from this dissertation have been blogged about in popular outlets such 
as the Washington Post, the Huffington Post, and the Mediashift. How would an ordinary news 
reader might react to public opinion evidence after being exposed to the findings from this 
dissertation? Studying human behavior and presenting findings to the public would undoubtedly 
have an important influence on people’s perceptions of evidence. One such claim was the 
coverage of party politics in the 2016 election and how the political elite might have reacted to 
the research evidence (Yglesias, 2016). 
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this dissertation documents evidence that ordinary individuals’ processing 
of public opinion evidence is biased. People tend to discredit systematic information, and their 
increased ability in the form of higher political knowledge and methodological knowledge 
usually exacerbates this bias. People also mostly resist a variety of objective informational 
correctives in journalistic reporting of public opinion evidence. While contextualized-aggregated 
evidence and expert comments seem to reduce bias, these findings are true only for those more 
responsive high education individuals and only when multiple sets of evidence do not compete. 
Overall, such biases would fuel skewed perceptions of public opinion and erode trust in public 
opinion reports, pollsters, journalists and government responsivity.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A – Sample Characteristics 
Table A1. Comparison of the Amazon and Qualtrics samples 
  
Amazon Mechanical 
Turk  
Qualtrics Online 
Sample 
 Counts Percentages* Counts Percentages* 
Sample size (completes) 1053  -  1226  - 
Effective sample size (valid completes**) 987  -  1211  - 
Completion time (mean) 16'54''  -  20'10''  - 
Date of collection Feb-15  -  Jul-15  - 
      
Female 451 45.7%  655 54.0% 
Is married 371 37.6%  610 50.4% 
Age (18-24) 96 9.7%  182 15.0% 
Age (25-34) 409 41.4%  144 11.9% 
Age (35-44) 230 23.3%  229 18.9% 
Age (45-54) 117 11.9%  224 18.5% 
Age (55-64) 102 10.3%  224 18.5% 
Age (65+) 33 3.3%  208 17.2% 
      
White 742 75.2%  794 65.6% 
Black/African American 67 6.8%  139 11.5% 
Mexican 31 3.1%  87 7.2% 
Puerto Rican 6 .6%  46 3.8% 
Cuban 4 .4%  21 1.7% 
American Indian/Alaskan 7 .7%  20 1.7% 
Asian 101 10.2%  69 5.7% 
Native Hawaiian - Pacific Islander 3 .3%  2 .2% 
Other 19 1.9%  3 .2% 
      
Edu - high school, equivalents or less 107 10.8%  235 19.4% 
Edu - college degree equivalents or less 341 34.5%  459 37.9% 
Edu - college degree (Bachelor's) 417 42.2%  344 28.4% 
Edu - graduate degree or equivalents 122 12.4%  172 14.2% 
      
Household income - less than $25k 257 26.0%  249 20.6% 
Household income - $25k to $50k 309 31.3%  340 28.1% 
Household income - $50k to $75k 200 20.3%  250 20.6% 
Household income - $75k to $100k 118 11.9%  174 14.4% 
Household income - more than $100k 103 10.3%  193 15.9% 
      
Strong Republican 65 6.6%  195 16.1% 
Republican  103 10.4%  202 16.7% 
Republican-leaning Independent 64 6.5%  97 8.0% 
Independent with no leaning 139 14.1%  155 12.8% 
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Democrat-leaning Independent 161 16.3%  142 11.7% 
Democrat 249 25.2%  143 11.8% 
Strong Democrat 206 20.9%  221 18.2% 
 
  
   
Strong Conservative 40 4.10%  93 7.70% 
Conservative 89 9.00%  206 17.00% 
Conservative-leaning 112 11.30%  132 10.90% 
No inclination 167 16.90%  340 28.10% 
Liberal-leaning 169 17.10%  113 9.30% 
Liberal 282 28.60%  175 14.50% 
Strong Liberal 121 12.30%  85 7.00% 
      
Owns gun personally  -  -  218 18.0% 
Respondent's household has a gun 243 24.6%  389 32.1% 
Has been a gun victim personally  -  -  95 7.8% 
Has witnessed gun violence personally  -  -  200 16.5% 
Has an acquaintance who has been a gun victim 154 15.6%  356 29.4% 
Has had abortion   -  -  81 6.7% 
Has an acquaintance who has had abortion 424 43.9%   520 42.9% 
      
Notes.  *Percentages may not sum to 100% due to item non-response. **Valid completes is set 
of respondents who passed attention and minimum completion time (detected speeders) filters. 
Blank cells indicate either absence of percentage or a question that was not asked in the Amazon 
sample. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Initially 10% of the total number of targeted respondents were invited to complete the survey 
experiment on June 17th. We initially planned to continue data collection on June 18th after 
checking data quality for these initial respondents. Following the Charleston Church shooting, 
which occurred on the evening of June 17th (after all initial responses had been collected), we 
decided to postpone the rest of the data collection for two weeks. We were worried that the 
presence of a recent shooting might alter attitudes about gun control and thus cloud the results of 
our experiment. There were no substantive differences between the personal characteristics of 
individuals interviewed in these two periods, including ideology and abortion issue positions. 
However there was a slight difference in attitudes supportive of gun control among respondents 
interviewed before and after the Charleston shooting, t(1209)=1.95, p=.05 (Mpre-Charleston=.62 and 
Mpost-Charleston=.68). These differences were driven mostly by an increase in support for gun 
control among Independents; there were no notable party differences. 
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Appendix B – Amazon Replication 
Description of Amazon Sample 
The sample is composed of 1053 Amazon Mechanical Turk participants and the data 
were collected through the Qualtrics survey platform in February 2015. The participants were 
US-based Amazon MTurk workers who had a 99% assignment approval rate and had completed 
at least 1000 assignments. They received $1 compensation for participating. The mean 
completion time was 16.9 minutes (s.d.=6.49). Participants who completed the survey under 2 
minutes (most of them were incomplete cases – 63 participants) and those who finished it in 
more than an hour (3 participants) were eliminated, leaving us with an effective sample size of 
987. Respondents were instructed to complete the survey at one setting because we thought this 
was important for observing manipulation effects in time. The mean respondent age was 36.5 
years (s.d.=12.4): there are 478 females and 572 males; and 568 of the respondents had 
Bachelor’s degree or higher. There were 833 Whites, 109 Asians, 69 Blacks or African 
Americans. The median total household income was in the $40,000-$49,000 range. The sample 
reported itself as 589 liberals and 246 conservatives, and 616 Democrats, 232 Republicans, and 
139 Independents. 
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Table B1. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control  
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.13 * .06  -.22 ** .08  -.24 ** .08  -.07  .08 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.14 + .08         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.07  .08         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .22 + .12         
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             -.11  .08     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.08  .08     
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .23 + .12     
Disagreement X Detail                 .00  .08 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .10  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail                 -.09  .11 
                    
Intercept .47 *** .03  .44 *** .03  .42 *** .04  .42 *** .04  .46 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.02  .01  -.02  .01  -.02  .01  -.01  .01  -.02  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  -.03  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .02  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .02  .01  .01  .01 
S-I Consonance .04 * .01  .04 * .01  .08  .05  .03 + .02  .04 * .01 
S-M Dissonance .03 * .01  .03 * .01  .02  .02  .06  .05  .02 + .01 
Poll Interest .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03 
Disagreement -.13 *** .01  -.05  .04  .01  .05  .01  .05  -.06  .05 
Political Knowledge -.28 *** .03  -.22 *** .04  -.20 *** .05  -.19 ** .06  -.28 *** .06 
                    
N 980  980  980  980  980 
R-square .21  .21  .22  .22  .22 
F Test (df) -  4.74* (1)  1.29 (3)  1.48 (3)  1.68 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested 
against the Baseline Model. 
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Table B2. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on 
Gun Control 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  .02  .04  -.03  .06 
Gun Disagreement X Detail     -.11 + .06 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .04  .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .10  .08 
        
Intercept .40 *** .03  .4 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03 + .01  -.03 + .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .  .01  .  .04 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .02  .01  .02  .01 
S-I Consonance .03 + .02  .03 + .02 
S-M Dissonance .03 * .01  .03 + .01 
Poll Interest .23 *** .03  .23 *** .03 
Disagreement -.15 *** .03  -.09 * .04 
Methodological Knowledge -.10 *** .03  -.12 ** .04 
        
N 980  980 
R-square .15  .16 
F Test (df) -  3.30* (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against Knowledge Effects model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
 
Table B3. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion  
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.20 ** .06  -.21 ** .08  -.23 ** .08  -.12  .08 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.10  .08         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.05  .08         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .05  .12         
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             -.08  .08     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.08  .08     
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .07  .12     
Disagreement X Detail                 .11  .08 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .08  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail                 -.17  .12 
                    
Intercept .44 *** .03  .39 *** .03  .36 *** .04  .36 *** .04  .41 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.02  .01  -.02  .01  -.02  .02  -.02  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .02  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  -.04  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .02  .01  .01  .02  .01  .02  .01  .02  .01  .02 
S-I Consonance .05 *** .01  .05 *** .01  .12 * .05  .06 *** .02  .05 *** .01 
S-M Dissonance .03 * .01  .03 * .01  .05 ** .02  .10 + .05  .03 * .01 
Poll Interest .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03  .30 *** .03 
Disagreement -.15 *** .01  -.03  .04  .00  .05  .01  .06  -.08  .05 
Political Knowledge -.26 *** .03  -.17 *** .04  -.15 ** .05  -.13 * .06  -.21 *** .05 
                    
N 980  980  980  980  980 
R-square .23  .24  .25  .25  .25 
F Test (df) -  10.85** (1)  1.78 (3)  .76 (3)  .74 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested 
against the Baseline Model.  
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Table B4. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  .01  .04  -.03  .06 
Gun Disagreement X Detail     -.05  .06 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .06  .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .09  .09 
        
Intercept .38 *** .03  .40 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.02  .02  -.02  .02 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .01  .01  -.03  .04 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .02  .02  .02  .02 
S-I Consonance .05 ** .02  .04 ** .02 
S-M Dissonance .04 ** .01  .04 * .01 
Poll Interest .24 *** .03  .23 *** .03 
Disagreement -.17 *** .03  -.14 *** .04 
Methodological Knowledge -.10 *** .03  -.13 *** .04 
        
N 980  980 
R-square .19  .20 
F Test (df) -  2.16+ (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes  
p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge  
Effects model.  
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Appendix C – Manipulations 
Figure C1. Manipulations 
Manipulation 1 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 1 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 2 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 2 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 3 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 3 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 4 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 4 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 5 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 5 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 6 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 6 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 7 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 7 – Abortion 
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Manipulation 8 – Gun Control 
 
Manipulation 8 – Abortion 
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Appendix D - Survey Instrument 
Notes. 
Questions appeared as below. See Appendix C for Manipulations. 
We added a “request response” alert when participants left blank (item non-response) but allowed the respondents to 
move on if they chose to leave it blank despite this warning. The only exceptions were age, sex, race and party ID; 
these questions were mandatory items as they were used to get quotas during sampling process and thus were asked 
by Qualtrics at the very beginning of the survey. Respondents were not able to turn back to the previous page to 
change their responses. 
 
 The Survey Instrument: 
 
1. Which year were you born? 
Dropdown List 1920 to 1997 
 
2. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin?  
No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin 
Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano 
Yes, Puerto Rican 
Yes, Cuban 
Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
 
3. Which of the following describes your race?   Please select all that apply. 
White or Caucasian 
Black or African American 
American Indian or Alaska Native 
Asian 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
Other 
What is your sex? 
Male 
Female 
 
4. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? 
Republican 
Democrat 
Independent 
No preference 
 
5. You stated you are independent. Do you consider yourself as closer to the Republican or the Democratic 
party? 
Republican 
Democrat 
Neither 
Would you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican? 
Strong Republican 
Not a very strong Republican 
 
Would you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Democrat? 
Strong Democrat 
Not a very strong Democrat 
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6. How would you describe your level of general interest in politics? 
Not at all interested 
Slightly interested 
Moderately interested 
Interested 
Very interested 
 
7. How frequently do you talk about politics with family or friends? 
Never 
Less than once a month 
1 to 3 times a month 
Once a week 
Several times a week 
Once every day 
Several times a day 
 
8. Now focus on just this last week in answering this question and try to remember:  How many days in the 
past week did you talk about politics and public issues with family or friends 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
 
9. Overall, do you support or oppose stricter GUN CONTROL laws in the US? 
Strongly support stricter laws 
Moderately support stricter laws 
Moderately oppose stricter laws 
Strongly oppose stricter laws 
No opinion 
 
10. Please indicate your support or opposition to the following specific gun control laws: 
Stricter laws for gun sales 
Stricter laws for ammunition sales 
Stricter laws for universal background checks 
Response Options: Support strongly, support moderately, oppose moderately, oppose strongly, no opinion 
 
11. Overall, do you support or oppose stricter ABORTION laws in the US? 
Strongly support stricter laws 
Moderately support stricter laws 
Moderately oppose stricter laws 
Strongly oppose stricter laws 
No opinion 
 
12. Do you think abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases or illegal in all 
cases? 
Legal in all cases 
Legal in most cases 
Illegal in most cases 
Illegal in all cases 
No opinion 
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13. Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. 
Recreational marijuana use is legal only in the state of California. 
More Americans have health insurance today than in 2009, before Obamacare. 
The US uses drones (un-manned aircraft) to fight against the Taliban and Al Quaeda. 
The Guantanamo Bay Detention Center has been closed under President Obama’s administration. 
Unemployment today is lower than it was in 2009. 
Response options: Definitely true, probably true, probably false, definitely false, no idea/don’t know 
 
14. What are the first and last names of the people who hold these positions currently? 
Current Vice President of the United States: 
Current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court: 
Current Chancellor of Germany: 
Current Secretary General of the United Nations: 
 
15. How interested are you in reading various poll results reported in the media? 
Not at all interested 
Slightly interested 
Somewhat interested 
Interested 
Very Interested 
 
16. How frequently do you read polls reported in various media outlets such as newspapers, online news sites, 
and social media at the different times given below? 
In general, when there is no election 
During an election campaign 
The last month before election day 
Response options: Never, Less than once a month, 1-3 times a month, once a week, several times a week, once every 
day, several times a day 
 
Manipulation 1st Story Presented (Gun Control or Abortion – order randomized) 
 
17. Manipulation Check: What does the result of this poll say? Please briefly describe it in your own words. 
 
18. How informative do you find this poll result? 
Not at all informative 
Slightly informative 
Moderately informative 
Informative 
Very informative 
 
19. How accurate do you think the results of this poll represent public opinion on this issue in the United 
States?   
Not at all accurate 
Slightly accurate 
Moderately accurate 
Accurate 
Very accurate 
 
20. How trustworthy do you think the results of this poll are? 
Not at all trustworthy 
Slightly trustworthy 
Moderately trustworthy 
Trustworthy 
Very trustworthy 
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Manipulation 2nd Story Presented (Gun Control or Abortion – order randomized) 
 
21. Manipulation Check: What does the result of this poll say? Please briefly describe it in your own words 
 
Q-17, 18, 19 repeated. 
 
22. Which of the following scenarios do you think would give a more accurate estimate of an election outcome, 
considering that all other factors are the same? 
If the poll is conducted 2 days before the actual election 
If the poll is conducted 2 weeks before the actual election 
If the poll is conducted 2 months before the actual election 
Timing of the poll would not make any difference under any circumstances as long as the sample is representative 
Do not know/have no idea 
 
23. Assuming all other characteristics are the same, which of the following polls’ sample characteristics would 
provide the best estimate of support levels in the country for a particular policy position? 
When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, half of it coming from cities and the other half of it coming from rural 
areas 
When the sample size of the poll is 10,000, and is representative of 3 big cities: New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles 
When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, but it is not a representative sample 
When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, and it is a nationally representative sample 
Do not know/have no idea 
 
24. Assuming all other characteristics are the same, which of the following poll results would you be most 
confident represents a policy position that is supported by a majority of people? 
Policy position X got 47 % support, with a 2 % margin of error 
Policy position X got 51 % support, with a 2 % margin of error 
Policy position X got 54 % support, with a 2 % margin of error 
Both 2nd and 3rd options show that position X is being supported by the majority 
Do not know/have no idea 
 
25. When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, 
moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, or haven't you 
thought much about this? 
Extremely Liberal 
Liberal 
Slightly Liberal 
Moderate, middle of the road 
Slightly Conservative 
Conservative 
Extremely Conservative 
Do not know; have not thought about it 
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26. What is your education level? 
No schooling completed 
Complete 8th grade or less 
Some high school, no diploma 
High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED) 
Some college credit, no degree 
Trade/technical/vocational training 
Associate degree 
Bachelor’s degree, college graduate 
Master’s degree 
Professional degree 
Doctorate degree 
 
27. Which category approximately represents the total combined household income of all members of your 
family during the past 12 months? This includes money from jobs, net income from business, farm or rent, 
pensions, dividends, interest, social security payments and any other money income received by members of 
your family who are 15 years of age or older. 
Less than $5,000; $5,000 to $7,499; $7,500 to $9,999; $10,000 to $12,499; $12,500 to $14,999; $15,000 to $19,999; 
$20,000 to $24,999; $25,000 to $29,999; $30,000 to $34,999; $35,000 to $39,999; $40,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to 
$59,999; $60,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $149,999; $150,000 or more. 
 
28. Have you ever witnessed a gun-related violent event? 
Yes 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
29. Have you ever been a victim of gun-related violence? 
Yes 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
30. Do you know anyone (family member or friend) who has been a victim of gun-related violence? 
Yes 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
31. Does anyone in your household own a gun? 
Yes, I do 
Yes, someone else does 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
32. Have you ever had an abortion? 
Yes 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
33. Do you know anyone (family member or friend) who has had an abortion? 
Yes 
No 
Do not want to answer 
 
Debriefing made. 
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Appendix E – Descriptive Tables 
Table E1. Comparison of the Descriptive Statistics for Amazon (left) and Qualtrics (right) Samples 
  N Mean sd   N Mean sd 
        
Political interest 1 (general interest) 987 .54 .27  1211 .61 .29 
Political interest 2 (political discussion frequency) 987 .45 .25  1211 .50 .27 
Political interest 3 (talk in last 7 days) 987 .32 .28  1211 .41 .30 
Political Interest Index (3 items) 987 .44 .24  1211 .51 .26 
Ideology (Conservative) 980 .38 .28  1144 .52 .29 
        
Issue knowledge 1 (marijuana) 987 .85 .31  1207 .72 .41 
Issue knowledge 2 (health insurance) 987 .51 .38  1207 .50 .39 
Issue knowledge 3 (drones) 987 .75 .34  1207 .63 .39 
Issue knowledge 4 (Guantanamo bay) 987 .54 .45  1207 .43 .45 
Issue knowledge 5 (unemployment) 987 .48 .40  1206 .41 .41 
Issue Knowledge Index (5item) 987 .63 .24  1206 .54 .24 
     
   
Methods Knowledge 1 (sampling time) 987 .60 .49  1209 .46 .50 
Methods Knowledge 2 (sample size and place) 986 .65 .48  1208 .41 .49 
Methods Knowledge 3 (margin of error) 987 .66 .47  1209 .34 .47 
        
Interest in reading poll news  987 .43 .25  1209 .47 .29 
Poll reading frequency (in general) 987 .28 .23  1210 .32 .27 
Poll reading frequency (during campaign) 987 .48 .26  1209 .48 .28 
Poll reading frequency (last month before vote) 987 .54 .28  1210 .51 .30 
Poll Interest Index (4 items) 987 .44 .22  1210 .45 .25 
        
Outcome variables for gun control        
Poll is informative 987 .42 .28  1211 .51 .30 
Poll accurately represents public opinion 987 .40 .26  1211 .46 .29 
Poll is trustworthy 987 .36 .26  1211 .44 .29 
Gun Control Poll Credibility Index 987 .39 .24  1210 .47 .26 
        
Outcome variables for abortion        
Poll is informative 987 .42 .28  1211 .51 .30 
Poll accurately represents public opinion 987 .38 .26  1211 .45 .28 
Poll is trustworthy 987 .36 .27  1211 .43 .28 
Abortion Poll Credibility Index 987 .38 .24  1208 .47 .26 
        
Stricter gun control laws in the US 952 .58 .37  1167 .58 .39 
Stricter laws for gun sales 949 .62 .37  1165 .68 .36 
Stricter laws for ammunition sales 924 .59 .38  1153 .65 .37 
Stricter laws for universal background checks 957 .76 .32  1170 .79 .32 
Gun issue position index (support gun control) (4 items) 914 .64 .34  1191 .68 .33 
        
Stricter abortion laws in the US 917 .71 .38  1071 .60 .40 
Legality in abortion (none to all cases) 917 .28 .38  1104 .57 .33 
Abortion issue position index (support abortion) (2 items) 913 .69 .32  1131 .58 .32 
        
Notes. 
All variables are recoded to range from 0 to 1.
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Appendix E continues: 
Index Computation Details for Variables not Reported in the Main Text: 
Abortion Issue Position Index. Respondent’s attitudes toward abortion were measured 
with two items.  Respondents were asked, “Overall, do you support or oppose stricter abortion 
laws in the US?” Response options were, “Strongly support stricter laws” (coded: 1), 
“Moderately support stricter laws” (.66), “Moderately oppose stricter laws” (.33), and “Strongly 
oppose stricter laws” (0), including a “No opinion”.  Responses to the two questions were 
averaged to create an index (M = .58, s.d.= .31, α= .65). 
Political interest.  Three questions were used to assess respondents’ political interest.  
Respondents were asked, “How would you describe your level of general interest in politics?” 
Response options were, “Not at all interested” (coding: 0), “Slightly interested” (.25), 
“Moderately interested” (.5), “Interested” (.75), and “Very interested” (1). Respondents were 
also asked, “How frequently do you talk about politics with family or friends?” Response options 
were, “Never” (coding: 0), “Less than once a month” (.17), “1 to 3 times a month” (.33), “Once a 
week” (.5), “Several times a week” (.67), “Once every day” (.83), and “Several times a day” (1). 
And finally, respondents were asked, “How many days in the past week did you talk about 
politics and public issues with family or friends?” Response options ranged from 0 to 7, but were 
recoded to range from 0 to 1 by dividing the answer by 7.  The items were averaged to form an 
index (M= .51, s.e.= .26, α=.88). 
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Appendix F – Reliabilities of Indexes 
 
Table F1. Cronbach's Alpha Statistics for the Reliabilities of the Indexes 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix G - Baseline Comparisons (Balance Checks) 
 
Random assignment achieved a fair level across equivalence of experimental conditions. 
The number of participants that ended up in each of the 8 conditions varied between 136 and 
176. Despite random automatic allocation of conditions we had this slight variation in the 
number of respondents who completed the survey in each one (136, 137, 138, 145, 150, 163, 
166, 176). These variations might result from the demographic-quotas that were considered 
during the sampling in Qualtrics, and there is no reason that any of the manipulations would 
trigger a systematic dropout. Two-way ANOVA results indicate there are no baseline credibility 
score mean differences across the conditions, F (7, 1210)=1.33 for gun control and F (7, 
1210)=1.03 for abortion. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis reveals no significant difference in means in 
any pairwise comparison of conditions as well (See Table G1). These results constitute the first 
evidence that conditions have been created equally and random assignment has been successful. 
Table G2 also extends this balance check into all predictor variables. As both the omnibus and 
post-hoc comparisons reveal, all predictors appear to be randomly distributed across the 
experimental conditions. 
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Table G1. Baseline (Raw means) Credibility Scores Comparisons across the Experimental 
Conditions 
   Amazon Sample  Qualtrics Sample 
   Mean sd F Test  Mean sd F Test 
Gun Control F, Sup, S  .41 .22 3.56**  .50 .26 1.24 
 F, Opp, S  .35 .26   .43 .27  
 F, Sup, D  .43 .21   .44 .25  
 F, Opp, D  .32 .25   .48 .27  
 M, Sup, S  .42 .24   .49 .27  
 M, Opp, S  .38 .22   .46 .27  
 M, Sup, D  .42 .23   .46 .26  
 M, Opp, D  .39 .24   .47 .26  
   
  
  
  
 
Abortion F, Sup, S  .41 .21 6.39***  .48 .26 1.06 
 F, Opp, S  .33 .26   .43 .27  
 F, Sup, D  .44 .21   .43 .24  
 F, Opp, D  .29 .25   .46 .27  
 M, Sup, S  .42 .24   .50 .27  
 M, Opp, S  .35 .25   .46 .27  
 M, Sup, D  .43 .23   .48 .25  
 M, Opp, D  .38 .24   .47 .26  
Notes. Values represent credibility scores. In experimental condition type, F=Fox, M=MSNBC, Sup=Poll result 
showing public support, Opp=Poll results showing public opposition, S=simple report, D=detailed report of methods 
of the poll. * denotes significance at p <.05, ** at p <.01, and *** at p<.001. All tests are two-tailed. ANOVA 
results indicate that in Amazon sample there is a significant difference in baseline scores for both gun control and 
abortion poll credibility scores. Due to unequal condition samples sizes, Tukey's test is chosen for post-hoc 
comparisons, and this omnibus significant difference is seen to be largely due to the consistently low score of 
condition 4. ANOVA results indicate there are no baseline credibility score differences across the conditions for 
Qualtrics sample. Although 2nd and 3rd condition appear to have lower scores in different measures, these are not 
significant. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis reveals no significant difference in means in any pairwise comparison of 
conditions in Qualtrics sample. 
 
Table G2. Balance test of experimental conditions (random assignment check) 
Variables  F Test  p value 
Gun Control Issue Position  F(7, 1183)= 1.38  0.21 
Abortion Issue Position  F(7, 1123)= .77  0.61 
Political Interest  F(7, 1203)= .83  0.57 
Poll Interest  F(7, 1202)= .57  0.78 
Political Knowledge  F(7, 1198)= .71  0.66 
Poll Knowledge  F(7, 1200)= .65  0.71 
Ideology  F(7, 1203)= .91  0.50 
Party Identification   F(7, 1147)= 1.50  0.16 
Age  F(7, 1203)= 1.17  0.32 
Female  F(7, 1203)= .47  0.86 
White  F(7, 1203)= 1.43  0.19 
Education  F(7, 1202)= .70  0.67 
Income  F(7, 1198)= .55  0.80 
Notes. One-way ANOVA has been conducted with experimental conditions (8 stories) as the factor.  F tests show 
that none of the variables are significant, revealing that the random assignment worked as expected. We also 
conducted Tukey’s post-hoc analysis to see if any pair-wise combinations of the experimental conditions were 
unbalanced, but none of the post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference as well. 
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Appendix H – Supplementary Knowledge Tests 
 
The issue knowledge battery contains a mixture of debated and undebated facts, the answers to which sometimes favor each political party. However, debated 
facts may be susceptible to biased processing, as suggested by some recent work on expressive responding (Prior et al. 2016; though see Berinsky, 2012 for an 
alternative view). In order to test this possibility, we replicated our results using a variety of additional approaches. We first tested each knowledge item from the 
index separately by itself. Then we tested the dichotomized (true vs false) versions of these items (where the certainty dimension was removed), separately for 
each of them and as an index of dichotomized items. Although all of these moderators accounted for less variance than the measures used (and thus sometimes 
did not reach statistical significance), the overall pattern of results was consistent and free of motivational differences between items (see Table H1 in Appendix 
H). The results also replicated using alternative knowledge measures in the form of awareness of public officials (although this is not a relevant or effective 
knowledge scale given our topic, we had also asked this set of more traditional knowledge items for comparison) and education - as a theoretical proxy variable 
to knowledge (see Table H2 in Appendix H). Finally the results we report on methodological knowledge about polls also provide a consistent story for our 
knowledge moderation finding. 
 
Table H1. Item by Item Analysis of Political Knowledge X Disagreement Interaction with and without the Certainty Factor  
  
Item 1 
(Marijuana)  
Item 2 
(Healthcare)  
Item 3 
(Drones)  
Item 4 
(Guantanamo)  
Item 5 
(Unemployment) 
  Est. se p  Est. se p  Est. se p  Est. se p  Est. se p 
                     
Item by Item (Q) Gun Control -.07 (.03) .04  -.07 (.04) .07  -.08 (.04) .03  -.09 (.03) .00  -.17 (.04) .00 
 (Q) Abortion  -.10 (.03) .00  -.04 (.04) .26  .01 (.04) .87  -.08 (.03) .01  -.01 (.03) .75 
 (A) Gun Control -.01 (.04) .91  -.01 (.04) .84  -.06 (.04) .12  -.06 (.03) .05  -.08 (.04) .03 
 (A) Abortion -.05 (.04) .30  -.08 (.04) .03  -.06 (.04) .13  -.02 (.03) .56  -.13 (.04) .00 
                     
                     
Item by Item  
(Dichotomous) 
(Q) Gun Control -.05 (.03) .16  -.00 (.03) .96  -.06 (.04) .11  -.07 (.04) .01  -.11 (.03) .00 
(Q) Abortion  -.09 (.03) .01  -.02 (.03) .51  .02 (.03) .47  -.05 (.03) .09  .02 (.03) .46 
 (A) Gun Control -.02 (.05) .74  .03 (.03) .42  -.03 (.05) .54  -.04 (.03) .18  -.04 (.03) .19 
 (A) Abortion -.07 (.05) .14  -.04 (.03) .20  -.07 (.05) .15  -.01 (.03) .68  -.07 (.03) .01 
                     
Notes. Dependent variable is perceived poll credibility. Q denotes Qualtrics sample, A denotes Amazon sample. Item by Item analysis is conducted on each item 
of the political knowledge index including the certainty dimension (response scores: 0 vs 0.5 vs 1 for each item). Item by item (dichotomous) analysis is 
conducted with certainty dimension removed (response scores: 0 vs 1 for each item). The coefficients represent the Political Knowledge Item X Disagreement 
interaction in the models. All tests are two-tailed. We also tested the significance for the improvement in model fits and results were substantially same because 
all predictors have been recoded to range from 0 to 1. All other variables (reported in the manuscript) are also controlled for in these models. Out of 40 models, 
only 4 had positive interaction coefficient signs and all of these were insignificant. A sign test was used to assess the probability that 36 of the 40 coefficients 
would be negative if there was no overall relationship; the p-value of this test was <.001 (two-tailed), suggesting that the relations were considerably more 
negative than would be expected by chance. These results show that items of our political knowledge index are not prone to expressive responding or they do not 
vary to an extent that would be problematic for our inferences in the interaction models. 
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Table H2. Auxiliary Evidence for Political Knowledge Moderation in Motivated Poll Perceptions 
  
Index of 
Dichotomous Items 
  
Officer Knowledge 
Index 
  Education 
 Est. se p  Est. se p  Est. se p 
            
(Q) Gun Control -.20 .06 .00  -.12 .04 .01  -.01 .01 .07 
(Q) Abortion  -.08 .05 .13  -.01 .04 .76  .01 .01 .40 
(A) Gun Control -.09 .06 .13  -.01 .05 .89  -.01 .01 .15 
(A) Abortion -.15 .06 .02  -.08 .05 .10  .00 .01 .98 
                        
Notes. Q denotes Qualtrics sample, A denotes Amazon sample. Index of Dichotomized Items is the  
index (average) of dichotomized items reported in Table H1. Officer knowledge scale had open-ended  
questions on who current people holding positions as Vice President of the U.S., the Chief Justice of  
the Supreme Court, the Chancellor of Germany, the General Secretary of the UN (responses are coded  
as true and false, and 4 items are averaged). All three measures range from 0 to 1. The coefficients  
represent their interaction with the disagreement factor. All tests are two-tailed. All other variables  
(reported in the manuscript) are also controlled in these models.  
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Appendix I – Independently Tested Effects of Key Variables 
Table I1. Individual Effects of Key Independent Variables and Their Interaction with Political Knowledge in the Prediction of 
Perceived Credibility of Public Opinion Polls 
Main Effect Only (Model 1)   Interaction with Political Knowledge (Model 2) 
 Coef. se   Coef. se 
Fox -.01  .02  Fox .01  .04 
     Political Knowledge -.01  .05 
     Fox X Political Knowledge -.04  .06 
         
Detailed Reporting -.01  .02  Detail -.01  .04 
     Political Knowledge -.04  .04 
     Detail X Political Knowledge .01  .06 
         
Majority Support .02  .02  Majority Support -.08 * .04 
     Political Knowledge -.14 ** .05 
     Majority Support X Political Knowledge .19 ** .06 
         
Disagreement with Result (Gun control) -.12 *** .01  Disagreement with Result (Gun control) .00  .04 
     Political Knowledge .07 + .04 
     Disagreement with Result (Gun control) X Political Knowledge -.24 *** .06 
         
Disagreement with Result (Abortion) -.04 ** .01  Disagreement with Result (Abortion) .07 + .04 
     Political Knowledge .02  .04 
     Disagreement with Result (Abortion) X Political Knowledge -.20 *** .06 
         
Source-Ideology Consonance .03 * .02  Source-Ideology Consonance .02  .04 
     Political Knowledge  -.04  .04 
     Source-Ideology Consonance X Political Knowledge .02  .07 
         
Source-Message Dissonance .00  .02  Source-Message Dissonance -.02  .04 
     Political Knowledge  -.05  .04 
     Source-Message Dissonance X Political Knowledge  .04  .06 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. The left 
column effects are obtained when these variables are entered as the only predictor in the models whereas the right column effects 
provide the coefficients when there is an interaction with Political Knowledge. 
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Appendix J – Abortion Replication (Qualtrics) 
Table J1. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion  
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.18 ** .06  -.21 ** .07  -.18 * .08  -.21 ** .08 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.09  .07         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.01  .08         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .11  .12         
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             .02  .07     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .02  .08     
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .00  .12     
Disagreement X Detail                 .01  .07 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .08  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail                 .06  .11 
                    
Intercept .40 *** .02  .36 *** .03  .36 *** .03  .37 *** .04  .39 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  -.07  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .01  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01 
S-I Consonance .01  .01  .00  .01  .02  .05  .00  .02  .00  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  -.02  .05  .00  .01 
Poll Interest .43 *** .03  .43 *** .03  .43 *** .03  .43 *** .03  .43 *** .03 
Disagreement -.05 *** .01  .04  .03  .07 + .04  .03  .05  .04  .05 
Political Knowledge -.17 *** .03  -.09 * .04  -.08 + .05  -.09 + .05  -.12 * .05 
                    
N 1204  1204  1204  1204  1204 
R-square .17  .18  .18  .18  .18 
F Test (df) -  9.69** (1)  .69 (3)  .27 (3)  2.23+ (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is 
tested against the Baseline Model.  
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Table J2. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  -.13 ** .04  -.19 ** .06 
Gun Disagreement X Detail     -.02  .04 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .01  .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .12  .08 
        
Intercept .35 *** .02  .36 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.03  .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .00  .01  .00  .01 
S-I Consonance .01  .01  .01  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01 
Poll Interest .41 *** .03  .41 *** .03 
Disagreement -.01  .02  .00  .03 
Methodological Knowledge -.07 * .03  -.08 + .04 
        
N 1206  1206 
R-square .04  .04 
F Test (df) -  1.86 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes  
p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against the Knowledge  
Effects model.  
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Appendix K – Party ID Split Analysis on Qualtrics Sample 
Table K1. Key Results by Party ID across the Issues (Qualtrics) 
  Democrats (N=506)  Republicans (N=494) 
  Gun Control  Abortion  Gun Control  Abortion 
  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
             
(1) Knowledge 
Effects 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge -.35 *** .09  -.24 ** .08  -.06  .09  .05  .09 
                
                
(2) Source-
Ideology 
Consonance 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge -.35 *** .10  -.27 ** .10  -.02  .12  -.03  .12 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance -.02  .12  -.06  .12  -.01  .11  -.11  .11 
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance -.04  .13  -.06  .13  .01  .12  -.08  .13 
 Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance .01  .19  .09  .18  -.08  .19  .19  .19 
                 
(3) Source-
Message 
Dissonance 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge -.33 ** .12  -.22 + .12  -.07  .13  .06  .13 
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance -.05  .11  .07  .10  -.01  .11  .05  .10 
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance -.01  .12  .00  .11  .05  .12  .07  .13 
 Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance -.02  .17  -.05  .17  .01  .19  -.01  .18 
                 
(4) Detailed 
Reporting 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge -.34 ** .11  -.20 + .11  .06  .14  -.04  .14 
Disagreement X Detail .04  .10  .11  .10  .16  .11  -.03  .10 
Political Knowledge X Detail .07  .11  .15  .11  .04  .12  -.06  .13 
 Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail -.02  .17  -.08  .16  -.19  .19  .17  .18 
                 
(5) Methodological 
Knowledge Effects 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge -.10  .06  -.16 ** .06  -.03  .07  -.13 * .07 
                
                
(6) Detailed 
Reporting by 
Methodological 
Knowledge 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge -.01  .09  -.16 * .08  -.03  .10  -.21 * .10 
Disagreement X Detail .10  .07  .05  .06  .08  .07  -.02  .07 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail .19 * .09  .06  .08  .05  .08  .03  .10 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail -.18  .13  .01  .12  -.01  .14  .16  .13 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. 
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Appendix L – Regression Predicting Perceived Poll Credibility with Disagreement Strength 
Because the majority manipulation was randomly assigned, whether respondents disagreed with the poll result was also randomly assigned for all individuals 
whose attitudes were not at the midpoint. This simple dummy computation assumes that degree of disagreement with a given poll result does not make a 
difference, which we thought would have more ecological validity. Appendix L shows the results for an alternative coding in which strength of disagreement is 
taken in relation to respondent’s distance from the response scale midpoint. 
Table L1. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control  
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge     -.63 *** .15  -.69 *** .18  -.65 *** .19  -.63 ** .20 
Disagree S. X S-I Consonance         -.25  .19         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .01  .08         
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .23  .31         
Disagree S.  X S-M Dissonance             .06  .18     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .00  .07     
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .03  .30     
Disagree S. X Detail                 .07  .18 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .03  .07 
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X Detail                 .02  .29 
                    
Intercept .43 *** .03  .38 *** .03  .38 *** .03  .39 *** .03  .40 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  .00  .02  -.01  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.04  .04 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.04 ** .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02 
S-I Consonance .02  .01  .02  .01  .03  .05  .01  .02  .02  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  -.02  .04  -.01  .01 
Poll Interest .37 *** .03  .38 *** .03  .38 *** .03  .38 *** .03  .38 *** .03 
Disagree S. -.35 *** .04  .01  .09  .08  .11  -.03  .12  -.04  .13 
Political Knowledge -.09 ** .03  .00  .04  .00  .04  .00  .05  -.01  .05 
                    
N 1205  1205  1205  1205  1205 
R-square .18  .19  .19  .19  .19 
F Test (df) -  18.86*** (1)  1.14 (3)  .34 (3)  .60 (3) 
Notes. Disagree S. denotes disagreement strength. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are 
two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested against the 
Baseline Model.  
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Table L2. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagree S. X Methodological Knowledge  -.22 * .10  -.07  .14 
Disagree S. X Detail     .21 + .11 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .10 + .05 
Disagree S. X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     -.29  .21 
        
Intercept .41 *** .02  .43 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.06 * .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02 
S-I Consonance .03 + .01  .03 + .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  -.01  .01 
Poll Interest .37 *** .03  .37 *** .03 
Disagree S. -.26 *** .06  -.37 *** .08 
Methodological Knowledge -.06 * .03  -.11 ** .04 
        
N 1208  1208 
R-square .18  .19 
F Test (df) -  1.75 (3) 
Notes. Disagree S. denotes disagreement strength. + denotes p lower than .10,  
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are  
two-tailed. F change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model.  
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Table L3. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion 
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge     -.26 + .16  -.24  .19  -.21  .22  -.20  .22 
Disagree S. X S-I Consonance         .06  .20         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .05  .07         
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.08  .33         
Disagree S. X S-M Dissonance             .18  .19     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .01  .07     
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.08  .32     
Disagree S. X Detail                 .25  .19 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .10  .07 
Disagree S. X Political Knowledge X Detail                 -.12  .31 
                    
Intercept .41 *** .02  .39 *** .03  .40 *** .03  .41 *** .03  .43 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01  -.02 + .01  -.03 * .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.08 * .04 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
S-I Consonance .01  .01  .01  .01  -.02  .04  .00  .02  .01  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .01  -.03  .04  .00  .01 
Poll Interest .42 *** .03  .42 *** .03  .42 *** .03  .42 *** .03  .42 *** .03 
Disagree S. -.25 *** .04  -.10  .10  -.12  .12  -.20  .13  -.23 + .13 
Political Knowledge -.15 *** .03  -.12 *** .03  -.13 ** .04  -.12 ** .05  -.17 *** .05 
                    
N 1204  1204  1204  1204  1204 
R-square .19  .19  .19  .20  .20 
F Test (df) -  2.77+ (1)  .16 (3)  1.09 (3)  3.20* (3) 
Notes. Disagree S. denotes disagreement strength. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, ***  
denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model except for the one  
reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested against the Baseline Model.  
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Table L4. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagree S. X Methodological Knowledge  -.22 * .11  -.28 + .15 
Disagree S. X Detail     .08  .12 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .03  .05 
Disagree S. X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .20  .22 
        
Intercept .37 *** .02  .39 *** .02 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03 * .01  -.03 * .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.04 + .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.01  .01  -.01  .01 
S-I Consonance .02  .01  .02  .01 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01 
Poll Interest .41 *** .03  .41 *** .03 
Disagree S. -.16 ** .06  -.21 * .08 
Methodological Knowledge -.10 *** .02  -.11 ** .04 
        
N 1206  1206 
R-square .20  .21 
F Test (df) -  2.62* (3) 
Notes. Disagree S. denotes disagreement strength. + denotes p lower than .10,  
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are  
two-tailed. F change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model.  
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Appendix M – Qualtrics Results Including Additional Control Variables 
Table M1. Full Regression Table for Gun Control Poll Credibility – Including All Control Variables 
 
Baseline Model 
 
Knowledge Effects 
Model 
 
Source-Ideology 
Consonance 
 
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Intercept .46*** (.06) 
 
.40*** (.06) 
 
.39*** (.06) 
 
.40*** (.06) 
 
.42*** (.06) 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
 
-.06 (.05) 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.04** (.02) 
 
-.05*** (.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
Liberal-Conservative  .00 (.03) 
 
.00 (.03) 
 
.00 (.03) 
 
.00 (.03) 
 
.00 (.03) 
Age -.04 (.03) 
 
-.05 (.03) 
 
-.05 (.03) 
 
-.05 (.03) 
 
-.05 (.03) 
Female .02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
High School Graduate .06 (.05) 
 
.07 (.05) 
 
.07 (.05) 
 
.07 (.05) 
 
.07 (.05) 
Some College .03 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
College Graduate -.01 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
Post Graduate .02 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.04 (.05) 
$ 25-50K -.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
$ 50-75K -.02 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
$ 75-100K -.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
More than $ 100K -.04† (.03) 
 
-.04 (.02) 
 
-.04 (.02) 
 
-.04 (.02) 
 
-.04 (.02) 
White -.05*** (.02) 
 
-.05*** (.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
 
-
.05*** 
(.02) 
Political Interest .00 (.04) 
 
-.01 (.04) 
 
-.01 (.04) 
 
.00 (.04) 
 
.00 (.04) 
Poll Interest .37*** (.04) 
 
.37*** (.04) 
 
.37*** (.04) 
 
.37*** (.04) 
 
.37*** (.04) 
Political Knowledge -.06* (.03) 
 
.06 (.04) 
 
.06 (.05) 
 
.06 (.06) 
 
.03 (.06) 
Disagreement -.14*** (.02) 
 
.00 (.03) 
 
.03 (.04) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
-.03 (.05) 
S-I Consonance .02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.01) 
 
.06 (.05) 
 
.01 (.02) 
 
.02 (.01) 
S-M Dissonance .00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
-.02 (.05) 
 
.00 (.01) 
               
Table M1 continues on next page               
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Table M1 Continues               
               
Political Knowledge X Disagreement 
   
-.28*** (.06) 
 
-
.30*** 
(.07) 
 
-
.30*** 
(.08) 
 
-.26** (.08) 
S-I Consonance X Political Knowledge 
      
-.03 (.08) 
      
S-I Consonance X Disagreement 
      
-.10 (.07) 
      
S-I Consonance  X Political Knowledge X 
Disagreement       
.09 (.12) 
      
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance 
         .00 (.08)    
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance 
         .01 (.07)    
Political Knowledge X Disagreement X S-M 
Dissonance          
.04 (.12) 
   
Detail X Political Knowledge 
            
.06 (.08) 
Detail X Disagreement 
            
.05 (.07) 
Detail X Disagreement X Political 
Knowledge             
-.03 (.11) 
               
N 1202  1202  1201  1202  1202 
Adj. R-square .19  .20  .20  .20  .20 
F Test (df) -  22.98*** (1)  .98 (3) . .30 (3)  .83 (3) 
 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is 
tested against the Baseline Model. 
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Table M2. Gun Control Poll Credibility – Methodological Knowledge – Including All Control Variables 
 
Baseline Model 
 
Methods 
Knowledge Model 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. Se 
Intercept .46*** (.06) 
 
.48*** (.06) 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.01 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .00 (.01) 
 
-.06* (.03) 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.04** (.02) 
 
-.05** (.02) 
Liberal-Conservative  .00 (.03) 
 
.00 (.03) 
Age -.04 (.03) 
 
-.04 (.03) 
Female .02 (.01) 
 
.02 (.01) 
High School Graduate .05 (.05) 
 
.05 (.05) 
Some College .03 (.05) 
 
.03 (.05) 
College Graduate -.01 (.05) 
 
-.01 (.05) 
Post Graduate .02 (.05) 
 
.03 (.05) 
$ 25-50K -.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
$ 50-75K -.02 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
$ 75-100K -.01 (.02) 
 
-.01 (.02) 
More than $ 100K -.04† (.03) 
 
-.04† (.02) 
White -.05** (.02) 
 
-.05** (.02) 
Political Interest .00 (.04) 
 
.00 (.04) 
Poll Interest .37*** (.04) 
 
.37*** (.04) 
Political Knowledge -.04 (.03) 
 
-.04 (.03) 
Disagreement -.14*** (.02) 
 
-.14*** (.03) 
S-I Consonance .03† (.02) 
 
.03† (.01) 
S-M Dissonance .00 (.01) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
Methods Knowledge -.06* (.02) 
 
-.06 (.04) 
Methods Knowledge X Disagreement 
   
-.06 (.06) 
Detail X Methods Knowledge 
   
.11† (.06) 
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Detail X Disagreement 
   
.07 (.04) 
Detail X Disagreement X Methods Knowledge 
   
-.09 (.08) 
      
N 1201  1201 
Adj. R-square .19  .20 
F Test (df) -  2.69* (3) 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001.  
All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against the Baseline Model.
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Table M3. Full Regression Table for Abortion Poll Credibility – Including All Control Variables 
 
Baseline 
Model 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model 
 
Source-Ideology 
Consonance 
 
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
Intercept .43*** (.05) 
 
.40*** (.05) 
 
.39*** (.06) 
 
.41*** (.06) 
 
.44*** (.06) 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.03* (.01) 
 
-.03* (.01) 
 
-.03* (.01) 
 
-.03* (.01) 
 
-.03* (.01) 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) .00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
-.09† (.04) 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
Liberal-Conservative  .03 (.03) 
 
.03 (.03) 
 
.03 (.03) 
 
.03 (.03) 
 
.03 (.03) 
Age -.09** (.03) 
 
-.09** (.03) 
 
-.09** (.03) 
 
-.09** (.03) 
 
-.09** (.03) 
Female .04* (.01) 
 
.04* (.01) 
 
.04* (.01) 
 
.04* (.01) 
 
.04** (.01) 
High School Graduate .01 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
 
.01 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
Some College -.02 (.05) 
 
-.03 (.05) 
 
-.03 (.05) 
 
-.02 (.05) 
 
-.03 (.05) 
College Graduate -.06 (.05) 
 
-.07 (.05) 
 
-.07 (.05) 
 
-.07 (.05) 
 
-.07 (.05) 
Post Graduate -.05 (.05) 
 
-.05 (.05) 
 
-.05 (.05) 
 
-.05 (.05) 
 
-.05 (.05) 
$ 25-50K .02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.02) 
$ 50-75K .00 (.02) 
 
.00 (.02) 
 
.00 (.02) 
 
.00 (.02) 
 
.00 (.02) 
$ 75-100K .03 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
More than $ 100K -.03 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
 
-.03 (.02) 
 
-.02 (.02) 
 
-.03 (.02) 
White -.06*** (.01) 
 
-.06*** (.01) 
 
-.06*** (.01) 
 
-.06*** (.01) 
 
-.06*** (.01) 
Political Interest .04 (.03) 
 
.04 (.03) 
 
.04 (.03) 
 
.04 (.03) 
 
.04 (.03) 
Poll Interest .40*** (.04) 
 
.40*** (.04) 
 
.40*** (.04) 
 
.40*** (.04) 
 
.40*** (.04) 
Political Knowledge -.09** (.03) 
 
-.03 (.04) 
 
-.03 (.05) 
 
-.04 (.05) 
 
-.08 (.05) 
Disagreement -.05*** (.01) 
 
.02 (.03) 
 
.05 (.04) 
 
.01 (.05) 
 
.01 (.05) 
S-I Consonance .01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.05) 
 
.00 (.02) 
 
.01 (.01) 
S-M Dissonance -.01 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
 
-.02 (.05) 
 
-.01 (.01) 
               
               
Table M3 continues on next page               
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Table M3 continues 
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Political Knowledge X Disagreement 
   
-.15** (.06) 
 
-.17* (.07) 
 
-.15† (.08) 
 
-.16* (.08) 
S-I Consonance X Political Knowledge 
      
.01 (.08) 
      
S-I Consonance X Disagreement 
      
-.08 (.07) 
      
S-I Consonance  X Political Knowledge X 
Disagreement       
.09 (.12) 
      
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance 
         
.02 (.08) 
   
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance 
         
.02 (.07) 
   
Political Knowledge X Disagreement X S-M 
Dissonance          
-.01 (.11) 
   
Detail X Political Knowledge 
            
.11 (.08) 
Detail X Disagreement 
            
.04 (.07) 
Detail X Disagreement X Political Knowledge 
            
.02 (.11) 
               
N 1200  1200  1200  1200  1200 
Adj. R-square .20  .21  .21  .21  .21 
F Test (df) -  6.88** (1)  .76 (3)  .17 (3)  2.58† (3) 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against the Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is 
tested against the Baseline Model. 
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Table M4. Abortion Poll Credibility – Methodological Knowledge – Including All Control Variables 
 
Baseline Model 
 
Methods 
Knowledge Model 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
Intercept .43*** (.05) 
 
.42*** (.06) 
Source Manipulation  -.03* (.01) 
 
-.03* (.01) 
Reporting Manipulation  .00 (.01) 
 
-.04 (.03) 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
Liberal-Conservative  .04 (.03) 
 
.03 (.02) 
Age -.09** (.03) 
 
-.08** (.03) 
Female .04* (.01) 
 
.04** (.01) 
High School Graduate .00 (.05) 
 
.00 (.05) 
Some College -.02 (.05) 
 
-.02 (.05) 
College Graduate -.06 (.05) 
 
-.06 (.05) 
Post Graduate -.05 (.05) 
 
-.05 (.05) 
$ 25-50K .02 (.02) 
 
.02 (.02) 
$ 50-75K .00 (.02) 
 
.00 (.02) 
$ 75-100K .03 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
More than $ 100K -.03 (.02) 
 
-.03 (.02) 
White -.06*** (.01) 
 
-.06*** (.01) 
Political Interest .04 (.03) 
 
.04 (.03) 
Poll Interest .40*** (.04) 
 
.40*** (.04) 
Political Knowledge -.06† (.03) 
 
-.06† (.03) 
Disagreement -.06*** (.01) 
 
.00 (.03) 
S-I Consonance .01 (.01) 
 
.01 (.01) 
S-M Dissonance .00 (.01) 
 
.00 (.01) 
Methods Knowledge -.08*** (.02) 
 
-.03 (.04) 
Methods Knowledge X Disagreement 
   
-.18** (.06) 
Detail X Methods Knowledge 
   
.03 (.06) 
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Detail X Disagreement 
   
.00 (.04) 
Detail X Disagreement X Methods Knowledge 
   
.10 (.08) 
      
N 1199  1199 
Adj. R-square .21  .22 
F Test (df) -  4.51** (3) 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001.  
All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against the Baseline Model.
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Appendix N – Results without the Poll Interest Variable 
Table N1. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control (Models excluding Poll Interest variable) 
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.25 *** .06  -.28 *** .08  -.29 *** .09  -.24 ** .09 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.12  .08         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.09  .09         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .12  .13         
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             -.03  .07     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.02  .08     
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .09  .13     
Disagreement X Detail                 .05  .07 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .02  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail                 -.03  .12 
                    
Intercept .57 *** .03  .52 *** .03  .50 *** .03  .52 *** .04  .53 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) .00  .01  .00  .01  -.01  .01  .00  .02  .00  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.04  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.04 * .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02  -.05 ** .02 
S-I Consonance .03 * .02  .03 + .02  .11 * .05  .03  .02  .03 + .02 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  -.01  .01  .00  .02  -.01  .05  -.01  .01 
Disagreement -.15 *** .02  -.01  .04  .02  .04  .00  .05  -.04  .05 
Political Knowledge -.04  .03  .07 + .04  .10 + .05  .08  .06  .07  .06 
                    
N 1205  1205  1205  1205  1205 
R-square .07  .08  .08  .08  .08 
F Test (df) -  16.72*** (1)  1.44 (3)  .32 (3)  .65 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested 
against the Baseline Model.  
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Table N2. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Gun Control (Models excluding Poll Interest  
variable) 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  -.11 * .04  -.09  .06 
Gun Disagreement X Detail     .06  .05 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .06  .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     -.03  .09 
        
Intercept .56 *** .02  .58 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) .00  .01  .00  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.05 + .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) -.04 ** .02  -.04 ** .02 
S-I Consonance .04 ** .02  .04 ** .02 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  -.01  .01 
Disagreement -.10 *** .02  -.13 *** .03 
Methodological Knowledge -.03  .03  -.06  .04 
        
N 1209  1209 
R-square .08  .08 
F Test (df) -  1.15 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes  
p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge  
Effects model.  
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Table N3. Predicting the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion (Models excluding Poll Interest variable) 
 Baseline 
Model  
Knowledge 
Effects 
Model  
Source-
Ideology 
Consonance  
Source-
Message 
Dissonance  
Detailed 
Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge     -.19 ** .06  -.24 ** .08  -.15 + .09  -.22 * .09 
Disagreement X S-I Consonance         -.15 + .08         
Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         -.09  .09         
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-I Consonance         .18  .13         
Disagreement X S-M Dissonance             .08  .07     
Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             .07  .08     
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X S-M Dissonance             -.09  .13     
Disagreement X Detail                 .00  .07 
Political Knowledge X Detail                 .04  .08 
Disagreement X Political Knowledge X Detail                 .05  .12 
                    
Intercept .53 *** .03  .48 *** .03  .46 *** .03  .51 *** .04  .50 *** .04 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.02  .01  -.02  .01  -.02  .01  -.02  .02  -.02  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.01  .01  -.04  .05 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .02  .02  .01  .02  .01  .02  .01  .02  .01  .02 
S-I Consonance .02  .02  .02  .02  .10 + .06  .02  .02  .02  .02 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .02  -.06  .05  .00  .01 
Disagreement -.04 * .01  .07 + .04  .11 * .04  .03  .05  .07  .05 
Political Knowledge -.08 * .03  .01  .04  .04  .05  -.02  .06  -.01  .06 
                    
N 1204  1204  1204  1204  1204 
R-square .02  .02  .03  .03  .03 
F Test (df) -  9.69** (1)  1.39 (3)  .75 (3)  .80 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F 
change is tested against Knowledge Effects model except for the one reported in the Knowledge Effects model itself which is tested 
against the Baseline Model.  
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Table N4. Methodological Knowledge and Detailed Reporting Analysis for Predicting  
the Perceived Credibility of Poll Reports on Abortion (Models excluding Poll Interest  
variable) 
 
Knowledge 
Effects Model  
Detailed Reporting 
 Coef. se  Coef. se 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge  -.13 ** .04  -.21 *** .06 
Gun Disagreement X Detail     -.05  .05 
Methodological Knowledge X Detail     -.02  .06 
Disagreement X Methodological Knowledge X Detail     .16 + .09 
        
Intercept .50 *** .02  .50 *** .03 
Source Manipulation (1=Fox News) -.02  .01  -.02  .01 
Reporting Manipulation (1=Detailed) -.01  .01  -.01  .03 
Result Manipulation (1=Majority Support) .01  .01  .01  .01 
S-I Consonance .03 + .02  .03 * .02 
S-M Dissonance .00  .01  .00  .01 
Disagreement .01  .02  .03  .03 
Methodological Knowledge -.05  .03  -.03  .04 
        
N 1206  1206 
R-square .04  .04 
F Test (df) -  1.86 (3) 
Notes. + denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes  
p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. F change is tested against Knowledge  
Effects model.  
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Appendix O: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample and Key Variables 
 
Table O1. Weighted descriptive statistics of the demographic variables (N=959; C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) 
Variable Response Options Mean sd Frequency Percentage 
Age   47.44 (17.7)     
Sex Male     461.95 48.17% 
  Female     497.04 51.82% 
Education level Less than high school     261.31 12.57% 
  High school     608.95 29.30% 
  Some college     587.64 28.28% 
  Bachelor's degree or higher     620.00 29.84% 
Race White, Non-Hispanic     618.79 64.52% 
  Black, Non-Hispanic     112.42 11.72% 
  Other, Non-Hispanic     69.29 7.23% 
  Hispanic     148.31 15.46% 
  2+ Races, Non-Hispanic     10.20 1.06% 
Income Less than $5,000     39.73 4.14% 
  $5,000 to $7,499     14.81 1.54% 
  $7,500 to $9,999     8.96 0.93% 
  $10,000 to $12,499     20.83 2.17% 
  $12,500 to $14,999     16.75 1.75% 
  $15,000 to $19,999     27.27 2.84% 
  $20,000 to $24,999     38.42 4.01% 
  $25,000 to $29,999     45.10 4.70% 
  $30,000 to $34,999     56.56 5.90% 
  $35,000 to $39,999     42.17 4.40% 
  $40,000 to $49,999     60.41 6.30% 
  $50,000 to $59,999     83.56 8.71% 
  $60,000 to $74,999     86.64 9.03% 
  $75,000 to $84,999     81.37 8.48% 
  $85,000 to $99,999     55.55 5.79% 
  $100,000 to $124,999     125.52 13.09% 
  $125,000 to $149,999     53.84 5.61% 
  $150,000 to $174,999     37.20 3.88% 
  $175,000 or more     64.20 6.71% 
Marital Status Married     494.63 51.58% 
  Widowed     44.36 4.63% 
  Divorced     101.97 10.63% 
  Separated     14.98 1.56% 
  Never married     245.35 25.58% 
  Living with partner     57.71 6.02% 
Note on Managing the samples. Each specific hypothesis or research question relied on a subsample of the whole 
dataset (as clarified in preregistration) by using the data only from specific conditions (see Table 1 in the manuscript). 
This is necessary because the dependent variable, relative poll credibility, is a bipolar item where extreme ends 
represent high relative credibility (Poll A is much more accurate than poll B vs vice versa). Hence, the number of 
comparisons across the conditions differs and this led to the comparison of Condition 1 multiple times. Hence 
Condition 1 (C1) is oversampled (has twice the sample size of other conditions, Table 1). 
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Table O2. Weighted Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables across the Experimental 
Conditions and in Aggregate (N=959; C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) 
Relative Credibility of the Second Poll         
Mean  .54       
Standard deviation  .54       
   C1 (DR) C2 (dD) C3 (rR) C4 (rD) C5 (dR)  All 
First poll much more accurate  4.00% 10.62% 2.28% 6.44% 7.34%  5.66% 
First poll somewhat more accurate  6.23% 2.91% 3.01% 0.80% 1.90%  3.50% 
First poll slightly more accurate  4.84% 3.05% 4.27% 2.55% 0.09%  3.40% 
Both polls are equally accurate  68.89% 56.75% 63.53% 61.09% 57.28%  62.67% 
Second poll slightly more accurate  7.04% 7.69% 10.51% 9.11% 7.41%  8.14% 
Second poll somewhat more accurate  5.42% 9.62% 7.99% 9.43% 9.54%  7.92% 
Second poll much more accurate  3.95% 9.34% 8.40% 10.54% 15.64%  8.69% 
         
Perceived Probability of Trump Win         
Mean  .43       
Standard deviation  .31       
   C1 (DR) C2 (dD) C3 (rR) C4 (rD) C5 (dR)  All 
Clinton much more likely to win  19.38% 21.43% 19.52% 17.92% 18.13%  19.31% 
Clinton somewhat more likely to win  14.91% 12.96% 11.78% 9.39% 15.88%  13.32% 
Clinton a little more likely to win  12.55% 13.63% 10.09% 16.48% 13.45%  13.09% 
Both candidates equally likely to win  18.08% 26.68% 22.58% 25.85% 22.82%  22.37% 
Trump is a little more likely to win  17.83% 9.22% 17.79% 16.10% 13.96%  15.42% 
Trump is somewhat more likely to win  6.51% 7.16% 10.17% 5.18% 9.35%  7.52% 
Trump is much more likely to win  10.73% 8.91% 8.05% 9.06% 6.39%  8.96% 
         
Party Identification         
Mean  .54       
Standard deviation  .33       
   C1 (DR) C2 (dD) C3 (rR) C4 (rD) C5 (dR)  All 
Strong Republican  11.70% 14.50% 15.64% 13.10% 10.09%  12.87% 
Moderate Republican  8.59% 6.96% 10.54% 12.52% 9.18%  9.39% 
Republican leaning  22.18% 19.06% 17.55% 25.01% 16.26%  20.35% 
Independent  5.60% 8.54% 6.29% 7.67% 4.48%  6.37% 
Democrat leaning  20.66% 21.39% 19.81% 14.89% 24.87%  20.39% 
Moderate Democrat  14.97% 9.43% 13.77% 10.77% 15.90%  13.30% 
Strong Democrat  16.29% 20.09% 16.39% 16.02% 19.21%  17.39% 
         
Political Interest         
Mean  .52       
Standard deviation  .35       
   C1 (DR) C2 (dD) C3 (rR) C4 (rD) C5 (dR)  All 
Not at all interested  19.25% 22.91% 18.67% 16.21% 25.56%  20.35% 
Slightly interested  24.19% 25.82% 21.90% 33.71% 20.40%  24.99% 
Somewhat interested  39.15% 25.28% 34.48% 31.81% 32.02%  33.58% 
Very interested  17.41% 25.98% 24.95% 18.26% 22.01%  21.08% 
Notes. All refers to the statistics of the whole sample. 
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Full wording of the variables 
 
Perceived relative accuracy of the polls: “Comparing the two polls directly, which poll 
do you think is more accurate in representing the public support for the likely candidates in this 
election?”  
“The first poll (KnowPolitics) is much more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)”,  
“The first poll (KnowPolitics) is somewhat more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)”, 
“The first poll (KnowPolitics) is a little more accurate than the second one (Public-Metrics)”, 
“Neither poll is more accurate than the other poll”,  
“The second poll (Public-Metrics) is a little more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)”,  
“The second poll (Public-Metrics) is somewhat more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)”, 
“The second poll (Public-Metrics) is much more accurate than the first one (KnowPolitics)” 
 
 Election predictions: “If the election were held tomorrow and it was between Hillary 
Clinton and Donald Trump, which candidate do you think would win and become the next 
President of the U.S.?”  
“Clinton is much more likely to win”,  
“Clinton is somewhat more likely to win”,  
“Clinton is a little more likely to win”,  
“Both candidates are equally likely to win”,  
“Trump is a little more likely to win”,  
“Trump is somewhat more likely to win”,  
“Trump is much more likely to win” 
 
Party Identification: Party identification (Party ID) was asked with the traditional vetted 
question that first asked whether respondents are Republican, Democrat, or Independent. Those 
who selected either party were asked a follow-up question about the strength of their identification 
(example: strong Republican vs not a very strong Republican), and Independents were asked a 
follow-up question about whether they leaned towards any of the two parties or that they were 
fully independent. These four questions were combined to create a measure of party identification 
strength with seven points, ranging from 0 (strong Republican) to 1 (strong Democrat). 
 
Political Interest: “In general, how interested are you in politics and public affairs?”  
“Not at all interested,”  
“Slightly interested,”  
“Somewhat interested,”  
“Very interested.” 
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Appendix P: Manipulation Stories and Preregistration 
 
Note. First, I informed respondents that these were real screenshots from a website and I stylized 
them to support this claim. I included a byline (gender-variant names chosen), title, candidate 
picture, and introductory contextualizing paragraph, and two separate paragraphs with poll 
results and methodological details. I chose Yahoo! News as the platform where the poll story 
presumably was reported.  Also, two polling firm names were made up carefully to prevent any 
possible name effects. Compared to conditions where poll results were different, producing the 
conditions where results were similar (without making them the same) was harder, especially 
when I want to keep the stories realistic. For example, I used a 4% points gap between the 
candidates in experimental condition 2 and a 6% gap in condition 3. This might introduce some 
unintended variation, although such small differences did not matter as I checked for order 
effects. 
 
Figure P1. Manipulations 
[Condition 1] 
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[Condition 2] 
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[Condition 3] 
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[Condition 4] 
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[Condition 5] 
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Preregistration Notes 
 
Preregistration Institution: Evidence in Governance and Politics 
Preregistration Title: Redacted 
Preregistration ID: Redacted 
Note: Some wording changes are made to clarify the tests better in the manuscript text; however, 
as seen, all research questions and hypotheses are kept the same.  
 
- Preregistration Text Starts Here - 
[title redacted]  
EGAP Preregistration  
GATED until [redacted] 
Note: This study has received Time-Sharing Experiments in Social Sciences Small Studies 
Program Grant. This preregistration document is a shortened and updated version of the TESS 
application that was submitted to TESS PIs in [redacted]. The TESS application has contained all 
hypotheses as well, and the TESS documents will become public in a year as well. GfK (working 
for TESS) fielded this study in [redacted] and provided the researchers with the dataset on 
[redacted] While submitting this preregistration to EGAP, the researchers have not made any 
changes to the hypotheses or other information I submitted in the TESS application. 
Introduction. 
 How does the public evaluate and react to polls? Opinion polls are very important as they 
constitute one of the major communicative pathways of public opinion. Whereas extensive 
research has examined effects of polls on attitudes (e.g. bandwagon and underdog) as well as 
behavior (e.g. turnout, voting preferences), our understanding of the mechanisms that mediate how 
the public engages with polls (perceptions and credibility evaluations of polls) is rather limited. 
Especially in the context of horse-race journalism in the election years, media reports are saturated 
with poll reports, which have either consistent or inconsistent results, have varying methodological 
qualities, and are often interpreted along with heavy partisan or expert commentaries from polling 
pundits. 
The current study proposes a survey experiment designed to leverage the horse-race 
dynamics in the 2016 elections. Specifically, I will examine how individuals perceive, evaluate, 
and react to polls by manipulating multiple polls’ results, their methodological quality, and partisan 
and expert opinionation of the findings in hypothetical poll reports. I investigate how the public 
perceive and react to polls. I draw from literatures on motivated reasoning, correctives/fact-
checking and opinionated news in formulating our research questions and hypotheses.  
Theoretical Background 
Motivated Reasoning. Motivations play an important role in public opinion processes 
leading us to discount information that challenges our pre-existing views. Similarly, people 
interpret polls in line with their motivations; they discredit polling results that suggest their favorite 
issue position or candidate are in the minority. This motivational bias is stronger among the 
respondents who are more knowledgeable (and hence have greater capacity to counter-argue). To 
date, it is unclear whether motivated responses to poll results operate in the contested horse-race 
environment where individuals are often exposed to multiple and conflicting poll results 
simultaneously or within short intervals of time. Hence, one of the core questions of this study 
concerns how people would respond to consistent or inconsistent results of polls that might or 
might not be favorable to their choices. 
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Fact-checking/Corrective Attempts. As a way to help the public interpret polling results, 
pollsters have long pushed to include information about survey methodology in media reports. The 
presence of methodological details could serve as a corrective against the potential of motivational 
biases in the public’s assessments of polls. Similarly, media organizations often invite polling 
experts to comment on results and methodological details to help people properly interpret poll 
news. A growing literature on fact-checking and attempts to correct misinformation, however, 
raises questions about whether either of these practices can counter motivated reasoning in the 
polling context. 
 Partisan opinionation. In practice, however, objective commentators are not the only 
individuals who attempt to sway the public’s understanding of poll results. Poll reports are often 
accompanied by partisan commentaries as well. And there are strong reasons to think that partisan 
commentary may enhance motivational biases. 
Design 
In this study I test how polling results, polling quality, and the presence of expert and 
partisan opinionation can influence the public’s interpretation of poll results. Specifically, I 
examine how these factors alter the perceived accuracy of poll results as well as respondents’ 
perceptions of who would win the election. I formulated 12 experimental conditions (See Table 1 
below). In each condition, respondents are presented with a news story about two poll results. I 
manipulate whether each poll finds a Democratic or Republican candidate lead, whether the polls 
are of consistently high or mixed methodological quality, whether polling experts render objective 
assessments, and whether partisan commentators render political judgments on which polls to 
believe. 
In [redacted], I have collected nationally representative sample of 2078 Americans via 
GfK through a TESS Small Study grant I received. 
Table P1. Design of the Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. High (vs Low) indicates poll with high methodological quality. Dem (vs Rep) indicates a 
poll result showing the lead of Democratic candidate. Debunk (vs Praise or None) indicates that 
expert or partisan source debunks the poll’s methodology.  
The 12 conditions proposed will allow us to test eight substantive hypotheses and two 
research questions. Our first set of hypotheses concern the presence of motivated reasoning and 
how it depends on poll quality. First, I expect to find evidence that motivated reasoning operates 
when respondents simultaneously encounter conflicting poll results (H1). I plan to test this by 
looking at differences in the perceptions of polls in condition C1 by partisanship (See Table 1). 
Condition 
Result 
(who leads) 
Quality of 
Methods 
Expert or Partisan     
Opinionation  
C1 Dem-Rep High-High None 
C2 Dem-Dem Low-High None 
C3 Rep-Rep Low-High None 
C4 Rep-Dem Low-High None 
C5 Dem-Rep Low-High None 
C6 Dem-Dem Low-High Expert Debunk-Expert Praise 
C7 Rep-Rep Low-High Expert Debunk-Expert Praise 
C8 Dem-Rep Low-High Expert Debunk-Expert Praise 
C9 Rep-Dem Low-High Expert Debunk-Expert Praise 
C10 Dem-Rep High-High Partisan Praise-Partisan Debunk 
C11 Rep-Dem High-High Partisan Praise- Partisan Debunk 
C12 Dem-Rep High-High Expert Debunk-Expert Debunk 
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Next, I expect that partisans will differ from one another in the credibility that they associate with 
polls that have consistent results (H2; C2 and C3 by partisanship). These same conditions will 
allow us to answer our first research question: Do people recognize methodological quality 
differences between polls with consistent results? (RQ1; C2 and C3). When polls are inconsistent, 
however, I expect that individuals will be responsive to methodological quality (H3; C4 and C5). 
Whether variations in methodological quality will enhance or mitigate motivational biases in 
conflicting polls is a key question (RQ2; C4 and C5 by partisanship vs C1 by partisanship). 
Compared to conditions where poll results are consistent, I expect that inconsistent results will 
trigger stronger methods-based assessments (H4; C4 and C5 by partisanship vs C2 and C3 by 
partisanship).  
Our second set of hypotheses concern how commentary on polls might further moderate 
poll evaluations. Because out-partisans can latch onto expert critiques to dismiss disliked results, 
I expect that expert commentary will enhance motivated reasoning for polls with consistent 
findings (H5; C6 and C7 by partisanship vs C2 and C3 by partisanship). In contrast, I expect that 
expert commentary will reduce motivational biases where polls’ results are inconsistent, because 
they will serve as an informational corrective (H6; C8 and C9 by partisanship vs C4 and C5 by 
partisanship). Partisan commentary, on the other hand, should enhance motivated reasoning (H7; 
C10 and C11 by partisanship vs C1). Finally, I included an additional condition in which an expert 
critiques conflicting polls both of which are high quality. In this condition, I expect the effects of 
motivational biases will be stronger than in a condition without expert commentary (H8; C12 vs 
C1). This final condition is also important for ecological validity reasons as the entire polling 
industry has increasingly come under fire.   
Across all of the conditions, I expect to replicate the earlier studies’ findings that more 
politically aware respondents will be the most susceptible to motivational biases; I plan to use 
education and party strength to test this. Aside from the respondents’ perceptions of accuracy, I 
will also examine whether our manipulations alter respondents’ perceptions of likely election 
outcomes. 
Importance of Study. To date, much of the research on motivated reasoning has illustrated 
that individuals encounter political information with a series of cognitive biases. This study 
provides a novel window into how those biases might fuel partisan differences in perceptions of 
polls in the context of an election year. The results of this study will provide important information 
on how media organizations can potentially mitigate the polarizing effects of poll reports. It does 
so in an ecologically valid way that recognizes the complex informational environment that 
characterizes American political campaigning and news reporting. This study taps the dynamic 
aspects of the horserace by focusing on the competitive poll results, their varying methodological 
qualities, and impact of competing commentaries in media coverge. 
- Preregistration Text Ends Here - 
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Appendix R: Results controlling for political interest 
Table R1. OLS Regressions Predicting the Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls, Controlling for Political Interest 
A-) Regressions predicting preference for Republican poll when both polls are high quality (H1)  
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .62 *** (.03)   .69 *** (.04) 
Interest .01   (.03)   .02   (.03) 
Education -.05   (.03)   -.17 ** (.06) 
Democratic Voter -.17 *** (.03)   -.31 *** (.07) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .22 * (.09) 
N (c1) 286   286 
R2 .11   .13 
F-change -    F(1)=5.8* 
B-) Regressions assessing conditions under which individuals identify quality distinctions between polls with 
similar results (H2) (Republican Ahead is dummy variable where rR=1, dD=0) 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .41 *** (.04)   .28 *** (.06) 
Interest .03   (.04)   .03   (.04) 
Education .16 *** (.04)   .38 *** (.09) 
Disagreement .04   (.05)   .29 ** (.11) 
Republican Ahead .09 * (.04)   .22 * (.09) 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead -.15 * (.07)   -.38 * (.15) 
Disagreement X Education         -.44 ** (.16) 
Republican Ahead X Education         -.22   (.13) 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead X Education         .40 † (.22) 
N (c2, c3) 300   300 
R2 .07   .10 
F-change -    F(1)=2.59† 
C-) Regressions assessing conditions under which individuals recognize quality distinctions among polls with 
contradictory results (RQ2) (Inconsistent Quality is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and DR is 0) 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .57 *** (.03)   .68 *** (.05) 
Interest .04   (.03)   .04 † (.03) 
Education .00   (.03)   -.18 * (.07) 
Disagreement -.17 *** (.04)   -.31 *** (.08) 
Inconsistent Quality .01   (.03)   -.15 * (.07) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Quality .09 † (.05)   .25 * (.11) 
Disagreement X Education         .23 * (.11) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education         .26 ** (.10) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Quality X Education         -.25   (.16) 
N (c1, c4, c5) 585   585 
R2 .06   .08 
F-change  -   F(3)=3.14* 
D-) Regressions assessing differences in quality recognition when polls have consistent vs inconsistent results 
(H4) (Inconsistent Results is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and dD and rR are 0) 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Intercept .47 *** (.03)   .37 *** (.05) 
Interest .05 * (.03)   .05 † (.03) 
Education .11 *** (.03)   .27 *** (.07) 
Disagreement  -.04   (.04)   .11   (.08) 
Inconsistent Results .04   (.03)   .16 * (.07) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Results -.04   (.05)   -.17   (.12) 
Disagreement X Education         -.25 * (.11) 
Inconsistent Results X Education         -.20 † (.10) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Results X Education         .23   (.17) 
N (c2, c3, c4, c5) 599   599 
R2 .04   .04 
F-change  -   F(3)=2.29† 
Notes. Left columns are simple models, right columns are education interaction models. Higher scores in the outcome variable 
represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. Note the specific subsamples that are utilized in each of the 
models (C#s in parentheses represent condition numbers as shown in Table 1). † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** 
lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Table R2. OLS Regressions Predicting Perceptions of Trump Win, Controlling for Political Interest 
A-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when both polls are high quality (H1)  
  Coef.   se  Coef.   se 
Intercept .83 *** (.05)   .88 *** (.07) 
Interest -.03   (.05)   -.02   (.05) 
Education -.13 ** (.05)   -.22 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.56 *** (.05)   -.66 *** (.10) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .16   (.14) 
N 292   292 
R-square .35   .36 
F-change  -   F(1)=1.20 
 B-) Predicting perceptions of Trump win when individuals encounter polls with similar results, varying 
methodological quality (H2) (Republican Ahead is dummy variable where rR=1, dD=0) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .73 *** (.05)   .75 *** (.08) 
Interest .03   (.04)   .03   (.04) 
Education -.11 * (.05)   -.14   (.12) 
Democratic Voter -.51 *** (.06)   -.55 *** (.12) 
Republican Ahead .03   (.05)   .03   (.11) 
Republican Ahead X Democratic Voter -.01   (.08)   .01   (.18) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .07   (.19) 
Republican Ahead X Education         .01   (.17) 
Democratic Voter X Republican Ahead X Education         -.04   (.26) 
N 307   307 
R-square .35   .35 
F-change  -   F(3)=.05 
C-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls with contradictory results have different qualities 
(RQ2) (Inconsistent Quality is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and DR is 0) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .82 *** (.04)   .87 *** (.07) 
Interest .00   (.03)   .00   (.03) 
Education -.15 *** (.04)   -.23 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.55 *** (.05)   -.66 *** (.10) 
Inconsistent Quality -.10 * (.04)   -.16 † (.09) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality .17 ** (.06)   .31 * (.15) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .16   (.15) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education         .10   (.13) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality X Education         -.21   (.21) 
N 593   593 
R-square .28   .28 
F-change  -   F(3)=.46 
D-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls have consistent vs inconsistent results (H4) 
(Inconsistent Results is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and dD and rR are 0)  
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .76 *** (.04)   .76 *** (.06) 
Interest .03   (.03)   .03   (.03) 
Education -.13 *** (.03)   -.13   (.08) 
Democratic Voter -.52 *** (.04)   -.55 *** (.09) 
Inconsistent Results -.07 † (.04)   -.07   (.09) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results .14 * (.06)   .20   (.14) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .05   (.13) 
Inconsistent Results X Education         .00   (.12) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results X Education         -.10   (.20) 
N 608   608 
R-square .28   .28 
F-change  -   F(3)=.26 
Notes. Left columns are simple models, right columns are education interaction models. Higher scores in the outcome variable 
represent respondent perceptions of a Trump win as more probable. Note the specific subsamples that are utilized in each of the 
models (C#s in parentheses represent condition numbers as shown in Table 1). † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** 
lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix S: Details of H2 Analysis 
 
When results are consistent with each other, people should not care about the differences between pieces of evidence. 
Hence, we expect that partisans will differ from one another in the credibility that they associate with polls that have 
consistent results. That is, they will evaluate multiple polls similarly in both directions; uniformly debunking 
unfavorable ones and praising favorable ones (H2). 
 
When respondents encountered polls that showed the same result but differed in their methodological quality (robust 
vs poor), their credibility evaluations were not influenced by the poll result’s favorability to their own position (b=-
.03, se=.05, p=ns, Table S1, Column 1). However, education has both a main effect and interaction. More educated 
people tend to recognize the better-quality poll correctly, yet, when they disagree with the results of the both polls, 
they tend to not care about the quality differences (b=-.48, se=.16, p=.01, Table S1, Column 2, Figure S1).  
 
Table S1. Regressions assessing conditions under which individuals identify quality distinctions between polls with 
similar results (H2) (Republican Ahead is dummy variable where rR=1, dD=0) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .42 *** (.04)   .28 *** (.06) 
Education .17 *** (.04)   .41 *** (.09) 
Disagreement .03   (.05)   .31 ** (.11) 
Republican Ahead .09 * (.04)   .23 * (.09) 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead -.14 * (.07)   -.40 ** (.15) 
Disagreement X Education         -.48 ** (.16) 
Republican Ahead X Education         -.24 † (.13) 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead X Education         .44 * (.22) 
N (c2, c3) 311   311 
R2 .08   .10 
F-change     F(3)=3.30* 
Notes. Left columns are simple models, right columns are education interaction models. Higher scores in the 
outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to the first poll. Note the 
specific subsamples that are utilized in each of the models (C#s in parentheses represent condition numbers as 
shown in Table 1). † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. 
All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Figure S1. Credibility Perceptions of Polls with Similar Results 
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Finally, polls with similar results and dissimilar methodological quality did not influence respondents’ predictions of 
the election outcome (Table S2). 
 
Table. S2. Predicting perceptions of Trump win when individuals encounter polls with similar results, varying 
methodological quality (H2) (Republican Ahead is dummy variable where rR=1, dD=0) 
   Coef.   se    Coef.   se  
Intercept  .74 *** (.05)   .76 *** (.08) 
Education -.09 * (.05)   -.12   (.12) 
Democratic Voter -.51 *** (.06)   -.57 *** (.12) 
Republican Ahead  .03   (.05)   .03   (.11) 
Democratic Voter X Republican Ahead  .00   (.08)   .04   (.18) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .09   (.18) 
Republican Ahead X Education         .00   (.16) 
Democratic Voter X Republican Ahead X Education         -.06   (.26) 
N (c2, c3)  318    318 
R2  .33    .34 
F-change  -    F(3)=.14 
Notes. Left columns are simple models, right columns are education interaction models. Higher scores in the 
outcome variable represent respondent perceptions of a Trump win as more probable. Note the specific subsamples 
that are utilized in each of the models (C#s in parentheses represent condition numbers as shown in Table 1). † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
  
 
 
 
 
Additional Analysis for RQ2a (mentioned in manuscript): 
 
Table S3. Regression Predicting Perceived Accuracy of the Second Poll For Polls Among Inconsistent 
Results and Varying Methodological Qualities 
  Coef.   se 
Intercept .55 *** (.04) 
Education .09 * (.04) 
Predisposition to Disagree -.08 * (.04) 
Conditions Included C4, C5 
N 307 
R-square .03 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All 
tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix T: Details of Education Moderation  
 
Figure T1. Details of Education Moderation for Electoral Expectations: Interaction Plots 
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Details of Education Moderation for Electoral Expectations 
 
Table T1. Predicting Perceptions of Trump Win – Education Moderation 
A-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when both polls are high quality (H1) (Democratic 
Voter is the 7-point party-identification variable where greater values indicate stronger Democrat identity)  
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .79 *** (.04)   .85 *** (.06) 
Education -.11 * (.05)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.56 *** (.05)   -.65 *** (.10) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .15   (.14) 
N (c1) 306  306 
R2 .34  34 
F-change -  F(1)=1.08 
 B-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls with contradictory results have different 
qualities (RQ2) (Inconsistent Quality is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and DR is 0) 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .81 *** (.04)   .85 *** (.06) 
Education -.13 *** (.03)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.55 *** (.05)   -.65 *** (.10) 
Inconsistent Quality  -.10 * (.04)   -.13   (.09) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality  .17 ** (.06)   .29 * (.15) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .15   (.15) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education         .06   (.13) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality X Education         -.19   (.20) 
N (c1, c4, c5) 614  614 
R2 .28  .28 
F-change -  F(3)=.53 
C-) Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls have consistent vs inconsistent results 
(H4) (Inconsistent Results is a dummy variable where rD and dR are 1, and dD and rR are 0)  
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .77 *** (.03)   .77 *** (.06) 
Education -.12 *** (.03)   -.12   (.08) 
Democratic Voter -.52 *** (.04)   -.55 *** (.09) 
Inconsistent Results  -.07 † (.04)   -.06   (.09) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results  .13 * (.06)   .19   (.14) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .06   (.13) 
Inconsistent Results X Education         -.01   (.12) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results X Education         -.10   (.19) 
N (c2, c3, c4, c5) 626  626 
R2 .27  .27 
F-change -  F(3)=.41 
Notes. Left columns are simple models, right columns are education interaction models. Higher scores in the 
outcome variable represent respondent perceptions of a Trump win as more probable. Note the specific subsamples 
that are utilized in each of the models (C#s in parentheses represent condition numbers as shown in Table 1). † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix U:  
Consistent vs Inconsistent Results and Causal Effects (Mediation) of Perceived Credibility  
Causal Effects of Perceived Credibility 
 
A. Consistent vs Inconsistent Results 
 
On the other hand, because inconsistent results encourage elaboration, as noted above, 
individuals should be more likely to recognize poll quality under conditions where the results are 
inconsistent as opposed to when polls have consistent results (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). 
People who view inconsistent results should identify higher quality methods more frequently, 
regardless of partisanship (H7), and should exhibit less partisan certainty in their subsequent 
electoral predictions (H8).  
 
 Whether results were consistent or inconsistent did not matter for the evaluations of polls 
with differing quality (b= -.04, se= .05, p= .51, Table U1, Column 1).64 There was no notable 
difference in the slopes for consistent and inconsistent-results (Figure 1E).65 Still, across the board, 
respondents generally recognized the higher quality poll as more accurate (Figure 1E). 
These results do not support H7.  
 
Table U1. OLS Regressions predicting the perceived relative accuracy of the second (which is always higher quality) poll (H4a) 
and the perceived chances of Trump win (H4b) when comparing polls that have consistent vs inconsistent results (Conditions 2, 
3, 4, and 5) 
  Perceived Relative 
Poll Accuracy (H7)  
  Perceived Chance of 
Trump Win (H8)  
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Predisposition to Disagree (Disagree) -.05   (.04)         
Democratic Respondent         -.52 *** (.04) 
Inconsistent Results Condition .04   (.03)   -.07 † (.04) 
Disagree X Inconsistent Results -.04   (.05)         
Democratic Respondent X Inconsistent Results         .13 * (.06) 
                
Intercept .49 *** (.03)   .77 *** (.03) 
Education .13 *** (.03)   -.12 *** (.03) 
N 617   626 
R2 .04   .27 
Notes. For H7, higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll (which is always the higher quality poll) being 
perceived as more accurate compared to the first poll; for H8, higher scores in the outcome variable represent respondent 
perceptions of a Trump win as more probable. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p 
lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
In contrast, for electoral predictions, exposure to inconsistent results (vs consistent results) 
made respondents less certain about the chances of their favorable candidate winning (b= .13, se= 
.06, p= .03). This relationship is visible in Figure 1F, as inconsistent results led to a shallower 
slope for respondents’ election predictions. These findings were in line with expectations from 
H8, which posited that inconsistent results would increase elaboration and thereby reduce the 
partisan driven certainty in electoral expectations. 
 
                                                 
64 In Table 2, Column 3, disagreement variable is not significant. This is because half of the conditions in this model 
had polls with consistent results, which push respondents who dislike them to the midpoint response option. 
65 And the inclusion of the interaction term (Disagreement X Inconsistent Results) did not improve the baseline 
model, F(2, 610)=.73, p=.48. 
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Discussion 
I had found little support for H4 which expected that individuals would be more likely to 
identify high quality polls when results were inconsistent. In interacting with respondent 
education, however, I complicate this story. Highly educated respondents who encountered polls 
with consistent results that supported their partisan positions effectively discriminated between 
polls with high and low quality methods. These same respondents did not differentiate by quality 
when they were predisposed to find the results disagreeable, however (b= -.19, se= .10, p= .06). 
Because more educated respondents were more likely to assert that the favorable poll was of higher 
quality in this condition, their assessments reflect greater partisan bias than lower educated 
respondents (H5). I take up these seemingly contradictory results below. 
Similarly, presentation of polls with inconsistent results also reduced individuals’ partisan 
confidence about the chances of favored candidate winning. In other words, when the evidence 
was consistently showing that their favored candidate would lose, respondents exhibited weaker 
beliefs that their favored candidate would win. These results thus echo recent research 
documenting that consistent findings matter more than inconsistent poll results in changing 
people’s beliefs (Tappin, van der Leer, McKay, 2017). However, given that there might be other 
factors in respondents’ electoral expectations and updating of their beliefs in response to what they 
believe is credible polling evidence, whether this finding constitutes a “reduction of motivational 
bias” or not is a theoretical debate that needs further research. 
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B. Causal Effects (Mediation) of Perceived Credibility Causal Effects of Perceived 
Credibility 
 
Does Perceived Poll Accuracy Matter for Electoral Predictions? 
One of the important questions I was interested in was whether perceptions of poll accuracy 
influenced predictions about the election outcome. In examining the results for H1, I found that 
perceived accuracy was significantly related to electoral expectations above and beyond party 
identification. That is, individuals who found the Trump-leading poll more credible were more 
likely to expect that Trump would win, controlling for partisanship and education. But, this 
analysis cannot establish causality, as it could be the case that election expectations shaped poll 
perceptions. 
 To assess whether perceived accuracy had a causal effect on electoral predictions, I 
leveraged differences between experimental conditions. When controlling for all variables, 
compared to the baseline condition of C1 (inconsistent results, equivalent quality), the interactions 
of experimental conditions with the perceived accuracy of Clinton-leading polls were uniquely 
associated with perceptions of Clinton victory, and same effect was observed for Trump 
(difference from baseline model, F(5)= 10.95, p< .001; Δ R2= .03; details in Appendix U). Such 
that, an increase in the perceived accuracy of a poll lead to that candidate being perceived as more 
likely to win across the experimental conditions.  
 
 
Table U2. Predicting Perceptions of Trump Win, Controlling for Poll Credibility 
 Coef. se 
Intercept .53 *** (.06) 
Relative Credibility of the Trump-leading poll .44 *** (.08) 
Education -.09 * (.04) 
Democratic Voter -.49 *** (.05) 
N 299 
R-square .41 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are 
two-tailed. Note that this analysis is based on C1. 
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Table U3. Examining the Causal Effect of Perceived Credibility on Election Predictions 
  
 Baseline Model   Perceived 
Accuracy and 
Condition 
Interactions  
  Perceived Accuracy,  
Partisanship, and 
Condition 
Interactions  
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .72 *** (.04)   .54 *** (.06)   .53 *** (.09) 
Education -.13 *** (.03)   -.12 *** (.03)   -.12 *** (.03) 
Democratic Voter -.53 *** (.05)   -.49 *** (.05)   -.45 *** (.13) 
dD -.04  (.05)   .11   (.08)   .14   (.13) 
rR -.02  (.05)   .13   (.09)   .12   (.14) 
rD -.06  (.05)   .38 *** (.09)   .30 * (.14) 
dR -.14 ** (.05)   -.01   (.09)   -.03   (.15) 
                        
Second Poll Credibility .16  ***  (.04)    .44 *** (.08)   .47 ** (.15) 
            
Democratic Voter X dD .02  (.08)   -.03   (.08)   -.07   (.19) 
Democratic Voter X rR .03  (.08)   -.02   (.08)   .01   (.21) 
Democratic Voter X rD .08  (.08)   .05   (.08)   .21   (.21) 
Democratic Voter X dR .22 ** (.08)   .17 * (.08)   .21   (.20) 
                        
Democratic Voter X Second Poll Credibility  -   -     -   -    -.06   (.23) 
                        
Second Poll Credibility X dD  -   -    -.24 * (.12)   -.29   (.23) 
Second Poll Credibility X rR  -   -    -.26 * (.13)   -.23   (.23) 
Second Poll Credibility X rD  -    -   -.77 *** (.13)   -.63 ** (.23) 
Second Poll Credibility X dR  -    -   -.23 † (.12)   -.18   (.23) 
                        
Democratic Voter X Second Poll Credibility X dD -    -   -    -   .09   (.33) 
Democratic Voter X Second Poll Credibility X rR -    -   -    -   -.06   (.36) 
Democratic Voter X Second Poll Credibility X rD -    -   -    -   -.28   (.37) 
Democratic Voter X Second Poll Credibility X dR -    -    -    -    -.06   (.35) 
                        
N 915   915   915 
R-square 0.32   0.35   0.35 
F-change from the previous model -   F(4)=9.73***   F(5)=.38 
 F-change from the Baseline Model                 F(9)=4.51*** 
Notes. dD, rR, rD, and dR are the experimental conditions where reference category is the first 
experimental condition (DR). Baseline model includes perceived accuracy as a control. The second model 
interacts this variable with experimental conditions to infer causal effects. The third model examines 
whether these causal effects differ for Republicans and Democrats. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower 
than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed.  
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Appendix V: Ordinal Logit Models 
 
Table V1. Ordinal Logit Regressions Predicting the Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls (H1) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.25   (.38)   -1.33 † (.73) 
Democratic Voter -2.22 *** (.41)   -3.50 *** (.85) 
Democratic Voter X Education         1.95 † (1.15) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -4.75 *** (.48)   -5.46 *** (.63) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -3.74 *** (.42)   -4.45 *** (.59) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -3.28 *** (.40)   -3.99 *** (.58) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll .55 † (.33)   -.15   (.51) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 1.22 *** (.35)   .53   (.52) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.16 *** (.41)   1.50 ** (.56) 
                
Residual Deviance 652.07   649.17 
AIC 668.07   667.17 
N 299   299 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
 
 
 
Table V2. Ordinal Logit Regressions Predicting the Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls with Similar Results (H2) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
   Coef.   se   Coef.    se  
Education 1.55 *** (.36)   3.56 *** .82 
Disagreement .28   (.47)   2.93 ** 1.00 
Republican Ahead .64 † (.39)   1.59 * .81 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead -1.11 † (.65)   -3.34 * 1.40 
Disagreement X Education         -4.49 ** 1.50 
Republican Ahead X Education         -1.62   1.15 
Disagreement X Republican Ahead X Education         3.81 † 2.01 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -1.77 *** (.38)   -.65   .55 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -1.34 *** (.36)   -.21   .54 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -.93 ** (.34)   .21   .54 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll 2.12 *** (.37)   3.33 *** .58 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 2.70 *** (.38)   3.91 *** .59 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 3.53 *** (.40)   4.76 *** .61 
                
Residual Deviance 823.14   813.75 
AIC 843.14   839.75 
N 311   311 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
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Table V3. Ordinal Logit Regressions Predicting the Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls with Consistent vs 
Inconsistent Quality (RQ2) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Education .35   (.26)   -1.15 † (.69) 
Disagreement -1.83 *** (.36)   -2.95 *** (.79) 
Inconsistent Quality .13   (.30)   -1.11   (.69) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Quality 1.18 * (.49)   1.99 † (1.10) 
Disagreement X Education         1.68   (1.08) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education         1.93 * (.97) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Quality X Education         -1.22   (1.54) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -3.45 *** (.33)   -4.44 *** (.53) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -2.86 *** (.31)   -3.85 *** (.52) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -2.49 *** (.30)   -3.48 *** (.51) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll .93 *** (.27)   -.03   (.49) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 1.44 *** (.28)   .49   (.49) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.23 *** (.30)   1.29 ** (.50) 
                
Residual Deviance 1476.95   1468.71 
AIC 1496.95   1494.71 
N 605   605 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
 
Table V4. Ordinal Logit Regressions Predicting the Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls with Consistent vs 
Inconsistent Results (H4) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Education 1.22 *** (.25)   2.67 *** (.58) 
Disagreement -.29   (.32)   1.19 † (.68) 
Inconsistent Results .30   (.28)   1.52 * (.61) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Results -.30   (.46)   -2.00 * (1.01) 
Disagreement X Education         -2.39 * (.97) 
Inconsistent Results X Education         -1.95 * (.86) 
Disagreement X Inconsistent Results X Education         2.72 † (1.43) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -2.11 *** (.27)   -1.24 ** (.41) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -1.78 *** (.26)   -.90 * (.40) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -1.45 *** (.25)   -.57   (.40) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll 1.61 *** (.25)   2.52 *** (.41) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 2.11 *** (.26)   3.02 *** (.42) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.90 *** (.28)   3.82 *** (.43) 
                
Residual Deviance 1629.60   1621.79 
AIC 1649.60   1647.79 
N 617   617 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
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Table V5. Ordinal Logit Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when both polls are high quality (H1) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.64 * (.32)   -1.21 † (.63) 
Democratic Voter -3.47 *** (.35)   -4.15 *** (.73) 
Democratic Voter X Education         1.03   (.97) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.99 *** (.35)   -4.36 *** (.50) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -3.02 *** (.32)   -3.40 *** (.48) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.32 *** (.30)   -2.69 *** (.47) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -1.39 *** (.28)   -1.76 *** (.45) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.25   (.28)   -.62   (.45) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .37   (.30)   .01   (.45) 
                
Residual Deviance 1042.93   1041.79 
AIC 1058.93   1059.79 
N 306   306 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely 
to win, < is slightly more likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V6. Ordinal Logit Regressions Predicting perceptions of Trump win when individuals encounter polls with 
similar results, varying methodological quality (H2) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
 Coef  se  Coef.  se 
Education -.62 * (.31)   -.49   (.80) 
Democratic Voter -3.33 *** (.44)   -3.49 *** (.83) 
Republican Ahead .33   (.36)   .64   (.75) 
Democratic Voter X Republican Ahead -.19   (.57)   -.20   (1.20) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .25   (1.24) 
Republican Ahead X Education         -.49   (1.10) 
Democratic Voter X Republican Ahead X Education         -.01   (1.73) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.75 *** (.38)   -3.69 *** (.56) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -2.94 *** (.36)   -2.88 *** (.55) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.26 *** (.34)   -2.20 *** (.54) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -.91 ** (.32)   -.84   (.52) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump .02   (.32)   .09   (.52) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .92 ** (.35)   .99 † (.54) 
                
Residual Deviance 1068.75   1068.01 
AIC 1088.75   1094.01 
N 318   318 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely 
to win, < is slightly more likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
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Table V7. Ordinal Logit Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls have consistent vs 
inconsistent quality (RQ2) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Education -.75 *** (.23)   -1.24 * (.63) 
Democratic Voter -3.53 *** (.33)   -4.23 *** (.72) 
Inconsistent Quality -.52 † (.27)   -.74   (.63) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality .97 * (.43)   1.62   (1.00) 
Democratic Voter X Education         1.06   (.97) 
Inconsistent Quality X Education         .34   (.88) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Quality X Education         -.98   (1.38) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -4.10 *** (.28)   -4.42 *** (.47) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -3.19 *** (.27)   -3.51 *** (.46) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.45 *** (.26)   -2.77 *** (.46) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -1.43 *** (.24)   -1.75 *** (.45) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.38   (.24)   -.69   (.45) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .36   (.25)   .04   (.45) 
                
Residual Deviance 2134.19   2132.78 
AIC 2154.19   2158.78 
N  614   614 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely 
to win, < is slightly more likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
 
Table V8. Ordinal Logit Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls have consistent vs 
inconsistent results (H4) 
 Simple Model  Education Interaction 
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Education -.73 ** (.23)   -.67   (.54) 
Democratic Voter -3.39 *** (.31)   -3.50 *** (.61) 
Inconsistent Results -.37   (.26)   -.18   (.58) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results .75 † (.42)   .81   (.93) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .19   (.86) 
Inconsistent Results X Education         -.29   (.82) 
Democratic Voter X Inconsistent Results X Education         -.09   (1.30) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.96 *** (.27)   -3.93 *** (.40) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -3.13 *** (.26)   -3.10 *** (.40) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.40 *** (.25)   -2.37 *** (.39) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -1.18 *** (.23)   -1.15 ** (.38) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.24   (.23)   -.20   (.38) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .64 ** (.24)   .68 † (.39) 
                
Residual Deviance 2160.84   2160.23 
AIC 2180.84   2186.23 
N  626   626 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely 
to win, < is slightly more likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
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Appendix Y: Demographic Composition of the Samples 
 
Table Y1. Demographics across the samples of Study 1 and 2 
 Study 1 (N=200)  Study 2 (N=401) 
 Freq. %  Freq. % 
      
Age (18-24)   23 11.5  38 9.5 
Age (25-34)  96 48  166 41.4 
Age (35-44) 38 19  90 22.4 
Age (45-54) 24 12  47 11.7 
Age (55-64) 14 7  50 12.5 
Age (65+) 5 2.5  10 2.5 
 
     
Male 108 54  224 55.9 
Female 92 46  177 44.1 
      
High school or less 27 13.5  47 11.7 
Some college credit, no degree 61 30.5  97 24.2 
Postgraduate degree or studies 96 48  203 50.6 
College degree 16 8  54 13.5 
      
Less than $24,999 46 23  89 22.2 
$25,000 to $49,499 68 34  119 29.7 
$50,000 to $74,999 53 26.5  91 22.7 
$75,000 to $99,999 15 7.5  56 14. 
$100,000 to $149,999 15 7.5  33 8.2 
More than $150,000 3 1.5  13 3.2 
      
Strong Democrat 29 14.5  78 19.5 
Moderate Democrat 26 13  71 17.7 
Democrat-leaning Independent 28 14  70 17.5 
Independent 63 31.5  77 19.2 
Republican-leaning Independent 21 10.5  29 7.2 
Moderate Republican 13 6.5  39 9.7 
Strong Republican 12 6  26 6.5 
No preference 8 4  11 2.7 
Notes. %s are valid frequencies (and add up to 100); because of force-response, there are no item 
non-response in these questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Appendix Z: The Survey Instrument 
Note: Questions that are explained in the manuscript are not included here.  
[Media skepticism-1] Media is politically biased in its coverage of the election 
[Media skepticism-2] Media is excessively focused on the race between the candidates 
[Media skepticism-3] Media does a good job of covering the election issues important to the 
public 
[Media skepticism-4] Media provide interesting, engaging reports and stories regarding the 
election 
[Knowledge-1] Which of the candidates served as the United States Secretary of State? 
Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton 
[Knowledge-2] In the primaries, which Democratic candidate wanted to replace Obamacare with 
a single-payer system? 
Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders 
[Knowledge-3] Which Republican primary candidate was known for his surgical skills? 
John Kasich, Ben Carson 
[Knowledge-4] Who was the Republican campaigner who got the second most vote share during 
the 2016 primaries? 
Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz 
[Knowledge-5] Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Democrats? 
Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders 
[Knowledge-6] Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Republicans? 
Donald Trump, Ted Cruz 
[Numeracy-1] If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 80, this would be the same as having 
what percentage (%) chance of getting the disease? 
20%, 25%, 30%, 40% 
[Numeracy-2] If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
3 seconds, 1 minute, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 100 minutes 
[Numeracy-3] Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 600 times. Out of 600 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up as an even number? 
50, 100, 200, 300, 600 
[Age] What year were you born? 
List ranges from year corresponding to age 18 to 100 
[Sex] What is your sex? 
Male, Female 
[Education] What is your education level? 
High school or less, Some college credit, no degree, College degree, Postgraduate degree or 
studies 
[Income] Which category approximately represents the total combined household income of all 
members of your family during the past 12 months?  
Less than $24,999, $25,000 to $49,499, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to 
$149,999, More than $150,000 
[Party ID] Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or 
an Independent? 
Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Democrat-leaning Independent, Independent, 
Republican-leaning Independent, Moderate Republican, Strong Republican, No preference 
244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
Appendix AA: Descriptive and Univariate Results 
 
Table AA1.  Frequencies of Exposure and Outcome Variable Items - Study 1 
  Polls 
Polling 
Averages 
Forecasting 
Models 
Media 
Analyses 
Prediction 
Markets 
  Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Exposure Never 8 4 27 13.5 36 18 54 27 110 55 
 Once a month 21 10.5 34 17 49 24.5 58 29 34 17 
 Several times a month 45 22.5 46 23 46 23 40 20 26 13 
 Once a week 46 23 47 23.5 37 18.5 27 13.5 21 10.5 
 Several times a week 62 31 38 19 27 13.5 19 9.5 9 4.5 
 Everyday 18 9 8 4 5 2.5 2 1 0 0 
            
Representativeness Not representative at all 12 6 12 6 15 7.5 22 11 42 21 
 Slightly representative 38 19 45 22.5 33 16.5 71 35.5 75 37.5 
 Somewhat representative 91 45.5 79 39.5 87 43.5 88 44 62 31 
 Very representative 51 25.5 54 27 52 26 18 9 19 9.5 
 Extremely representative 8 4 10 5 13 6.5 1 0.5 2 1 
            
Accuracy Not accurate at all 11 5.5 15 7.5 17 8.5 25 12.5 38 19 
 Slightly accurate 42 21 39 19.5 26 13 76 38 79 39.5 
 Somewhat accurate 86 43 83 41.5 88 44 78 39 58 29 
 Very accurate 54 27 54 27 54 27 19 9.5 23 11.5 
 Extremely accurate 7 3.5 9 4.5 15 7.5 2 1 2 1 
            
Relevance Not relevant at all 12 6 12 6 19 9.5 25 12.5 51 25.5 
 Slightly relevant 39 19.5 44 22 28 14 76 38 63 31.5 
 Somewhat relevant 76 38 68 34 77 38.5 64 32 62 31 
 Very relevant 58 29 60 30 60 30 31 15.5 21 10.5 
 Extremely relevant 15 7.5 16 8 16 8 4 2 3 1.5 
Notes. %s are valid frequencies (and add up to 100); because of force-response, there are no item 
non-response in these questions. 
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Table AA2. Descriptive Statistics of Exposure and Outcome Variable Items in Study 1 
  Polls 
Polling 
Averages 
Forecasting 
Models 
Media 
Analyses 
Prediction 
Markets 
Exposure Mean 3.94 3.30 2.93 2.53 1.93 
 sd 1.30 1.41 1.39 1.33 1.23 
Representativeness Mean 3.03 3.03 3.08 2.53 2.32 
 sd .92 .97 .99 .83 .94 
Accuracy  Mean 3.02 3.02 3.12 2.49 2.36 
 sd .92 .97 1.02 .87 .95 
Relevance Mean 3.13 3.12 3.13 2.57 2.31 
 sd 1.01 1.03 1.06 .96 1.01 
Notes. sd denotes standard deviation of the mean. 
 
 
Table AA3. Media Attitudes (Skepticism) Frequencies in Study 1 
 
Notes. See the complete wording of the four items in Appendix B. %s are valid frequencies (and 
add up to 100); because of force-response, there are no item non-response in these questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Media is 
biased 
Too much 
horse race 
Media covers 
issues 
effectively 
Media provide 
engaging reports 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Not true at all 9 4.5 12 6 52 26 42 21 
A little true 23 11.5 17 8.5 47 23.5 43 21.5 
Somewhat 
true 54 27 54 27 70 35 75 37.5 
Very true 49 24.5 53 26.5 21 10.5 31 15.5 
Extremely true 65 32.5 64 32 10 5 9 4.5 
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Table AA4. Descriptive Statistics of Political and Other Correlates across the samples of Study 1 
and 2: 
  Study 1  Study 2 
  freq. %  freq. % 
Election Interest Not interested at all 12 6  19 4.74 
 A little interested 16 8  53 13.22 
 Somewhat interested 59 29.5  98 24.44 
 Very interested 57 28.5  122 30.42 
 Extremely interested 56 28  109 27.18 
 mean (sd) 3.65 (1.15)  3.62 (1.15) 
       
News Consumption  Mode Only offline 3 1.5  6 1.50 
 Mostly offline 17 8.5  37 9.23 
 Slightly more on offline 6 3  24 5.99 
 Equally on offline and online 34 17  60 14.96 
 Slightly more on online 13 6.5  36 8.98 
 Mostly online 95 47.5  189 47.13 
 Only online 32 16  49 12.22 
 mean (sd) 5.25 (1.54)  5.11 (1.55) 
       
Political Knowledge Item 1 - Incorrect 6 3  3 .75 
 Item 1 - Correct 194 97  398 99.25 
 Item 2 - Incorrect 40 20  56 13.97 
 Item 2 - Correct 160 80  345 86.03 
 Item 3 - Incorrect 33 16.5  51 12.72 
 Item 3 - Correct 167 83.5  350 87.28 
 Item 4 - Incorrect 32 16  45 11.22 
 Item 4 - Correct 168 84  356 88.78 
 Item 5 - Incorrect 71 35.5  162 40.4 
 Item 5 - Correct 129 64.5  239 59.6 
 Item 6 - Incorrect 116 58  227 56.61 
 Item 6 - Correct 84 42  174 43.39 
 mean (sd) .75 (.18)  .77 (.18) 
       
Numeracy Item 1 - Incorrect 48 24  63 15.71 
 Item 1 - Correct 152 76  338 84.29 
 Item 2 - Incorrect 64 32  149 37.16 
 Item 2 - Correct 136 68  252 62.84 
 Item 3 - Incorrect 38 19  55 13.72 
 Item 3 - Correct 162 81  346 86.28 
 mean (sd) .75 (.29)  .78 (.27) 
Notes. Freq is frequency, sd is standard deviation. 
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Appendix AB: Manipulation Stories 
 
Figure AB1. Manipulations 
Polling Average Story – Clinton Ahead 
 
 
Forecasting Model Story – Clinton Ahead 
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Forecasting Model Story – Trump Ahead 
 
 
Social Media Analytic Report – Clinton Ahead 
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Social Media Analytic Report – Trump Ahead  
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Appendix AC: Balance Checks across the Treatments 
 
Table AC1. Experimental Condition Balance Checks in Study 2 
Variables  F-test p  
Age  F(3,397)=1.94  
Sex  F(3,397)=1.20  
Education  F(3,397)=2.50 † 
Income  F(3,397)=  .40  
Election Interest  F(3,397)=3.02 * 
New Consumption Mode  F(3,397)=1.12  
Political Knowledge  F(3,397)=1.03  
Numeracy  F(3,397)=  .44  
Party Identification (Dem to Rep)  F(3,397)=1.63  
Notes. The results of one-way ANOVA tests showing the compositional differences of the 
samples of the four experimental conditions. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** 
lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Table AC2. Baseline Comparison of Outcome Variables across the Conditions in Study 2 
Variables  F-test p 
Polling Average-Representativeness  F(3,397)=.51  
Forecasting Model-Representativeness  F(3,397)=9.47 *** 
Social Media-Representativeness  F(3,397)=6.88 *** 
Polling Average-Accuracy  F(3,397)=.04  
Forecasting Model-Accuracy  F(3.397)=12.94 *** 
Social Media-Accuracy  F(3,397)=7.99 *** 
Polling Average-Relevance  F(3,397)=1.09  
Forecasting Model-Relevance  F(3,397)=12.83 *** 
Social Media-Relevance  F(3,397)=4.24 ** 
Polling Average-Ranking  F(3,397)=4.66 ** 
Forecasting Model-Ranking  F(3,397)=5.16 ** 
Social Media-Ranking  F(3,397)=5.14 ** 
Notes. The results of one-way ANOVA tests shows the baseline mean differences of outcome 
variables between the four experimental conditions. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, 
** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix AD: Item by Item Analysis of Outcome Variable via GLM in Study 2  
(Instead of Predicting the Index Outcome Variable) 
Table AD1. General Linear Model (GLM) Predictions of the Evaluations of Representativeness, Accuracy, and Relevance of the 
Analysis of the Three Election Reports – Study 2 
  Polling Averages  Forecasting Models  
Analyses of Social 
Media Buzz 
  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Representativeness Intercept 3.02 *** (.30)  3.11 *** (.28)  2.72 *** (.27) 
 Election Interest .02  (.05)  .06  (.05)  .06  (.04) 
 Numeracy .29  (.18)  .12  (.18)  -.30  (.18) 
 Political Knowledge .02  (.29)  -.67 * (.29)  -.39  (.28) 
 Disagreement -.11 *** (.03)  -.10 *** (.02)  -.09 *** (.02) 
 N 394  394  394 
 McFadden R
2 .05  .08  .08 
             
Accuracy Intercept 3.02 *** (.29)  2.93 *** (.29)  2.70 *** (.27) 
 Election Interest .01  (.04)  .06  (.05)  .06  (.04) 
 Numeracy .18  (.18)  .21  (.19)  -.30 + (.18) 
 Political Knowledge .10  (.28)  -.54 + (.30)  -.47 + (.27) 
 Disagreement -.11 *** (.03)  -.12 *** (.02)  -.10 *** (.02) 
 N 394  394  394 
 McFadden R
2 .04  .10  .11 
             
Relevance Intercept 3.10 *** (.31)  3.30 *** (.30)  3.14 *** (.30) 
 Election Interest .05  (.05)  .06  (.05)  .01  (.05) 
 Numeracy .17  (.20)  .13  (.20)  -.48 * (.20) 
 Political Knowledge .10  (.30)  -.70 * (.31)  -.48  (.31) 
 Disagreement -.14 *** (.03)  -.12 *** (.02)  -.08 *** (.02) 
 N 394  394  394 
 McFadden R2 .06  .09  .07 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
McFadden R2 is a pseudo R-square parameter for the models [(1- (residual deviance/null deviance)].
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Appendix AE: Comparing Study 1 and Study 2 Directly 
Figure AE1. Boxplots comparing the distributions of evaluations across the three types of 
election reports in general vs specific story examples. 
 
Notes. Left column is the comparison of samples regarding polling averages, whereas the middle 
column is for forecasting models, and the right column is for media analyses. The top row is 
representativeness evaluation, and middle one is for accuracy evaluation, and the bottom row is 
for relevance evaluation. In each boxplot, the left bar is the “general” (Study 1, views on a type 
of election report in general) whereas the middle bar is the report showing a favorable result and 
the right one is the unfavorable result (Study 2, views on a specific example of election report 
that has a clear result as to which presidential candidate is in lead). Nstudy 1=200, Nstudy 2=400. 
Results here (significance tests are in Table AE1) show that unfavorable messages always 
evaluated worse than others. 
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Table AE1. Comparing Neutral, Favorable and Unfavorable Messages across Study 1 and Study 2 
     
 Mean 
Difference 
 Group Mean Group Mean  t p 
Representativeness Neutral Polling Average 3.02 Favorable Polling Average 3.05  -.28  
 Neutral Polling Average 3.03 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.70  2.55 * 
 Favorable Polling Average 3.05 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.70  2.88 ** 
 Neutral Forecast 3.08 Favorable Forecast 2.79  3.06 ** 
 Neutral Forecast 3.08 Unfavorable Forecast 2.34  6.42 *** 
 Favorable Forecast 2.79 Unfavorable Forecast 2.34  4.16 *** 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.52 Favorable Media Analyses 2.24  3.41 *** 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.52 Unfavorable Media Analyses 2.19  3.01 ** 
 Favorable Media Analyses 2.24 Unfavorable Media Analyses 2.19  .41  
        
Accuracy Neutral Polling Average 3.01 Favorable Polling Average 2.97  .47  
 Neutral Polling Average 3.01 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.63  .12  
 Favorable Polling Average 2.97 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.63  2.79 ** 
 Neutral Forecast 3.12 Favorable Forecast 2.76  3.76 *** 
 Neutral Forecast 3.12 Unfavorable Forecast 2.18  8.18 *** 
 Favorable Forecast 2.76 Unfavorable Forecast 2.18  5.22 *** 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.49 Favorable Media Analyses 2.30  2.18 * 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.49 Unfavorable Media Analyses 1.60  9.54 *** 
 Favorable Media Analyses 2.30 Unfavorable Media Analyses 1.60  7.60 *** 
        
Relevance Neutral Polling Average 3.12 Favorable Polling Average 3.14  -.15  
 Neutral Polling Average 3.12 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.73  2.81 ** 
 Favorable Polling Average 3.14 Unfavorable Polling Average 2.73  3.06 ** 
 Neutral Forecast 3.13 Favorable Forecast 2.92  2.05 * 
 Neutral Forecast 3.13 Unfavorable Forecast 2.43  5.77 *** 
 Favorable Forecast 2.92 Unfavorable Forecast 2.43  4.22 *** 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.57 Favorable Media Analyses 2.41  1.67 † 
 Neutral Media Analyses 2.57 Unfavorable Media Analyses 1.83  6.81 *** 
 Favorable Media Analyses 2.41 Unfavorable Media Analyses 1.83  5.34 *** 
Notes. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. These 
are the numerical mean values and the t-tests comparing the all distributions in the boxplots in Figure AE1. 
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Appendix AF: Anonymized preregistration details 
 
Biases in Message Credibility and Voter Expectations  
EGAP Preregisration  
Summary. 
Election polls in horserace coverage characterize a competitive information environment with 
inconsistent results being published within short intervals of time. And these small or large 
differences in results do not always reflect real electoral shift.  
 
In response to variability in the results and methodological quality of polls, over the last decade, 
we have seen the increasing use and media coverage of polling aggregations/averages from sites 
like RealClearPolitics, FiveThirtyEight, CNN poll of polls, and Huffpost Pollster. Polls vary in 
direction, in terms of the gap between candidates, and poll of polls either replicate or stand in 
contrast to individual poll findings.  
 
Whereas a large literature documents the effects of polls on citizens’ perceptions, attitudes, and 
political behavior in various contexts, these dynamic aspects of the competitive information 
environment as well as the perceptions of polling averages have not been investigated. Such an 
information environment provides a perfect scenario to test motivational biases and objective 
updating of beliefs (Bayesian updating) in an experimental set up where we present, 
consecutively, various combinations of multiple messages. 
 
We set-up an online survey experiment in order to leverage these dynamics of horserace 
coverage in the context of 2016 U.S. presidential elections. We test through a large national 
survey experiment (N=1200, Qualtrics), the extent to which people engage in motivational 
resistance (motivated reasoning) or Bayesian updating (objective assessment of poll finding) 
while they encounter consecutively presented consistent (or inconsistent) singular poll reports (or 
polling averages of five recent polls) that represent small (or large gaps) between the 
presumptive nominees (Clinton and Trump). As outcome measures, we focus on perceived 
credibility of messages and voter expectations of support for candidates. 
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Table AF1. Manipulations Set up 
Condition 
Time 1 
Trump-Clinton 
Time 1 Time 2 
Trump-
Clinton 
Time 2 
c1 summative T+2 45-43 singular T+6 47-41 
c2 summative C+2 43-45 singular C+6 41-47 
c3 summative T+2 45-43 singular C+2 44-46 
c4 summative C+2 43-45 singular T+2 46-44 
c5 singular T+2 44-42 summative T+2 45-43 
c6 singular C+2 42-44 summative C+2 43-45 
c7  singular T+6 47-41 summative T+2 45-43 
c8 singular C+6 41-47 summative C+2 43-45 
c9 singular C+2 44-46 summative T+2 45-43 
c10 singular T+2 46-44 summative C+2 43-45 
c11a  singular T+2 45-43 singular C+2 44-46 
c11b Singular C+2 44-46 Singular T+2 45-43 
c12a   singular C+2 44-46 singular C+2 43-45 
c12b  singular T+2 44-46 singular T+2  43-45 
Table Notes. 
1. T is Trump, C is Clinton. 
2. Singular is single poll result and Summative is a polling average result 
3. Plus (+) sign mean that candidate’s % is leading the other candidate by that amount. 
4. Conditions 1 through 10 have also 2 versions (a and b) where we either include or 
exclude a basic explanation of the logic behind polling averages. It is technically another 
manipulation although we treat it as a dosage (strenght of message) and will test its 
impact as well as running analyses with a and bs combined for each condition. 
Methodology. 
1. Online survey experiment on a national sample of N=1200 respondents, Qualtrics panel 
where we present hypothetical news stories 
2. Within subjects cross-sectional study with 2 sets of manipulation screening and outcome 
question answering. 
3. Outcome variables: Poll Credibility (asked both at t1 and t2), Voter Prediction (asked 
only at t2). 
4. We plan to conduct OLS and logistic regression analyses with interaction tests to predict 
the outcome variables.  
Manipulations. 
Please interpret below manipulations togethr with the Table 1 above and example manipulation 
stories at the end of this document. 
1. Poll result: Clinton lead vs Trump lead 
2. Poll gap: 2% vs 6% (only for singular polls) 
3. Poll type: Singular poll vs Aggregate poll 
4. Poll consistency: Consistent vs Inconsistent 
5. Poll order: Singular+Summative vs Summative+Singular vs Singular+Singular 
6. Theoretical explanation: Absence of presence of 3rd paragraph in polling average stories 
(only for polling averages, see Note 4 in Table Notes above) 
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Hypotheses. 
For simplicity, we refer only to poll credibility below, but these hypotheses apply to the direction 
and magnitude of shifts in voter predictions as well. Bias is operationalized as discounting of 
unfavorable message, both in credibility and election prediction assessments. 
 
1. Respondents will discredit unfavorable polls (those showing their candidate as losing) more 
than those favorable polls.  
(c1 through c12b by party identification at t1) 
2. Summative polls will have greater effect size than singular polls (at t1) and they will do so 
more if the logic of polling average is included in the news story.  
(c1 through c4 vs c5 through c12b by party identification at t1) 
3. The consonance between summative and singular polls will facilitate biased perceptions, the 
dissonance will mitigate it. 
(c1 through c10 by party identification at t2) 
4. When summative is presented first, it will lead to less biased evaluation of secondarily-
presented individual polls (at t2).  
(c1 through c4 vs c5 through c10 by party identification at t2) 
5. When summative comes post hoc, it will facilitate bias (if both singular and summative poll 
is favorable), or it serves as a corrective attempt by mitigating bias (if singular poll is 
favorable and the summative poll is unfavorable). 
(c5 through c10 by party identification at t2) 
6. The effect sizes of singular polls in which there is wider gap between candidates will be 
stronger than those that have smaller gaps (at t1). 
(c7 through 8 vs c5,6,9,10 by party identification at t1) 
7. When two consecutively presented singular polls contradict each other, there will be less 
bias, than when they align with each other. 
(c11 vs c12a and b by party identification at t2) 
8. The cumulative effects of singular+summative polls will be greater (both in facilitating and 
reducing bias) than singular+singular polls (at t2). 
(c1 through c10 vs c11 through c12b by party identification at t2) 
9. All these relationships will be moderated by political knowledge, methodological 
knowledge/numeracy. According to motivated reasoning, those with greater ability should 
have greater bias (at t1 and t2). 
(c1 through c12b by party identification and ability measures at both t1 and t2) 
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Figure AF1. Manipulations 
Example manipulation story 1: A polling average result showing Clinton lead with the 3rd 
explanatory (corrective) paragraph included. 
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Example manipulation story 2: A polling average result showing Trump lead with the 3rd 
explanatory (corrective) paragraph excluded. 
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Example manipulation story 3: A poll result showing Clinton lead with a 6% gap 
 
Example manipulation story 4: A poll result showing Trump lead with a 2% gap 
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Appendix AG: Full question wordings 
 
Voting Preference Intention 
 
If the election for President were held today and the candidates were Donald Trump, the 
Republican, and Hillary Clinton, the Democrat, for whom would you vote - or wouldn't you 
vote? 
 Donald Trump (1) 
 Hillary Clinton (2) 
 Some other person (4) 
 Would not vote (3) 
 
If the election for President were held today and the candidates were Hillary Clinton, the 
Democrat, and Donald Trump, the Republican, for whom would you vote  - or wouldn't you 
vote? 
 Hillary Clinton (1) 
 Donald Trump (2) 
 Some other person (4) 
 Would not vote (3) 
 
Party Identification 
 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent? 
 Republican (1) 
 Democrat (2) 
 Independent (3) 
 No preference (4) 
 
Do you consider yourself as closer to the Republican or the Democratic party? 
 Republican (1) 
 Democratic (2) 
 Neither (3) 
 
Would you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican? 
 Strong Republican (1) 
 Not a very strong Republican (2) 
 
Would you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Democrat? 
 Strong Democrat (1) 
 Not a very strong Democrat (2) 
 
 
 
Outcome Variable Items  
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How trustworthy do you think this polling average is? 
 Not trustworthy at all (1) 
 Slightly trustworthy (2) 
 Somewhat trustworthy (3) 
 Very Trustworthy (4) 
 Extremely trustworthy (5) 
 
How accurate do you think this polling average is in representing the public support for each of 
the candidates in this election? 
 Not accurate at all (1) 
 Slightly accurate (2) 
 Somewhat accurate (3) 
 Very accurate (4) 
 Extremely accurate (5) 
 
How informative do you find this polling average? 
 Not informative at all (1) 
 Slightly informative (2) 
 Somewhat informative (3) 
 Very informative (4) 
 Extremely informative (5) 
 
How trustworthy do you think this poll is? 
 Not trustworthy at all (1) 
 Slightly trustworthy (2) 
 Somewhat trustworthy (3) 
 Very Trustworthy (4) 
 Extremely trustworthy (5) 
 
How accurate do you think this poll is in representing the public support for each of the 
candidates in this election? 
 Not accurate at all (1) 
 Slightly accurate (2) 
 Somewhat accurate (3) 
 Very accurate (4) 
 Extremely accurate (5) 
 
How informative do you find this poll? 
 Not informative at all (1) 
 Slightly informative (2) 
 Somewhat informative (3) 
 Very informative (4) 
 Extremely informative (5) 
 
Education Level 
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What is your education level? 
 No schooling completed (1) 
 Complete 8th grade or less (2) 
 Some high school, no diploma (3) 
 High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED) (4) 
 Some college credit, no degree (5) 
 Trade/technical/vocational training (6) 
 Associate degree (7) 
 Bachelor’s degree, college graduate (8) 
 Master’s degree (9) 
 Professional degree (10) 
 Doctorate degree (11) 
 
Election Related Political Knowledge 
 
Which of the candidates served as the United States Secretary of State? 
 Donald Trump (1) 
 Hillary Clinton (2) 
 
In the primaries, which Democratic candidate wanted to replace Obamacare with a single-payer 
system? 
 Hillary Clinton (1) 
 Bernie Sanders (2) 
 
Which Republican primary candidate was known for his surgical skills? 
 John Kasich (1) 
 Ben Carson (2) 
 
Who was the Republican campaigner who got the second most vote share during the 2016 
primaries? 
 Marco Rubio (1) 
 Ted Cruz (2) 
 
Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Democrats? 
 Hillary Clinton (1) 
 Bernie Sanders (2) 
 
Who was the Iowa caucus winner for the Republicans? 
 Donald Trump (1) 
 Ted Cruz (2) 
 
Poll Methodology Knowledge 
 
Which of the following scenarios do you think would give a more accurate estimate of an 
election outcome, considering that all other factors are the same? 
 If the poll is conducted 2 days before the actual election (1) 
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 If the poll is conducted 2 weeks before the actual election (2) 
 If the poll is conducted 2 months before the actual election (3) 
 Timing of the poll would not make any difference under any circumstances as long as the 
sample is representative (4) 
 
Assuming all other characteristics are the same, which of the following sample characteristics of 
a poll would provide the best estimate of support levels in the country for a particular candidate? 
 When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, half of it coming from cities and the other half 
of it coming from rural areas (1) 
 When the sample size of the poll is 10,000, and is representative of 3 big cities: New 
York, Chicago, and Los Angeles (2) 
 When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, but it is not a representative sample (3) 
 When the sample size of the poll is 5,000, and it is a nationally representative sample (4) 
 
Assuming all other characteristics are the same, which of the following response rates would 
provide a poll result that is most representative of the country? 
 A poll that reached 1000 people; 700 people responded and 300 refused to take the poll 
(1) 
 A poll that reached 2000 people, 1900 people responded and 100 refused to take the poll 
(2) 
 A poll that reached 1800 people, 1700 people responded and 100 refused to take the poll 
(3) 
 A poll that reached 1900 people, 1800 people responded and 100 refused to take the poll 
(4) 
 
Assuming all other characteristics are the same, which of the following poll results would you be 
most confident represents a candidate who is supported by a majority of people? 
 When the candidate got 47 % support, with a 2 % margin of error (1) 
 When the candidate got 51 % support, with a 2 % margin of error (2) 
 When the candidate got 54 % support, with a 2 % margin of error (3) 
 Both 2nd and 3rd options show that the candidate is being supported by the majority (4) 
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Appendix AH: A Compilation of Polling Critiques in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
 
1. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/something-better-than-polls-for-political-predictions-you-bet/  
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Appendix AI: Demographic Details  
 
Table AI1. Weighted descriptive statistics of the demographic variables  
Variable Response Options mean sd Frequency Percentage 
Age   47.30 17.50     
Sex male     1000.99 48.17% 
  female     1077.01 51.82% 
Education level Less than high school     261.30 12.57% 
  High school     608.95 29.30% 
  Some college     587.74 28.28% 
  Bachelor's degree or higher     620.00 29.83% 
Race White, Non-Hispanic     1346.68 64.81% 
  Black, Non-Hispanic     240.34 11.57% 
  Other, Non-Hispanic     140.52 6.76% 
  Hispanic     325.25 15.65% 
  2+ Races, Non-Hispanic     25.20 1.21% 
Income Less than $5,000     69.08 3.32% 
  $5,000 to $7,499     37.64 1.81% 
  $7,500 to $9,999     26.02 1.25% 
  $10,000 to $12,499     45.80 2.20% 
  $12,500 to $14,999     43.84 2.11% 
  $15,000 to $19,999     62.35 3.00% 
  $20,000 to $24,999     77.03 3.71% 
  $25,000 to $29,999     103.14 4.96% 
  $30,000 to $34,999     109.75 5.28% 
  $35,000 to $39,999     108.07 5.20% 
  $40,000 to $49,999     120.86 5.82% 
  $50,000 to $59,999     182.81 8.80% 
  $60,000 to $74,999     186.41 8.97% 
  $75,000 to $84,999     165.26 7.95% 
  $85,000 to $99,999     134.53 6.47% 
  $100,000 to $124,999     283.18 13.63% 
  $125,000 to $149,999     123.98 5.97% 
  $150,000 to $174,999     75.10 3.61% 
  $175,000 or more     123.14 5.93% 
Marital Status Married     1098.95 52.88% 
  Widowed     97.66 4.70% 
  Divorced     224.48 10.80% 
  Separated     28.04 1.35% 
  Never married     515.49 24.81% 
  Living with partner     113.38 5.46% 
Notes. N=2078; C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12 
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Appendix AK: Manipulation Stories and Preregistration Details 
 
Notes 
 
Preregistration Notes: The same pregistration notes are available in the appendices for 
Empirical Study 2 in Chapter 2. 
 
Manipulations for the conditions 1 through 5 are already presented in the appendices of 
the Empirical Study 2 in Chapter 2. Below the remaining manipulation stories are 
presented, those of the conditions 6 through 12. 
Figure AK1. Manipulations 
[Condition 6] 
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[Condition 7] 
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[Condition 8] 
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[Condition 9] 
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[Condition 10] 
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[Condition 11] 
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[Condition 12] 
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Appendix AL: Results Based on Ordinal Logit Models 
 
Table AL1. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is expert 
commentary on polls with consistent results 
 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
 
 
Table AL2. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is expert 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results 
 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
 
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education 1.66 *** (.25)   1.21 † (.68) 
Disagreement -.32   (.32)   2.75 *** (.58) 
Expert on Consistent -.06   (.27)   .71   (.57) 
Disagreement X Expert on Consistent .47   (.44)   -1.41   (.96) 
Disagreement X Education         -2.47 * (.97) 
Expert on Consistent X Education         -1.24   (.81) 
Disagreement X Expert on Consistent X Education         3.03 * (1.36) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -2.15 *** (.28)   -1.49 *** (.42) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -1.63 *** (.26)   -.97 * (.40) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -1.11 *** (.24)   -.45   (.40) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll 1.79 *** (.25)   2.46 *** (.41) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 2.42 *** (.26)   3.10 *** (.42) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 3.43 *** (.28)   4.12 *** (.43) 
                
Residual Deviance  1731   1724  
AIC  1751   1750 
N  626    626 
 
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education 1.26 *** (.25)   .75   (.66) 
Disagreement -.63 † (.34)   -.87   (.76) 
Expert on Inconsistent .25   (.28)   .14   (.63) 
Disagreement X Expert on Inconsistent -.83 † (.46)   -1.32   (1.02) 
Disagreement X Education         .37   (1.07) 
Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .17   (.88) 
Disagreement X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .82   (1.43) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -2.67 *** (.31)   -3.02 *** (.50) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -2.17 *** (.29)   -2.52 *** (.49) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -1.86 *** (.28)   -2.21 *** (.49) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll 1.38 *** (.27)   1.05 * (.47) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 1.80 *** (.28)   1.47 ** (.47) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.74 *** (.29)   2.41 *** (.48) 
                
Residual Deviance 1613    1610 
AIC 1633    1636 
N  628   628 
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Table AL3. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is overall 
debunking commentary on polls with inconsistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.01   (.31)   -1.35 † (.74) 
Democrtic Voter -2.30 *** (.40)   -3.60 *** (.85) 
Overall Debunking -.65   (.40)   -2.05 * (.90) 
Democrtic Voter X Overall Debunking .60   (.62)   2.27   (1.39) 
Democrtic Voter X Education         1.99 † (1.15) 
Overall Debunking X Education         2.20 † (1.28) 
Democrtic Voter X Overall Debunking X Education         -2.61   (1.98) 
                
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -4.57 *** (.41)   -5.45 *** (.60) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -3.70 *** (.37)   -4.58 *** (.57) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -3.22 *** (.36)   -4.10 *** (.56) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll .71 * (.31)   -.15   (.52) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 1.39 *** (.32)   .54   (.52) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.28 *** (.37)   1.44 ** (.55) 
                
Residual Deviance 958   953 
AIC 978   979 
N 451   451 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
 
 
 
Table AL4. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is partisan 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education .37   (.27)   -1.36 † (.73) 
Disagreement -2.16 *** (.38)   -3.49 *** (.83) 
Partisan Commentary -.98 ** (.33)   -2.54 *** (.75) 
Disagreement X Partisan Commentary .73   (.51)   2.06 † (1.14) 
Disagreement X Education         1.99 † (1.14) 
Partisan Commentary X Education         2.39 * (1.04) 
Disagreement X Partisan Commentary X Education         -1.98   (1.59) 
                
1st poll >>> 2nd poll | 1st poll >> 2nd poll -4.03 *** (.35)   -5.19 *** (.57) 
1st poll >> 2nd poll | 1st poll > 2nd poll -3.27 *** (.33)   -4.42 *** (.55) 
1st poll > 2nd poll | 1st poll = 2nd poll -2.84 *** (.32)   -3.99 *** (.55) 
1st poll = 2nd poll | 1st poll < 2nd poll .92 ** (.29)   -.18   (.51) 
1st poll < 2nd poll | 1st poll << 2nd poll 1.63 *** (.31)   .52   (.52) 
1st poll << 2nd poll | 1st poll <<< 2nd poll 2.82 *** (.38)   1.74 ** (.56) 
                
Residual Deviance 1302   1293 
AIC 1322   1319 
N  590   590 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. 
Six cutoff points of the seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, 
*** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more accurate, << is somewhat more accurate, 
< is slightly more accurate, = is equally accurate. 
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Table AL5. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is expert 
commentary on polls with consistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.41 † (.22)   -3.47 *** (.61) 
Democratic Voter -3.37 *** (.31)   -.65   (.54) 
Expert on Consistent -.11   (.25)   .00   (.54) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Consistent .27   (.40)   -.35   (.87) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .17   (.86) 
Expert on Consistent X Education         -.17   (.77) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Consistent X Education         .95   (1.24) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.78 *** (.27)   -3.93 *** (.40) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -2.90 *** (.25)   -3.04 *** (.39) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.18 *** (.24)   -2.33 *** (.39) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -.97 *** (.23)   -1.12 ** (.38) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.06   (.23)   -.20   (.38) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .76 ** (.24)   .62   (.38) 
                
Residual Deviance 2198   2196 
AIC 2218   2222 
N  639   639 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. Six cutoff points of the 
seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely to win, < is slightly more 
likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
 
 
 
Table AL6. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is expert 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.53 * (.22)   -1.01   (.63) 
Democratic Voter -2.78 *** (.32)   -2.87 *** (.73) 
Expert on Inconsistent .36   (.26)   -.32   (.58) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Inconsistent -.86 * (.42)   -.45   (.95) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .12   (1.00) 
Expert on Inconsistent X Education         1.09   (.82) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         -.68   (1.32) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.66 *** (.29)   -3.98 *** (.48) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -2.75 *** (.27)   -3.08 *** (.48) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -1.97 *** (.26)   -2.29 *** (.47) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -.79 ** (.25)   -1.11 * (.46) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump .42 † (.25)   .11   (.46) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump 1.19 *** (.27)   .88 † (.47) 
                
Residual Deviance  2164   2160 
AIC  2184   2186 
N  635   635 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. Six cutoff points of the 
seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely to win, < is slightly more 
likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
 
279 
 
Table AL7. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is overall 
debunking commentary on polls with inconsistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.44 † (.26)   -1.26 * (.63) 
Democratic Voter -3.59 *** (.34)   -4.30 *** (.73) 
Overall Debunkiong -.46   (.32)   -.93   (.72) 
Democratic Voter X Overall Debunking .19   (.52)   .26   (1.18) 
Democratic Voter X Education         1.09   (.98) 
Overall Debunkiong X Education         .75   (1.04) 
Democratic Voter X Overall Debunking X Education         -.13   (1.66) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -3.90 *** (.31)   -4.43 *** (.49) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -3.08 *** (.29)   -3.61 *** (.48) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.37 *** (.28)   -2.90 *** (.47) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -1.23 *** (.26)   -1.76 *** (.46) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.13   (.26)   -.65   (.45) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .57 * (.27)   .05   (.46) 
                
Residual Deviance 1541   1538 
AIC 1561   1564 
N 459   459 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. Six cutoff points of the 
seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely to win, < is slightly more 
likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
 
 
 
Table AL8. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is partisan 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results  
Simple Model 
 
Education 
Interaction 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Education -.72 ** (.22)   -1.26 * (.63) 
Democratic Voter -3.60 *** (.33)   -4.30 *** (.72) 
Partisan Commentary -.20   (.26)   -.45   (.62) 
Democratic Voter X Partisan Commentary .49   (.43)   1.08   (.98) 
Democratic Voter X Education         1.08   (.98) 
Partisan Commentary X Education         .38   (.85) 
Democratic Voter X Partisan Commentary X Education         -.90   (1.34) 
                
Clinton >>> Trump | Clinton >> Trump -4.15 *** (.29)   -4.50 *** (.48) 
Clinton >> Trump | Clinton > Trump -3.21 *** (.27)   -3.56 *** (.47) 
Clinton > Trump | Clinton = Trump -2.49 *** (.26)   -2.84 *** (.46) 
Clinton = Trump | Clinton < Trump -1.44 *** (.24)   -1.79 *** (.45) 
Clinton < Trump | Clinton << Trump -.31   (.24)   -.66   (.45) 
Clinton << Trump | Clinton <<< Trump .39   (.25)   .05   (.45) 
                
Residual Deviance  2065   2064  
AIC  2085   2090  
N  602   602 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. Six cutoff points of the 
seven-point DV are shown. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than 
.001. All tests are two-tailed. <<< is much more likely to win, << is somewhat more likely to win, < is slightly more 
likely to win, = is equally likely to win. 
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Appendix AM: Results Controlling for Political Interest 
 
Table AM1. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is expert commentary on 
polls with consistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .44 *** (.03)   .37 *** (.05) 
Interest .05 † (.03)   .05 † (.03) 
Education .16 *** (.03)   .11   (.08) 
Disagreement -.04   (.04)   .27 *** (.07) 
Expert on Consistent  -.01   (.03)   .07   (.06) 
Disagreement X Expert on Consistent .07   (.05)   -.12   (.11) 
Disagreement X Education         -.25 * (.11) 
Expert on Consistent X Education         -.13   (.09) 
Disagreement X Expert on Consistent X Education         .31 * (.16) 
N 611   611 
R-square .07   .08 
F-change     F(3)=1.85 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to 
the first poll. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests 
are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AM2. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is expert commentary on 
polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .51 *** (.03)   .53 *** (.05) 
Interest .05 † (.03)   .05 † (.03) 
Education .11 *** (.03)   .08   (.08) 
Disagreement -.07 * (.04)   -.06   (.08) 
Expert on Inconsistent .04   (.03)   .02   (.07) 
Disagreement X Expert on Inconsistent -.09 † (.05)   -.17   (.12) 
Disagreement X Education         -.02   (.12) 
Expert on Inconsitent X Education         .02   (.10) 
Disagreement X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .12   (.17) 
N 607   607 
R-square .07   .08 
F-change     F(3)=1.00 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to 
the first poll. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests 
are two-tailed. 
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Table AM3. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is overall debunking 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .61 *** (.03)   .70 *** (.04) 
Interest -.01   (.03)   -.01   (.03) 
Education -.02   (.03)   -.16 ** (.06) 
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.17 *** (.03)   -.31 *** (.07) 
Overall Debunking -.07 * (.03)   -.24 *** (.07) 
Democrat X Overall Debunking .07   (.05)   .32 ** (.11) 
Democrat X Education         .22 * (.09) 
Overall Debunking X Education         .27 ** (.10) 
Democrat X Overall Debunking X Education         -.40 * (.16) 
N 434   434 
R-square .09   .11 
F-change     F(3)=2.95* 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to 
the first poll. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests 
are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AM4. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is partisan commentary 
on polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .59 *** (.03)   .69 *** (.04) 
Interest .00   (.02)   .00   (.02) 
Education .01   (.02)   -.17 ** (.06) 
Disagreement -.17 *** (.03)   -.31 *** (.07) 
Partisan Commentary -.08 ** (.03)   -.22 *** (.06) 
Disagreement X Partisan Commentary .05   (.04)   .16   (.10) 
Disagreement X Education         .22 * (.10) 
Partisan Commentary X Education         .21 * (.09) 
Disagreement X Partisan Commentary X Education         -.17   (.14) 
N 568   568 
R-square .09   .11 
F-change     F(3)=4.00** 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being perceived as more accurate compared to 
the first poll. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests 
are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
Table AM5. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is expert commentary on 
polls with consistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .76 *** (.04)   .79 *** (.06) 
Interest -.02   (.03)   -.02   (.03) 
Education -.08 * (.03)   -.13   (.08) 
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.52 *** (.04)   -.56 *** (.09) 
Expert on Consistent -.02   (.04)   -.01   (.08) 
Democrat X Expert on Consistent .06   (.06)   .00   (.13) 
Democrat X Education         .05   (.13) 
Expert on Consistent X Education         -.01   (.12) 
Democrat X Expert on Consistent X Education         .09   (.19) 
N 623   623 
R-square .31   .31 
F-change     F(3)=.54 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AM6. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is expert commentary on 
polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .68 *** (.04)   .71 *** (.07) 
Interest .00   (.03)   -.01   (.03) 
Education -.08 * (.03)   -.13   (.09) 
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.38 *** (.04)   -.35 *** (.10) 
Expert on Consistent .08 * (.04)   -.05   (.09) 
Democrat\ X Expert on Inconsistent -.16 ** (.06)   -.07   (.14) 
Democrat X Education         -.05   (.14) 
Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .20 † (.12) 
Democrat X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         -.14   (.19) 
N 634   634 
R-square .28   .29 
F-change     F(3)=1.99 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Table AM7. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is overall debunking 
commentary on polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .79 *** (.04)   .87 *** (.06) 
Interest .01   (.04)   .01   (.04) 
Education -.10 * (.04)   -.23 * (.09) 
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.55 *** (.04)   -.66 *** (.10) 
Overall Debunking -.09 † (.05)   -.21 * (.10) 
Democrat X Overall Debunking .05   (.08)   .13   (.17) 
Democrat X Education         .17   (.14) 
Overall Debunking X Education         .21   (.15) 
Democrat X Overall Debunking X Education         -.15   (.24) 
N 441   441 
R-square .35   .36 
F-change     F(3)=1.30 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AM8. Regressions predicting the perceived likelihood of Trump victory when there is partisan commentary 
on polls with inconsistent results 
 Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .82 *** (.04)   .88 *** (.07) 
Interest -.02   (.03)   -.01   (.04) 
Education -.13 *** (.03)   -.22 * (.09) 
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.55 *** (.05)   -.66 *** (.10) 
Partisan Commentary -.05   (.04)   -.13   (.09) 
Democrat X Partisan Commentary .09   (.06)   .22   (.14) 
Democrat X Education         .16   (.15) 
Partisan Commentary X Education         .13   (.13) 
Democrat X Partisan Commentary X Education         -.20   (.20) 
N 579   579 
R-square .32   .32 
F-change     F(3)=.46 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix AN: Split Analysis Based on Party 
 
Outcome Variable: Perceived Accuracy of the Second Poll 
 
A: Split Analysis Based on Party Leads in Consistent Polls (Consistently Democratic or 
Republican Lead) 
 
Table AN1. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is 
expert commentary on polls that show consistently a Clinton lead.  
 Simple Model  Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .41 *** (.04)   .28 *** (.06) 
Education .19 *** (.04)   .41 *** (.09) 
Disagreement .03   (.05)   .31 ** (.11) 
Expert Comment -.01   (.04)   .11   (.09) 
Disagreement X Expert Comment .08   (.08)   -.19   (.16) 
Disagreement X Education         -.48 ** (.17) 
Expert Comment X Education         -.21   (.13) 
Disagreement X Expert Comment X Education         .46 * (.23) 
Conditions Included 2, 6   2, 6  
N 308   308 
R-square .08   .11 
F-change  -   F(3)=2.86* 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AN2. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is 
expert commentary on polls that show consistently a Trump lead.  
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .52 *** (.04)   .51 *** (.06) 
Education .16 *** (.04)   .17 † (.09) 
Disagreement -.12 * (.05)   -.09   (.10) 
Expert View -.02   (.04)   .02   (.09) 
Disagreement X Expert Comment .06   (.07)   -.05   (.14) 
Disagreement X Education         -.05   (.14) 
Expert Comment X Education         -.07   (.12) 
Disagreement X Expert Comment X Education         .18   (.20) 
Conditions Included  3, 7   3, 7  
N 320   320 
R-square .08   .09 
F-change  -   F(3)=.36 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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B: Split Analysis Based on Campaign Representative Type (Democrat or Republican 
Commentator) 
 
Table AN3. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is a 
Trump campaign representative attacking the Clinton-leading poll 
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .58 *** (.03)   .68 *** (.04) 
Education .01   (.03)   -.14 * (.06) 
Disagreement -.18 *** (.03)   -.30 *** (.07) 
Trump Representative -.09 ** (.03)   -.31 *** (.08) 
Disagreement X Trump Representative  .07   (.05)   .29 * (.12) 
Disagreement X Education         .19 † (.10) 
Trump Representative X Education         .35 *** (.10) 
Disagreement X Trump Representative X Education         -.34 * (.17) 
Conditions Included  1, 11   1, 11  
N 452   452 
R-square .09   .12 
F-change  -   F(3)=4.76 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AN4. Regressions predicting the perceived credibility of the second poll when there is a 
Clinton campaign representative attacking the Trump-leading poll 
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .60 *** (.02)   .68 *** (.04) 
Education -.02   (.03)   -.14 * (.06) 
Disagreement -.18 *** (.03)   -.30 *** (.07) 
Clinton Representative -.08 * (.03)   -.09   (.07) 
Disagreement X Clinton Representative .04   (.05)   .00   (.12) 
Disagreement X Education         .19 * (.10) 
Clinton Representative X Education         .01   (.11) 
Disagreement X Clinton Representative X Education         .08   (.16) 
Conditions Included  1, 10   1, 10  
N 439   439 
R-square .11   .13 
F-change  -   F(3)=3.14* 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll being more accurate compared to the first poll. † 
denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Outcome Variable: Electoral Predictions (of Trump Win) 
A: Split Analysis Based on Party Leads in Consistent Polls (Consistently Democratic or 
Republican Lead) 
 
Table AN5. Regressions predicting the perceived chances of Trump victory when there is expert 
commentary on polls that show consistently a Clinton lead.  
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .72 *** (.05)   .76 *** (.08) 
Education -.05   (.05)   -.57 *** (.13) 
Democrat -.51 *** (.06)   -.12   (.12) 
Expert Comment -.01   (.05)   -.02   (.12) 
Democrat X Expert Comment .03   (.08)   .01   (.18) 
Democrat X Education         .09   (.19) 
Expert Comment X Education         .03   (.17) 
Democrat X Expert Comment X Education         .03   (.27) 
Conditions Included  2, 6   2, 6  
N 314   314 
R-square .31   .32 
F-change  -   F(3)=.27 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AN6. Regressions predicting the perceived chances of Trump victory when there is expert 
commentary on polls that show consistently a Trump lead.  
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .78 *** (.05)   .79 *** (.08) 
Education -.10 * (.05)   -.53 *** (.13) 
Democrat -.51 *** (.06)   -.12   (.12) 
Expert Comment -.04   (.05)   -.02   (.11) 
Democrat X Expert Comment .09   (.09)   .01   (.19) 
Democrat X Education         .02   (.18) 
Expert Comment X Education         -.04   (.16) 
Democrat X Expert Comment X Education         .12   (.27) 
Conditions Included  3, 7   3, 7  
N 327   327 
R-square .28   .28 
F-change  -   F(3)=.22 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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B: Split Analysis Based on Campaign Representative Type (Democrat or Republican 
Commentator) 
 
Table AN7. Regressions predicting the perceived chances of Trump victory when there is a 
Trump campaign representative attacking the Clinton-leading poll 
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .83 *** (.04)   .85 *** (.07) 
Education -.16 *** (.04)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democrat -.55 *** (.05)   -.65 *** (.11) 
Trump representative -.07   (.05)   -.10   (.11) 
Democrat X Trump Representative .17 * (.08)   .45 * (.19) 
Democrat X Education         .15   (.15) 
Trump representative X Education         .03   (.15) 
Democrat X Trump Representative X Education         -.41   (.25) 
Conditions Included  1, 11   1, 11  
N 463   463 
R-square .30   .31 
F-change  -   F(3)=2.51†  
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AN8. Regressions predicting the perceived chances of Trump victory when there is a 
Clinton campaign representative attacking the Trump-leading poll 
  Simple Model   Education Model 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Interept .77 *** (.03)   .85 *** (.06) 
Education -.06 † (.04)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democrat -.56 *** (.04)   -.65 *** (.10) 
Clinton representative -.01   (.05)   -.14   (.11) 
Democrat X Clinton representative .01   (.08)   .10   (.16) 
Democrat X Education         .15   (.14) 
Clinton representative XC Education         .21   (.15) 
Democrat X Clinton representative X Education         -.14   (.23) 
Conditions Included  1, 10   1, 10  
N 447   447 
R-square .36   .36 
F-change  -   F(3)=1.46 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Appendix AO: Additional Analysis on Expert Commentaries: Comparing Polls with 
Consistent and Inconsistent Results 
 
Table AO1. Regression Results Comparing the Influence of Expert Commentary on Perceived 
Relative Accuracy of Polls with Consistent vs Inconsistent Results 
  Simple Model   
Education 
Moderation 
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se 
Intercept .45 *** (.03)   .46 *** (.04) 
Education .17 *** (.03)   .15 * (.06) 
Disagreement with Poll Result (Disagree) .03   (.03)   -.01   (.07) 
Expert on Inconsistent  .08 ** (.03)   .11 † (.06) 
Disagree X Expert on Inconsistent -.20 *** (.05)   -.22 * (.11) 
Disagree X Education         .06   (.11) 
Expert on Inconsistent X Education         -.04   (.09) 
Disagree X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .04   (.15) 
Conditions Included C6, C7, C8, C9   C6, C7, C8, C9 
N 638   638 
R-squared .10   .10 
F-change  -   F(3)=.43 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent second poll (the higher quality one) being 
perceived as more accurate compared to the first poll. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than 
.05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Figure AO1. Interaction Plots for the Additional Analysis: Comparing the Influence of Expert 
Commentary on Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls with Consistent vs Inconsistent Results 
 
Figure AO2. Interaction Plots for the Additional Analysis: Comparing the Influence of Expert 
Commentary on Perceived Relative Accuracy of Polls with Consistent vs Inconsistent Results by 
Education 
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Appendix AP: Results for Electoral Expectations 
 
 Hypotheses. In the context of horserace coverage, electoral predictions are an important 
component of public opinion. Citizens’ expectations of the likely victor of the election and its 
competitiveness should be influential in their decisions to turnout and voting preferences (see Moy 
and Rinke, 2012; Rothschild and Malhotra, 2014). Previous research found that motivational 
biases shape election predictions (e.g. Delavande & Manski, 2012). Hence, we expect to replicate 
the hypotheses above (H1 through H5) for individuals’ election predictions as well (H6).  
 
Variable. To assess respondents’ expectations of election outcome, we measured the 
respondents’ prediction as to who would win the election: “If the election were held tomorrow and 
it was between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, which candidate do you think would win and 
become the next President of the U.S.?” Seven response options ranged from “Clinton much more 
likely to win” to “Trump is much more likely to win”. Both sets of responses were recoded to 
range from 0 to 1.  
 
Results. In general, commentaries in poll reports had little influence on respondents’ 
predictions regarding the election outcome when they encountered polls with inconsistent results. 
Controlling for partisanship, the presence of expert commentaries on polls with inconsistent results 
reinforced respondents’ perceptions that their favored candidate would win the election, and this 
was true for both Democrats and Republicans (b= -15. se=.06, p=.01, Table H2). As seen in Figure 
3, similar to the finding we observed for perceived poll credibility (although it was marginally 
significant), there might be a backfiring influence of expert commentaries as they increase 
respondents’ biases in electoral predictions.66 On the other hand, general debunking of polls, expert 
commentaries on polls with consistent results, and partisan commentaries did not have any 
influence on respondents’ election predictions. Whereas there was a consistent main effect of 
education (lower educated respondents were more likely to believe in a Trump win), education did 
not have a moderating effect in any of these tests. These mixed findings do not provide support for 
H6. (table and figures below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Further split analysis based on whether the better methodology poll was Clinton or Trump-leading indicated that 
this effect was primarily driven in cases where Trump leading poll was of better quality. When Trump-leading poll 
was better, an expert commentary increase Republicans’ perceived chances of Trump win and pushed Democrats to 
believe in Clinton victory stronger. 
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Table AP1. Predicting perceptions of Trump win when different polls with similar results have expert commentary 
(RQ3)  
   Coef.   se    Coef.   se  
Intercept  .75 *** (.03)   .77 *** (.06) 
Education -.08 * (.03)   -.12   (.08) 
Democratic Voter -.52 *** (.04)   -.55 *** (.09) 
Expert on Consistent  -.02   (.04)   -.02   (.08) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Consistent  .06   (.06)   .01   (.13) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .06   (.13) 
Expert on Consistent X Education         -.01   (.12) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Consistent X Education         .07   (.19) 
N (c2, c3, c6, c7)  639   639  
R2  .30   .30 
F-change  -    F(3)=.43 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AP2. Predicting perceptions of Trump win when polls with different results have expert commentary (H5)  
   Coef.   se     Coef.   se  
Intercept  .69 *** (.03)   .71 *** (.06) 
Education -.09 ** (.03)   -.13   (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.38 *** (.04)   -.36 *** (.10) 
Expert on Inconsistent .07 † (.04)   -.04   (.08) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Inconsistent -.15 * (.06)   -.09   (.13) 
Democratic Voter X Education         -.04   (.14) 
Expert on Inconsistent X Education         .17   (.12) 
Democratic Voter X Expert on Inconsistent X Education         -.11   (.19) 
N (c4, c5, c8, c9)  635   635 
R2  .29   .30 
F-change  -    F(3)=1.54 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Table AP3. Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when an expert debunks polls in general that have 
inconsistent results (H7)  
   Coef.   se    Coef.    se 
Intercept  .77 *** (.04)   .85 *** (.06) 
Education -.07 † (.04)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.56 *** (.04)   -.65 *** (.10) 
Overall Debunking -.08 † (.05)   -.18 † (.10) 
Democratic Voter X Overall Debunking .04   (.07)   .10   (.17) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .15   (.14) 
Overall Debunking X Education         .16   (.15) 
Democratic Voter X Overall Debunking X Education         -.09   (.24) 
N (c1, c12)  459   459  
R2  .35   .35 
F-change  -    F(3)=1.04 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AP4. Regressions predicting perceptions of Trump win when partisan commentary on polls is provided (H6)  
   Coef.   se     Coef.   se  
Intercept  .80 *** (.03)   .85 *** (.06) 
Education -.11 *** (.03)   -.19 * (.09) 
Democratic Voter -.56 *** (.05)   -.65 *** (.10) 
Partisan Commentary -.05   (.04)   -.10   (.09) 
Democratic Voter X Partisan Commentary .09   (.06)   .22   (.14) 
Democratic Voter X Education         .15   (.14) 
Partisan Commentary X Education         .09   (.13) 
Democratic Voter X Partisan Commentary X Education         -.19   (.20) 
N (c1, c10, c11)  602    602 
R2  .31    .32 
F-change  -    F(3)=.42 
Notes. Higher scores in the outcome variable represent stronger belief in Trump victory. † denotes p lower than .10, 
* lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Figure AP1. Election Predictions 
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Figure AP2. Election Predictions – Education Moderation 
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Effects of Perceived Accuracy on Electoral Expectations 
 
We also expect that expert and partisan commentaries will also uniquely influence 
respondents’ election predictions, that is, above and beyond the influence of partisanship  (H7). 
 
To see whether the perceived relative accuracy of polls uniquely predicts expectations 
about the election result, we ran a regression where we tested the interaction of party identification, 
experimental condition, and perceived relative accuracy of the second poll, while controlling for 
the other key variable, education.67 The difference of this interaction model from the baseline 
model was significant (F(11)=8.75, p<.001). Specifically, the perceived relative accuracy of the 
second poll significantly interacted with the presence of expert commentary when two Clinton 
leading polls were of differing quality in predicting perceived chances of a Trump win (b= -.52, 
se=.23, p=.03). Second, the perceived relative accuracy of the second poll significantly interacted 
with the presence of a partisan commentary that attacks the Clinton-leading poll in predicting the 
Trump-win expectations (b= -1.20, se=.22, p<.001). In both cases, the increases in the credibility 
of the Clinton leading poll due to the commentaries were associated with decreases in the chances 
of a Trump-win. These results provide some support for H7. (table below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 I examined this interaction for two reasons; first, the order of polls showing each candidate winning varied across 
conditions, second, some conditions had polls with consistent results. Hence, we could test the presence of unique 
effects only individually for each condition’s comparison to the baseline condition C1. 
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Table AP5. Effects of Perceived Accuracy on Electoral Expectations as Manipulated by 
Experimental Conditions 
   Baseline Model  
Perceived Accuracy 
and Condition 
Interactions     
  Coef.   se   Coef.   se   
Intercept .77 *** (.03)   .56 *** (.06)   
Education -.10 *** (.02)   -.09 *** (.02)   
Democratic Respondent (Democrat) -.55 *** (.05)   -.50 *** (.05)   
dD -.04   (.05)   .09   (.09)   
rR -.02   (.05)   .13   (.09)   
rD -.07   (.05)   .36 *** (.09)   
dR -.13 * (.05)   -.04   (.09)   
dD-Ex-NP -.06   (.05)   .18 † (.09)   
rR-Ex-NP -.05   (.05)   .19 * (.09)   
dR-Ex-NP -.03   (.05)   .06   (.10)   
rD-Ex-NP -.03   (.05)   .19 * (.08)   
DR-Pa-PN .00   (.05)   .12   (.10)   
RD-Pa-PN -.08 † (.05)   .42 *** (.08)   
DR-Ex-NN -.08 † (.05)   .09   (.10)   
Relative Accuracy of the Second Poll (Accuracy) .05 † (.03)   .39 *** (.09)   
dD X Democrat .04   (.08)   -.02   (.08)   
rR X Democrat .02   (.08)   -.03   (.08)   
rD X Democrat .11   (.08)   .07   (.08)   
dR X Democrat .22 ** (.08)   .18 * (.08)   
dD-Ex-NP X Democrat .08   (.07)   .02   (.07)   
rR-Ex-NP X Democrat .13 † (.08)   .07   (.08)   
dR-Ex-NP X Democrat -.03   (.08)   -.06   (.08)   
rD-Ex-NP X Democrat .07   (.08)   .02   (.08)   
DR-Pa-PN X Democrat -.01   (.08)   -.05   (.08)   
RD-Pa-PN X Democrat .18 * (.08)   .21 ** (.08)   
DR-Ex-NN X Democrat .04   (.08)   -.01   (.08)   
Democrat X Relative Accuracy                 
dD X Accuracy         -.21 † (.13)   
rR X Accuracy         -.25 † (.14)   
rD X Accuracy         -.76 *** (.13)   
dR X Accuracy         -.17   (.13)   
dD-Ex-NP X Accuracy         -.39 ** (.13)   
rR-Ex-NP X Accuracy         -.40 ** (.13)   
dR-Ex-NP X Accuracy         -.15   (.14)   
rD-Ex-NP X Accuracy         -.38 ** (.13)   
DR-Pa-PN X Accuracy         -.17   (.15)   
RD-Pa-PN X Accuracy         -1.10 *** (.14)   
DR-Ex-NN X Accuracy         -.28 † (.15)   
N  1882   1882    
R-square  .32   .36    
F-change from the previous model  -    F(11)=8.75***   
 F-change from the Baseline Model  -   -    
Notes. C1 (DR) is the baseline condition. For experimental conditions’ abbreviations, see the Table 1 in the 
manuscript. † denotes p lower than .10, * lower than .05, ** lower than .01, *** denotes p lower than .001. All tests 
are two-tailed.  
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